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The thesis examines court sentencing decisions in theft cases within the context of a 
proportionality-based sentencing framework. Whilst relatively little is known of the 
magistrates’ court and Crown Court interpretations of proportionality, such as the impact 
that various aggravating and mitigating factors may have on the sentencing decision, the 
thesis examines those factors (relating to both the offence and the offender) that appear to 
have the greatest impact on the sentencing decision. Additionally, it was accepted here that 
the courts may rely (to some extent) on a number of other sentencing justifications, 
particularly crime prevention through rehabilitation, deterrence and incapacitation.  
 
The thesis finds that only a small number of factors individually appear to affect the 
sentencing decision. In other cases, a number of factors work together to increase the 
seriousness of the offence and consequently inform the sentencing decision.  
 
The thesis also finds that whilst proportionality considerations may dominate the sentencing 
decisions in some cases, in others the courts appear to have high regard to the need to 
prevent crime, particularly where an offender has a demonstrated pattern of offending due 
to a drug addiction. Whilst in some cases these crime reduction aims may be used within the 
confines of proportionality, the courts’ desire to prevent crime may eclipse proportionality 











“The English Criminal trial, properly conducted, is one of the best products of our law, provided you walk out of 
court before the sentence is given.”1 
 
 
1.1 The Role of Sentencing 
 
Sentencing has been described as “arguably the most important area of the law”.2 It is the 
area in which the law inflicts upon the individual the greatest intrusion into his usual 
freedoms. It is the ultimate stage of the criminal process where justice can either be done or 
undone. Any perceived justice stemming from a conviction can be swiftly nullified by the 
imposition of an unjust sentence: a conviction in itself is of very little consequence unless 
followed by some form of punishment. But whether a sentence is just or not can only be 
determined if it is known why the sentence is justified.  
 
 
1.2 Justifications for Sentencing 
 
A sentence may be justified on any number of crime reduction grounds. By sentencing an 
offender, it may be hoped that he (or others) may be dissuaded from committing further 
crime, either through deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation. On the other hand, a 
                                                          
1 Jackson (1940),at 184 
2 M. Bagaric (2001), at 3 
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justification for punishment may not rest on idealised notions of crime reduction at all. 
Rather than using punishment as a means to an end, it may be a means in itself. Each of 





Deterrence seeks to control future conduct through fear of the consequences. In sentencing, 
the theory states that punishment is justified due to its crime preventive consequences, and 
the amount of punishment imposed should seek to deter the offender from committing 
further offences (special deterrence) and/or deter other potential offenders from entering a 
criminal lifestyle (general deterrence). Special deterrence would presumably escalate 
punishments for repeat offenders.3 For each reconviction, it would be reasoned that the 
previous sentence had failed to deter the offender, so a more punitive measure would be 
tried. The gravity of the offence may not factor largely in the determination of sentence; the 
offender’s perceived risk of reoffending would be a more central factor. 
 
Under general deterrence, a person may be sentenced disproportionately severely in order 
to deter others from committing similar acts.4 An objection to these exemplary sentences 
may be raised on the basis of the Kantian maxim that a person should be treated as an end 
and never as a means to an end.5 An offender is only responsible for his own actions and not 
for the actions of others; the fact that he has committed an offence does not justify using him 
as a vehicle to deter others.6 If others elect (or may elect) to offend, the original offender has 
                                                          
3 Ashworth (2010a), at 78 
4 Although it has claimed that punishment based on general deterrence is only ethically defensible if “the penalty is in 
reasonable proportion to the gravity of the offence…” Andanaes (1970), at 663. See also Tullock (1974), at 108. 
5 Kant (1991), at 140 
6 Even some deterrence proponents accept this objection as unavoidable. See for example, Ellis(2003), at 338 
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no control over this decision and so cannot be deemed responsible. If he is not responsible, 
he should not be punished for the crimes (or potential crimes) of others. 
 
For deterrence to work in practice, it relies on the infliction of certain and severe penalties. If 
an offender has only a slight chance of being apprehended (and subsequently punished) for 
his crime, the punishment, no matter how severe, may have little deterrent effect. Only if 
punishment is reasonably certain can it have a meaningfully deterrent impact. The 
punishment must also be adequately severe so as “to prove aversive”.7 The need for 
punishment to be both certain and severe thereby requires the cooperation of multiple 
criminal justice agencies. The severity of a punishment can be set by the courts, but they 
have no control over the certainty of apprehension and prosecution. 
 
A review of deterrence research carried out in 1999 demonstrated the unlikelihood of the 
severity of punishment affecting one’s criminality.8 One reason for this is the lack of 
certainty in punishment. It has been estimated that only two percent of offences result in a 
conviction.9 Many offences go undetected. Others are reported but are not followed up by 
the police, or proceedings are dropped at some point during the investigation. The use of 
diversionary powers to impose cautions and fixed penalty notices reduces the number of 
offences dealt with by the courts further still. There may, however, be evidence that the 
certainty of the imposition of some punishment does have a deterrent effect. During police 
strikes in Liverpool in 1919 and Melbourne in 1923, there was widespread crime and civil 
disobedience as, no doubt, people realised that there could be no legal consequences to their 
actions.10 
 
                                                          
7 Roberts & Ashworth (2009), at 40 
8 von Hirsch,  Bottoms, Burney & Wilkstrom (1999) 
9 Barclay & Taveres (1999) 
10 See Bagaric (2001), at 146 
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Deterrence fails to consider the point that offenders may cease their offending behaviour for 
any number of reasons. The offence may have been a one-off lapse of judgement, the 
offender may have no need to reoffend, or another opportunity to offend may not again 






Whereas deterrence seeks to reduce crime through the use of fearful consequences, 
incapacitation imposes restrictions on the offender to make them incapable of offending. 
Similarly to deterrence, incapacitation is based primarily on future conduct and calculating 
an individual’s risk of reoffending. Where a person demonstrates no future risk, protection 
of the public may be an unnecessary consideration, so incapacitation would not apply. 
Indeed, the application of incapacitation is usually confined to dangerous and persistent 
offenders.12 A number of penalties may have an incapacitative effect, but only capital 
punishment incapacitates absolutely.13 Whilst imprisonment eliminates an offender’s risk 
posed to the public, he remains a risk to other inmates and prison property. Nonetheless, 
incapacitation usually refers to an offender’s inability to offend within society. There may be 
very little to criticise the normative stance that persons likely to present a risk to the public 
should be restrained, particularly where the offender has a propensity toward seriously 
violent or sexual conduct.14 
 
                                                          
11 Ibid, at 141 
12 Ashworth (2010a), at 84 
13 Bagaric (2001), at 128 
14 Indeed, these have been separated from other types of offending by the English legislature. Section 2(2)(b) CJA 1991 
provided the courts with a power to impose a custodial sentence on an offender whose offence was violent or sexual in 




Perhaps the main objective toward incapacitation is the inability to accurately distinguish 
between those offenders who will reoffend and those who will not. There is a danger of 
identifying ‘false positives’; that is labelling a low-risk offender as high-risk.15 Any 
consequent punishment imposed which is aimed to incapacitate the offender is thereby 
undeserved and unnecessary.16 In predicting risk, “the predictor has to rely on correlations 
between the offenders’ currently observed characteristics and any subsequent criminal 
behaviour on their part.”17 Studies examining the accuracy of forecasting recidivism report a 
high rate of false positives, ranging from one true positive for every eight false positives, to 
one true for every two false positives.18 If this assertion is to be believed, the number of false 
positives always outweighs the number of true positives, which is clearly indicative of the 





Rehabilitation aims to reduce an offender’s propensity to reoffend by tackling those factors 
which contribute to his criminal conduct. The intended result is that crime is reduced as the 
offender no longer wants to offend. Perhaps the most obvious example of reformation is 
drug rehabilitation. Where an offender is propelled to offend due to a drug or alcohol 
dependency – as may be the case for many acquisitive crimes – his need to offend can be 
removed by eliminating the criminogenic need. Rehabilitation may be an equally desirable 
aim of sentencing for offenders with anger management issues or where the offender has a 
disregard for the impact his offending has on others. Rehabilitation may therefore aim to 
                                                          
15 von Hirsch (1976), chapter 3 
16 Ashworth (2010a), at 84 
17 von Hirsch (1976), at 22 
18 von Hirsch (1998a), at 100 
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change a circumstance surrounding the offender (e.g. a drug addiction) or may seek a 
change of attitude in the offender. 
 
There was an early scepticism surrounding rehabilitation as an appropriate sentencing goal. 
Following extensive research, Martinson found that no empirical study had established that 
any rehabilitation programmes had actually reduced reoffending.19 More recently, this 
scepticism has been softened somewhat following a demonstration that rehabilitation may 
be successful for some offenders in some circumstances.20 
 
Rehabilitation has been criticised for purportedly permitting grossly disproportionate 
penalties. An offender who has committed a relatively minor offence due to an ingrained 
drug addiction may require a prolonged period of treatment. However, utilitarians claim 
that in such cases rehabilitation may not be justified: “if the only way to reform an offender 
who steals a loaf of bread is to subject him to a prolonged period of treatment, then it is 
obvious that the ‘cure’ is worse than the ‘illness’, and would for that reason alone be 
rejected.”21 From a utilitarian’s point of view, this statement seems questionable for two 
reasons. Firstly, rehabilitation is a ‘forward looking’ aim of sentencing. It is primarily 
concerned not with what the offender has already done, but what he may do in the future. 
Ten’s statement fails to give any weight to the possible future conduct of his hypothetical 
bread thief and instead focuses on the minor current offence. Secondly, Ten effectively 
discounts persistent petty offenders from rehabilitation; a group who would no doubt 
constitute a large proportion of those entering treatment and other reformative programmes. 
 
                                                          
19 Martinson (1974), at 25 
20 Brody (1998), at 10 
21 Ten (1987), at 142 
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The effectiveness of rehabilitation is often measured in terms of reconviction rates. But, as 
Ashworth points out, there are significant deficiencies to this method.22 Firstly, not all crimes 
are reported. Many offenders may be wrongly thought to have been successfully reformed 
when, in reality, they continue to offend. Secondly, reconviction rates do not consider the 
frequency or seriousness of the reoffending. An offender may significantly reduce his 
offending, but would not be regarded as a successful rehabilitant even though real progress 





Deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation are all chiefly concerned with reducing 
reoffending. To that end, they are forward-looking justifications, focusing primarily on 
looking ahead to predict the level of risk posed by the offender (or in the case of general 
deterrence, the risk posed by other likeminded potential offenders). Desert, on the other 
hand, is a backward-looking theory. It is principally concerned with what the offender has 
done rather than what he may do in the future. Different desert theories have taken different 
approaches to explaining why punishment is justified. Michael Moore has claimed that 
persons guilty of criminal offences should be punished for the same reason as those who are 
guilty of civil wrongs should be ordered to pay damages. Not only does this justify the 
infliction of state punishment, but it places society under a duty to punish.23 An alternative 
justification for the infliction of punishment was adopted by John Finnis,24 Michael Davis25 
and the earlier writings by Andrew von Hirsch,26 based on an ‘unfair advantage’. The theory 
                                                          
22 Ashworth (2009a), at 4 
23 Moore (2009), at 110 
24 Finnis (1980), at 263-264 
25 Davis (1983) 
26 von Hirsch (1976), at 48-49 
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states that by committing an offence, the offender gains an unfair advantage over the law-
abiding majority which the infliction of punishment would cancel out, thereby restoring the 
social equilibrium. Andrew von Hirsch, the leading proponent of desert, subsequently 
distanced himself from the ‘unfair advantage’ approach and now claims that offenders 
deserve to be censured for their wrongdoing. Punishment conveys the disapprobation of the 
offending behaviour, for which the offender should be censured.27 
 
Perhaps more central to the desert theory is the question of how much punishment should 
be inflicted on an offender; a point on which desert theorists are more likely to agree. 
Whereas the forward-looking theories may allow lengthy sentences for relatively minor 
offences where such a penalty can be justified on grounds of crime reduction, desert only 
holds the offender accountable for his own actions and only his own actions should be used 
to determine the severity of the sentence. The severity of the sentence imposed should 
therefore reflect the seriousness of the offence; the more serious the crime, the greater the 
punishment that ought to be imposed. This approach obviously requires some method of 
measuring crime seriousness and sentence severity, which will be considered in chapter two.  
 
 
1.2.5 Primary Justification for Sentencing 
 
In the interests of consistency and fairness, a penal system must adopt a justification for 
sentencing. Quite how this justification is offered is a matter of judgement.28 Failure to 
provide a justification would lead to decisions being made not on principle, but on the 
sentencer’s own intuitions, which may not correspond with those of others. Indeed, even 
                                                          
27 von Hirsch (1993) 
28 Andrew Ashworth highlights a number of methods used to import principle into sentencing, including judicial self-
regulation, sentencing guidelines, and statutory regulation. See Ashworth (2009b). 
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where a justification is offered, intuition may still play a role in the determination of 
sentence. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 now offers five purposes of sentencing; punishment, 
reduction of crime through deterrence, rehabilitation, public protection and reparation.29 No 
primary rationale is offered. Sentencers must consider each of the rationales listed and then 
select one to give priority to.30 However, other provisions in the 2003 Act highlight the 
importance of desert, and it is this that the Sentencing Guidelines Council later adopted as 
the focus of its guidelines. 
 
 
1.3 The Aims of the Study 
 
The overarching aim of the study is to assess the ways in which the courts construct 
proportionality in theft cases and to assess the extent to which the courts adopt other 
sentencing philosophies which may or may not be consistent with proportionality. 
Following this, the research moved to consider the extent to which there is evidence of the 
courts applying a consistent sentencing approach that is in line with the relevant principles 
and policies in cases of theft. 
 
The study focuses on proportionality because this formed the basis of the framework 
contained within the Criminal Justice Act 1991. Subsequently, although the 2003 Act 
purported to move away from proportionality somewhat by also referring to crime 
reduction aims, the guidelines emanating from the Sentencing Guidelines Council have 
focused almost entirely on the proportionality principle by guiding all sentencing courts to 
                                                          
29 Section 142(1) CJA 2003 
30 Ashworth (2010a), at 78 
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“start by considering the seriousness of the offence”31 and by basing its sentence starting-
points and ranges on the gravity of the offence. 
 
 
1.4 Why Study Theft? 
 
Until recently little attention has been paid to the sentencing of offenders convicted for 
theft,32 a somewhat surprising fact considering the large number of offenders convicted and 
sentenced for the offence.33  Although there are examples of serious thefts (for example high 
value, sophisticated offending in breach of trust), theft often lies at the lower end of the 
offence-seriousness scale, almost certainly below many of the offences against the person 
(where the physical harm caused is likely to be considered more serious) and does not rank 
as highly as some other property offences, a number of which might amount to aggravated 
forms of theft (such as robbery). That is not to say that the offence is not serious. The broad 
scope of the offence means that on occasions an offender may be charged and subsequently 
convicted for theft where his actions fall just short of what is often considered a much more 
serious offence, such as robbery. Furthermore, as part of the offence’s mens rea, a 
consequence of being convicted for theft attaches to the offender a label of dishonesty, which 
may in itself carry with it a certain stigma, whilst also adversely affecting areas of the 
offender’s life, chiefly employability.  
 
                                                          
31 Sentencing Guidelines Council (2004a) para 1.3 
32 During the latter part of 2006, the Sentencing Guidelines Council published two related consultation papers; Theft from a 
Shop and Theft and Dishonesty. The Court of Appeal also considered the matter in its guideline judgment R v Page, Maher 
and Stewart [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 37.  
33 See for example Ministry of Justice (2010b) 
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Cases of theft rarely reach the Court of Appeal or beyond, thereby limiting the number of 
reported cases, and research studies on the subject are rarer still.34 Yet sentencing for theft 
offences raises a greater number of issues and questions for the sentencing court to consider 
than would be apparent in more serious cases where, perhaps, custodial sentences may be 
largely inevitable. Where the courts are dealing with serious forms of violent or sexual 
conduct, the court may not need to consider the suitability of the various community 
sentences, less still financial penalties and discharges. Similarly, with more minor non-
imprisonable offending, the courts do not have to consider all options since, by their very 
nature, custody is not available to the courts when dealing with such offences. 
 
Theft, on the other hand, sits somewhere between these poles. For some forms of the offence, 
the courts would no doubt consider imposing a custodial sentence. For other thefts, the 
offence may require no greater intervention than a mere discharge. In short, sentences for 
theft may feature the entire range of penalty types, from discharges through to custody. 
 
Although theft may be most commonly committed by offenders of a particular age, gender 
and ethnicity, the offence may be (and is) committed by a broad range of types of offender, 
as demonstrated in Chapter Six. Other offences may only be committed by a subgroup of 
offenders: buggery and indecency between males both may only be committed by males, 
and may be most commonly committed by adults rather than young offenders. Such 
offences do not, therefore, raise issues concerning equality, the sentencing of women and the 
relevance of the offender’s age, all of which may need to be considered when sentencing for 
theft. 
 
                                                          
34 Though see exceptionally, Speed & Burrows (2006), a study conducted on behalf of the Sentencing Advisory Panel. The 
study was limited to consideration only of theft from shops and did not offer an analysis in relation to sentencing 
philosophy. The study is discussed further in Chapter Three. 
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It is worthwhile taking time to briefly examine the nature of the research and to explain its 
significance. One research study has previously been completed on sentencing practice in 
theft cases,35 which had been announced a few months after work for this project 
commenced. The earlier work offered a statistical representation of sentencing trends in 
shoplifting cases. The present study, on the other hand, is not limited to consider only retail 
theft. Rather it embraces any subcategory of the offence falling within section 1 of the Theft 
Act 1968. The earlier work did not have as its purpose to offer an analysis of the trends 
within a theoretical context. This project considers sentencing practices and principles 
within a proportionality-based theoretical context. This study consequently becomes the first 
to combine theoretical and empirical elements specifically to sentencing for theft. 
 
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter Two introduces the principles of proportionate sentencing. It considers the theory 
of just deserts, and how proportionality has been adopted by the English sentencing 
framework under the Criminal Justice Acts of 1991 and 2003. Chapter Three builds upon 
Chapter Two by detailing the sentencing principles and practices particular to theft. This 
includes the courts’ sentencing powers, sentencing guidelines and guidance on mode of trial 
and committal to the Crown Court.  
 
Chapter Four discusses the quantitative and qualitative methods employed to collect and 
analyse the empirical data for this study.  
 
                                                          
35 Speed & Burrows (2006) 
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Chapter Five is the first of three analysis chapters; it examines the offence related factors and 
procedural issues which impact on the sentencing decision. The main focus of the thesis is 
on the sentence type imposed, rather than the length or quanta. Since 1991, English law has 
worked with a sentence hierarchy, with all custodial sentences being deemed to be more 
severe disposals than any non-custodial measures. Similarly, all community-based sentences 
are more severe than all fines and discharges, whilst also being less punitive than a custodial 
sentence. Extending the previous chapter beyond factors relating to the offence, Chapter Six 
deals with the factors and characteristics of the offender which appear to affect the sentence 
outcome. Chapter Seven offers an analysis of a series of interviews with judges, magistrates, 
and probation officers conducted for this project. 
 
Chapter Eight draws together the previous three chapters by offering a theoretical 
explanation of sentencing practice in theft cases. More specifically, it identifies the extent to 
which the courts appear to uphold the principles of proportionality, the role played by other 
sentencing justifications and the extent to which these may sacrifice the courts application of 
proportionate sentencing.  
 
Finally, Chapter Nine concludes the thesis by highlighting the implications of the study’s 



















In England and Wales, sentencing discretion is controlled through legislation and guidelines 
which seek to promote a consistent principled approach, although not necessarily as clearly 
as it may have been hoped. 1991 saw the government implement the first piece of legislation 
aimed at introducing a principled approach to sentencing. The Criminal Justice Act 1991 was 
centred on notions of proportionality, requiring the severity of the sentence imposed to 
reflect the seriousness of the crime. This endeavour for proportionality has continued, albeit 
somewhat diluted by various provisions pertaining to crime reduction, through to the 
current legislation, the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
 
This chapter will discuss the role played by proportionality within the English sentencing 
framework, along with some discussion concerning general desert theory which informs the 







2.2 Measuring Proportionality 
 
Here it shall be assumed that there exists a valid justification for inflicting punishment on 
those guilty of committing criminal offences. The issue for consideration therefore turns to 
determining the amount of punishment to inflict. This raises the main distinguishing feature 
of proportionality:1 that the severity of the punishment imposed should be commensurate 
with the seriousness of the offence. The principle is based upon a notion of fairness, made 
apparent by the assertions that only persons found to have breached the criminal law 
deserve to be punished, and the amount of punishment deserved should reflect the 
seriousness of the offence. During the resurgence of the theory, von Hirsch, probably the 
most notable living desert theorist, claimed that serious wrongs deserve severe punishment, 
whereas lesser wrongs warrant less severe penalties.2 
 
Through intuition, it is possible to recognise a grossly disproportionate sentence which 
could be imposed for a given offence.3 Such a sanction may be disproportionately severe or 
disproportionately lenient. These sanctions may be easily recognised as grossly 
disproportionate since they are so far removed from what could intuitively be deemed 
proportionate. If a penal system were to embrace proportionality as only a limiting 
principle,4 this intuition alone may be sufficient. However, if a sentencing framework is to 
adopt the notion of proportionality as a principle for determining the sentence, some more 
precise method of measuring the seriousness of an offence and the severity of a sentence 
                                                          
1 According to Ashworth (2009c), at 104 
2 von Hirsch (1976), at 66 
3 One’s perceptions of what constitutes a proportionate sentence to a given crime will also be influenced by culture. 
Responses such as amputation and flagellation may be deemed appropriate for certain crimes in the Middle-East, but may 
not receive the same level of support in Western Europe. 
4 See Morris (1981); Morris (1974), at 73-77, where it is suggested that the concept of desert should be used only to set the 
upper and lower limits of desert, thereby identifying what is not disproportionate, rather than identifying more precisely 
what is proportionate. For a critique of this concept of limiting retributivism, see von Hirsch (1985), chapter 4  
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must be formulated.5 The most plausible approaches to addressing these requirements will 
now be addressed.  
 
 
2.2.1 Offence Seriousness 
 
One problem concerning proportionality has been the subjective meanings attached to 
‘seriousness’; some may judge the term in relation to the amount (or type) of harm caused or 
risked to the victim, whereas others may define seriousness in moral terms:6 stealing £10 
from a charity donation box may be considered more serious by some than stealing the same 
amount from (say) an insurance firm, even though the loss suffered is the same for each. 
During the infancy of modern desert theories, Andrew von Hirsch suggested that offence 
seriousness should be calculated by reference to “the harm caused (or risked) by the act and 
on the degree of the actor’s culpability”.7 This general  premise has been accepted by many,8 
although there has been less consensus regarding how to calculate both harm and 
culpability, and whether they should carry equal weighting or whether one ought to be 
considered more important than the other. The premise that seriousness is a composite of 
harm and culpability has more recently been accepted by the English legislature and can 
now be found in section 143(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003: 
In considering the seriousness of any offence, the court must consider the offender’s culpability in 
committing the offence and any harm which the offence caused, was intended to cause or might 
foreseeably have caused.9 
 
                                                          
5 For a critique, see Walker (1991), who disputes the viability of these scales: “fitting together two scales whose rungs are 
as loose and interchangeable as this is not as simple as the proportionalists make out.” At page 102 
6 Walker (1978), at 360 
7 Von Hirsch (1976) at 69 
8 Including adoption by the SGC. SGC (2004a) 
9 According to Michael Davis, an offender who risks or intends, but does not cause, harm still deserves punishment for his 
attempted offence because of the risk of harm he has taken, which a law-abiding person would not take. At the same time, 
an inchoate offence deserves less punishment than a complete offence because risking harm is not taking as great an 
advantage as causing harm. “To attempt murder...is not worth as much [punishment] as to succeed at it. The successful 
murderer has the advantage of having done what he set out to do. The would-be murderer whose attempt failed has only 
had the chance to do what he set out to do. The difference is substantial.” See M. Davis (1992), at 116 
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The 2003 Act does not consider the individual importance of either harm or culpability, or 
even what the terms mean, leaving considerable scope for subjective interpretation. There is 
little doubt that one would rule a particularly heinous sexual offence as more serious than a 
‘petty’ shoplifting offence,10 but how much more serious is it? Also, when comparing two 
particularly emotive crimes, such as rape and murder, or when comparing variations of the 
same offence (e.g. murdering a child compared with murdering an elderly person) there 
may be less chance of achieving an overall principled consensus as to which is the most 
severe, or indeed by how much more severe one is than the other.11  
 
Harm and culpability are each compounds of numerous offence factors to be considered.  
The number of victims, offending against particularly vulnerable victims, repeat offending 
against the same victim, offending in the presence of children, the value of the property 
stolen, and the use or threat of force, are all factors affecting the harm caused by the offence.  
An offender’s moral culpability will be affected by, for example, offending whilst on bail or 
on licence, abusing a position of trust, committing an offence motivated by hostility towards 
the victim’s race, disability or sexual orientation, the offender’s previous criminal record,12 
the level of planning of the offence, the offender’s age, and the fact that the offender played 





                                                          
10 Although see Sparks, Genn & Dodd, (1977), where citizens were asked to assess the relative seriousness of numerous 
offences, the sale of marijuana to a 15-year old received a higher average score than rape, although the authors remarked 
that this might have “resulted from a general ignorance among our sample as to the nature of marijuana.” (at page 185) 
11 For discussion on varying perspectives on the severity of fatal offences, see Mitchell (1998) 
12 J. V. Roberts claims that the presence of previous record enhances the offender’s culpability. See Roberts, (2008a), and 
section 2.4.1 below. 






An early attempt to calculate harm (known as the ‘welfare interest’ analysis) was put 
forward by Joel Feinberg who suggested that harms should be compared in light of the 
extent to which they infringe a person’s choices.14 Many violent offences, for example, 
would be seen as particularly harmful because a person’s choices may be significantly 
curtailed following serious physical injury. This approach was later criticised as being 
“somewhat artificial”.15 Von Hirsch accepted that a significant physical injury would 
interfere with one’s choices, but this does not explain why our interest in avoiding such 
injury is so important.16 Rather, von Hirsch proposed, it would be more logical to judge our 
interest in avoiding pain through how such pain would affect the quality of one’s life. This 
led to perhaps the most widely accepted account of how to gauge harm: the ‘living-
standard’ analysis.17 
 
The term ‘living-standard’ refers to the quality of a person’s existence.18 It focuses not on 
“actual life quality or goal achievement, but on the means or capabilities for achieving a 
certain quality of life. It is standardised by referring to the means and capabilities that would 
ordinarily help one achieve a good life.”19 Since it is standardised, the living-standard does 
not have the added complexity of ruling what, say, a wealthy, professional person needs to 
maintain a good life compared with what a less affluent person may require. The primary 
advantage in using the living-standard as a means of gauging harm is that it fits in well with 
the way harms are usually judged:20 no doubt most would view a serious, violent attack on a 
                                                          
14 Feinberg (1984) 
15 von Hirsch (1993) at 30 
16 Ibid. 
17 Comprehensively considered in von Hirsch & Jareborg, (1991); see also von Hirsch (1993) chapter 4  and von Hirsch  
(1998b) at pages 185-190 
18 von Hirsch & Jareborg, (1991), at 10 
19 Ibid 
20 von Hirsch (1998b), at 186 
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person which leaves the victim paralysed as more serious than theft of a vehicle because the 
former has a greater adverse effect on the victim’s quality of life than the latter. 
 
In order to produce a workable model, harms need to be categorised. Von Hirsch and 
Jareborg suggest that most identifiable harms fall into one of four types: (1) physical 
integrity, (2) material support and amenity, (3) freedom from humiliation, and (4) privacy.21 
Each of these is then split into four grades reflecting the level of harm: (1) subsistence, (2) 
minimal well-being, (3) adequate well-being, and (4) enhanced well-being.22 Subsistence 
refers to a person’s survival, and as such constitutes the highest level of harm. The 
remaining three levels refer to varying degrees of life quality beyond mere survival. By way 
of example, homicide would clearly destroy a person’s subsistence (level one) and would 
therefore be classed as the most serious harm. Conversely, stealing an apple from a person’s 
orchard would cause little, if any, harm and would therefore fall under level four (or below 
since such harm may not even qualify as infringing a person’s ‘enhanced well-being’ and 
may not justify criminalisation). 
 
To demonstrate how the living standard would work in practice, von Hirsch and Jareborg 
consider an example of residential burglary where the offender breaks into the victim’s 
house while the victim is away and steals a television set.23 Firstly, two different categories 
of harm have been breached; material support and amenity, and privacy. The material loss 
consists of the loss of the television and the inconvenience and consequent loss of having the 
locks repaired. The privacy-intrusion consists of the unauthorised entry into the house. 
Secondly, both these categories of harm must be rated: a replacement television can be 
purchased at a modest cost, so the impact on the person’s living-standard is not particularly 
                                                          
21 von Hirsch & Jareborg, (1991), at  19 
22 Ibid, at page 17 
23 Ibid, at page 20 
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great, especially if the victim is insured against such loss (although this should not mitigate 
the seriousness of the offence). However, the rating may well be higher for the breach of 
privacy, though not significantly higher as the victim’s feelings that their privacy has been 
invaded are finite, and usually diminish with time.24  Where more than one incident of harm 
is caused it is necessary to combine the two harm ratings together to form the overall harm 
rating. For composite offences involving more than one type of harm, or for multiple 
offences involving several counts of the same harm, it seemed only logical to assume that 
the harm ratings for each element should be aggregated to create the total harm rating. 
Following a public survey, Wagner and Pease found that this ‘additivity’ assumption was 
incorrect.25 The authors had asked respondents to judge whether the commission of two 
counts of a specified offence was twice as serious as only one court of the same offence. Only 
18 percent of respondents believed that two offences were exactly twice as serious as a single 
offence, evidence that ‘additivity’ only held for a minority of the respondents.26 This finding 
led Wagner and Pease to conclude that “the combination of judgements of offences is far 
more complex than the [additivity] assumption would imply.”27 
 
Although the living standard model identifies types and levels of harm, it does not offer a 
calculable measurement of harm, or any analysis of the interrelationship between the types 
and levels of harm: how much more serious is a harm affecting one’s minimum well-being 
compared to adequate well-being? The authors offer no answer to this. 
 
 
                                                          
24 See Maguire & Bennett (1982) where the authors confirm that “about one-quarter of those who actually become victims 
are, temporarily at least, badly shaken by the experience.” Moreover, a small minority…suffer long-lasting effects including 
fear, sleeplessness and a deep distrust in others.” (at pages 164-5)  Therefore, a large majority of victims do not suffer from 
such long-term effects following a residential burglary, though no doubt they do suffer from some short-term effects.  The 
same may not be true of offences such as rape, where the victim is more likely to suffer long-term or perhaps permanently.   
25 Wagner and Pease, (1978), at 178 
26 Ibid, page 177 





The issue of culpability is, prima facie, less troublesome than that of harm. The substantive 
criminal law in most jurisdictions (including England and Wales) already distinguishes 
various forms of mens rea including intention, recklessness and negligence, along with a 
variety of excuses and justifications such as self-defence, crime prevention and provocation. 
An offender’s culpability will be assessed, as least in part, by his mens rea coupled with any 
recognised excuse or justification he has for committing the offence. This will affect the 
seriousness of the offence. It should be possible to reflect these distinctions in a sentencing 
framework, so as to take account of an offender’s mens rea (along with any defence) when 
calculating culpability. That is not to say that producing a scale on the basis of an offender’s 
culpability would be a trouble-free task: there would still be considerable work to be done in 
calculating how much worse, say, intention is compared to recklessness.28  It would also be 
necessary to consider the importance to be attached to any apparent defence, justification or 
excuse the offender might have which led to the offence being committed.29 The importance 
of any defence will depend initially on whether it reduces or extinguishes liability 
completely. A complete defence will absolve the defendant of any criminal liability, 
notwithstanding any mens rea on the defendant’s part, whereas a partial defence will 
merely diminish the defendant’s blameworthiness, either leading to a reduction in sentence 
or a conviction for a lesser offence, which may also carry a lesser penalty.30 The task would 
be further aggravated by the need to look at an offender’s culpability in conjunction with the 
harm caused or risked. 
                                                          
28 But culpability must be measured in reference to the harm caused: a reckless killing would be considered more serious 
than an intentional theft due to the former involving greater harm, notwithstanding the fact that the offender culpability in 
the latter is greater. See further section 2.2.1.3 below 
29 Gardner suggests that culpability (or blameworthiness) has a four-part formula. To be culpable, an offender must (a) 
have committed a prohibited act and (b) have been responsible for committing it, whilst lacking any (c) justification or (d) 
excuse for having done it. See Gardner (1998) at page 43. 
30 For example, s.2 of the Homicide Act 1957 which introduced ‘diminished responsibility’ as a partial defence to murder, 
entitling the defendant to be convicted of the lesser offence of manslaughter. Unlike murder, manslaughter does not carry 
mandatory life imprisonment. 
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2.2.1.3 Combining harm and culpability 
 
The assessment of offence seriousness requires a consideration of the relationship between 
harm and culpability. The two are not completely separable: “the extent of someone’s 
culpability for an action is [not] independent of the particular substance of that action.”31 
Since one does not deserve conviction or blame for committing a ‘good’ act,32 culpability 
relies on the presence of harm in order for the act to be deemed criminal. Similarly, a person 
who accidentally causes harm, and who therefore cannot be considered morally culpable, 
does not generally commit an offence.33 What is clear from this is that both harm and 
culpability are usually required for a criminal act to have been committed. What is less clear 
is the individual weighting which ought to be given to both harm and culpability. This can 
be particularly troublesome where an offence involves low-level harm but a high level of 
culpability, or vice versa.  
 
A considerable number of public surveys on the perceived seriousness of crimes have been 
conducted over the last six decades,34 although there are inherent dangers with undertaking 
such studies. Richard Sparks suggested that the seriousness of an offence depends not on 
people’s perception of the harm, but on the actual (or risked) harm.35 To the extent that 
respondents may overestimate or underestimate the harm caused or risked, public 
perceptions of seriousness will fail to provide a reliable basis for rating the gravity of 
offences.36 Respondents may not fully understand the offences they are being asked to 
                                                          
31 A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith (1996), at 13 
32 Ibid 
33 Unless the offence committed is recognised as a ‘strict liability’ offence thereby requiring little or no fault on the 
offender’s part. 
34 The first such study was Sellin & Wolfgang (1964), although this was limited to consider offending by juveniles. 




rank.37 Furthermore, opinion surveys on crime seriousness often fail to provide sufficiently 
comprehensive offence descriptors, leaving the respondents to question the full 
circumstances surrounding the offence and interpret the facts differently to one another, 
which may have an effect on the perception of seriousness. Monica Walker’s study 
attempted, to an extent, to avoid this problem by providing short offence descriptions 
(rather than merely listing the names of offences and asking respondents to rank them).38 
However, Walker’s descriptions did not express the level of planning, the offender’s motive, 
or (in property crimes) whether the property was recovered. Each of these issues could have 
a bearing on the perception of seriousness. By failing to address them, there is a real 
possibility that different respondents could view the offences in different ways.39 
 
Walker’s study asked respondents to gauge the seriousness of 11 criminal offences (a control 
offence, and pairs of burglaries, shopliftings, frauds, income tax evasions, and violent 
offences). For each pair of offences involving money (i.e. not the control offence or the 
violent offences), the facts presented to the respondents were the same, save for the amount 
of money involved: one burglary, shoplifting, fraud and tax evasion involved sums of £100, 
the other involved only £1. The study used three methods: paired comparisons whereby 
respondents were asked to identify the most serious offence from a pair, a category scale 
where the respondents were required to rank each offence in order of perceived seriousness 
(from 1 – 11), and a magnitude scale where each offence was scored in relation to the control 
offence, which was assigned a score of 10. Walker found that, regardless of which method 
was adopted, the mean ranking of offences was generally the same. Using the mean score, 
                                                          
37 In a survey conducted by Sparks, Genn and Dodd, the sale of marijuana to a 15 year old received a higher mean 
seriousness score than rape, due perhaps to “a general ignorance amongst our sample as to the nature of marijuana.” 
Sparks, Genn & Dodd (1977), at 185 
38 Walker (1978)  
39 Ashworth (2005) at 104 
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the more serious of the two violent offences40 was always the most serious of the 11 offences 
offered. The least serious offence was the income tax evasion involving £1.41 The study 
found that the type of harm is not the only factor in determining the seriousness of an 
offence; respondents also appeared to consider the amount of harm caused. Consequently, 
the more serious examples of shoplifting42 and fraud,43 both involving economic losses of 
£100, ranked higher in seriousness than the less-serious of the two violent offences.44 
 
When comparing each of the more serious examples of the monetary offence with its 
corresponding less serious example (i.e. to compare the seriousness of the £100 shoplifting 
and the £1 shoplifting), Walker found that the difference in the perceived seriousness of 
stealing £100 from a shop compared with stealing £1 from a shop was greater than the 
difference in the perceived seriousness of stealing £100 during a burglary compared with 
stealing only £1 in the course of a burglary.45 This suggests that the value of the property 
stolen during the course of a burglary is less important than the value of the property in a 
shoplifting. As a composite offence, burglary may involve theft whilst trespassing; the 
trespass may assume a greater role in determining the seriousness of the offence. 
 
As previously mentioned, public opinion surveys on the seriousness of crimes often fail to 
provide adequate offence descriptions to offer the respondents sufficient information to 
inform their scoring. Even those studies where a brief scenario is provided for each 
                                                          
40 “A man comes home from work and finds his wife has been gossiping with the neighbours all day; the house is a mess 
and his meal is not cooked. He attacks her with a knife and she needs three stitches in her arm.” The less serious violent 
offence involved a lesser degree of harm: “A man comes home from work and finds his wife has been gossiping with the 
neighbours all day; the house is a mess and his meal is not cooked. He hits her on the arm and face and bruises her.” 
41 “A man does some work in his spare time and earns money above his normal income. He does not report this to the 
income tax inspector and thus avoids paying £1 in tax.” 
42 “A man goes into a department store and deliberately comes out with goods worth £100 for which he has not paid.” 
43 “A man is in charge of the funds of a club to which he belongs. He steals £100 of the money and alters the books.” 
44 “A man comes home from work and finds his wife has been gossiping with the neighbours all day; the house is a mess 
and his meal is not cooked. He hits her on the arm and face and bruises her.” 
45 Walker (1978) 
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offence,46 the mental element of the crime usually goes unaddressed. Leslie Sebba’s study, 
however, was designed to examine the relevance of the mental element to the perceived 
seriousness of an offence.47 As hypothesised, he found that the mental element was relevant 
to the perception of seriousness. An intended result was considered more serious than 
recklessness, which itself scored higher on the seriousness scale than negligence.48 Sebba’s 
study demonstrated the importance of both culpability and harm in the determination of 
offence seriousness, reiterating the fact that the two are interlinked and may be equally 
relevant to measuring the seriousness of crime. 
 
 
2.2.2 Sentence Severity 
 
In order to establish whether a sentence is proportionate, having assessed the seriousness of 
the offence, it is necessary to gauge the severity of a punishment. Comparing custodial 
sentences with one another is prima facie straightforward: the comparison can be drawn by 
reference to the duration of the prison terms49 (although differing prison conditions and the 
variations in prisoners’ reactions to being imprisoned may also relevant). Clearly, six 
months’ imprisonment is less severe than one year imprisonment if both terms were to be 
served in the same prison, under the same conditions. However, the living conditions may 
vary between different institutions, rendering a longer period of imprisonment in a more 
humane institution as comparable to a shorter term in a facility with less favourable 
conditions.50 The circumstances of the offender may also be relevant to the determination of 
sentence severity: a 70-year-old is assumed to endure greater hardship during one year’ 
                                                          
46 See, for example Ibid. 
47 Sebba (1980)  
48 Ibid, at page 129-130 




imprisonment than a 30-year-old.51 The comparative severity of financial penalties may also 
be straightforward. A £5,000 fine is considerably more severe than a £50 fine when imposed 
on the same offender. But the severity of a fine relies heavily on an individual’s financial 
circumstances. A £1,000 fine levied against a wealthy offender may be significantly less 
severe than a £100 fine imposed on an impoverished offender.  
 
The real difficulty in assessing severity of penalties lies in comparing an intense non-
custodial sentence with a short term of imprisonment, or comparing the same penalty when 
imposed on different offenders. Mara Schiff claimed that different sanctions can be 
compared on a single scale “by breaking different punishments into individual…elements” 
thereby facilitating the comparison of “seemingly dissimilar incarcerative and 
nonincarcerative punishments…using equivalent measurement standards” such as 
deprivation of liberty through restrictions on physical mobility and supervisory control.52 
 
 
2.2.2.1 Comparing Custodial with Non-Custodial Sentences 
 
Morris and Tonry use proportionality only as a limiting principle. Rather than determining 
the sentence, proportionality should be used to identify and disregard any disproportionate 
sentence. According to Morris and Tonry, a sentence should not only be proportionate (or 
rather not disproportionate) but should also be appropriate given the individual offender’s 
circumstances and available resources.53 Consequently, two offenders convicted of the same 
offence, and sharing similar criminal histories, need not be given the same sentence: one 
may be particularly susceptible to treatment in the community, whereas for the other, a 
                                                          
51 Morris & Tonry (1991), at 95 
52 Schiff (1997), at 201 
53 Morris & Tonry (1991), at 43-4 
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community sentence may be anticipated to be entirely ineffective. As their scheme 
envisaged highly individualised sentences,54 Morris and Tonry emphasised the need for a 
sentencing system to include interchangeable punishments, particularly when dealing with 
offences within the middle range of seriousness where custody may be available as a 
disposal option but is not axiomatic.55 In such cases, non-custodial sentences of comparable 
severity could be imposed in view of the circumstances of the individual case. To facilitate 
this, they proposed a scheme whereby punishments are rated according to severity units;56 a 
short custodial sentence could be rated as severely (and thereby assigned the same number 
of severity units) as a longer period of probation, thereby allowing the two to be used 
interchangeably to select which is most appropriate in a particular case.57 Some sentence 
types may not be interchangeable. The differences in deprivations imposed by, for example, 
prison and a discharge may be so stark that they could never lead themselves to 
interchangeability, no matter how lengthy the discharge and how short the prison sentence.   
 
Various studies have attempted to measure sanction severity through opinion surveys. As 
with public surveys on crime seriousness, there are potential dangers involved with 
undertaking such studies. Responses given by members of the public must be treated with 
caution as the respondents may lack an accurate understanding of the precise nature of 
various penalties. Even where studies specifically target respondents with knowledge of 
different sanctions, those who have experience of serving custodial sentences are likely to 
perceive imprisonment as less severe than those who work within the criminal justice 
system who have not themselves experienced incarceration.58 Compounding the subjective 
                                                          
54 “In sentencing, no generic man stands before the court, but countless individuals do. We think it axiomatic that 
questions of fairness and justice in criminal punishment must be weighed in individual terms”, Ibid, at 94 
55 Ibid, at 77 
56 Ibid, at 74 
57 For a critique of Morris and Tonry’s scheme, see von Hirsch (1993) page 65-68 
58  Moore, May & Wood (2008) 
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nature of perceptions of sentence severity, the inmates’ characteristics (including gender) 
may also affect the perceived severity.59 
 
Petersilia and Piper-Deschenes’ American study asked male inmates about their perceptions 
surrounding various custodial and non-custodial sanctions.60 The results showed that the 
inmates believed a small fine ($100) was the least severe penalty of those listed, whilst a 
lengthy prison term (five years) was the most severe. More surprisingly perhaps, the 
respondents favoured a six-month jail term over a $5,000 fine, though clearly, that is not to 
say the general public would hold the same views. The findings may have been distorted by 
the nature of the respondents. Since the respondents were all inmates, it is doubtful that they 
would have a reasonable, stable income. As a result, their views on monetary fines would be 
affected due to their (potential) lesser earning capacity. Secondly, since the respondents had 
all experienced imprisonment, they may view the experience in a different light compared to 
members of the general public. Those with no first-hand experience of the criminal justice 
system are more likely to fear the ordeal of imprisonment, whereas those who have 
experience of incarceration know what to expect and, perhaps, how to cope in custody.  
 
The respondents of a further American study61 were asked to rank the severity of various 
penalties, in comparison with a one-year jail term which was represented as 100 points on 
the severity scale. Respondents then assigned a number to each penalty, relative to 100 for 
one year in jail. The study led to four significant conclusions. Firstly, and similar to Petersilia 
and Piper-Deschenes’ study,62 custodial sentences were not always considered to be the 
most severe penalty: a lengthy period of probation was thought to be more severe than a 
                                                          
59 One study found that female inmates rated non-custodial penalties as less punitive than their male counterparts. See 
Wood & Graswick (1999)  
60 Petersilia & Piper-Deschenes (1994). The penalties listed were fines ($100, $1,000 and $5,000), probation (one, three 
and five years), intensive probation (one, three and five years), jail (three months, six months and one year), and 
imprisonment (one, three and five years).  
61 Erickson & Gibbs (1979) 
62 See above 
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short period of incarceration.63 Secondly, the perceived severity of a penalty appeared to be 
based on the type and the length of the penalty: the length of the penalty in itself was not of 
paramount importance64 but, as mentioned above, a sufficiently lengthy non-custodial 
sentence could be more severe than a short term of imprisonment suggesting that the type of 
penalty is not always the most important factor in determining severity. Thirdly, the study 
found a non-linear relationship between the severity of different sanctions: the difference 
between one and five years (of any type of penalty, be it prison, jail, or probation) was 
greater than the difference between ten and fifteen years, even though the time span is the 
same.65 Finally, using log transform models, the study was able to calculate the perceived 
severity of sentence lengths beyond those scored by the study’s respondents. Consequently, 
the study found that one year in county jail (scoring 100 points) was equal to six months’ in 
prison, 7.8 years on probation and a $2,922 fine,66 which helps to understand the 
interrelationship of various penalty types and the potential interchangeability of these. 
 
A number of other studies have also found that a lengthy non-custodial option could be 
perceived as more punitive than a period of imprisonment. A study undertaken by Sebba 
and Nathan, which asked four groups of respondents (police officers, prisoners, probation 
officers and students) to rank 36 penalties according to their perceived severity, found that 
generally imprisonment was viewed as more severe than non-custodial penalties, with 
terms becoming increasingly severe as the length of term rose.67 However, large fines and 
lengthy periods on probation were also perceived as severe, with a $50,000 fine achieving an 
equivalent rating of between five and seven years’ imprisonment, and 10 years on probation 
ranking between 12 and 18 months’ imprisonment. For prison sentences of less than 12 
                                                          
63 Ten years’ probation was given an average score of 116 points, compared with one year in jail which was assigned 100 
points. See Erickson & Gibbs (1979), at 109 
64 One year in prison scored 164 points, compared with only 28 points for one year on probation. 
65 Erickson & GibbS (1979), at 111 
66 Ibid, page 110 
67 Sebba and Nathan (1984), at 228 
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months, non-custodial sanctions could be viewed as more severe, with fines over $500, 
suspended sentences over three years and probation orders over three years all ranking 
higher on the severity scale than one month imprisonment.68 
   
Von Hirsch admits that proportionality is principally concerned only with the severity of 
penalties, and not their particular form.69 This allows for penalties of comparable severity to 
be used interchangeably.  
“This means that one might even substitute between short stints of confinement and the more 
substantial non-custodial sanctions – provided the severity-equivalence test has been met.”70 
 
 
To use the findings of Erickson and Gibbs’ study discussed above, if six months’ 
imprisonment and 7.8 years probation are of comparable severity, then either penalty could 
be used interchangeably for offences whose seriousness warrants that level of punishment. 
Consequently, different penalties could be substituted on grounds of crime prevention. 
Where an offender poses a risk of reoffending, an alternative rehabilitative sentence could be 
imposed without undermining proportionality. 
 
In their conceptual work on the scaling of penalties, Andrew von Hirsch and Martin Wasik 
put forward a suggested ‘limited substitutability model’, whereby a standard type of 
punishment would be prescribed for a particular offence, which would usually be the 
recommended disposal for a given type of offence.71 There would however be a rule 
allowing for the prescribed penalty type to be substituted for another equally-severe penalty 
where the individual case warranted a different type of penalty. This substitution rule may 
be exercised where the court had reason to believe that the offender would be particularly 
                                                          
68 Ibid 
69 von Hirsch (1992), at 80 
70 Ibid 
71 von Hirsch, Wasik and Greene (1989), at 604; see also Wasik & von Hirsch (1988)  
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susceptible to a different type of penalty. Regardless of whether the prescribed sentence or a 
substituted penalty is imposed, principles of proportionality are still satisfied as the 
substituted penalty is of equal severity to the prescribed sanction.72 
 
The notion of interchangeability between penalties of comparable severity does not sit easily 
with the approach taken by the English penal system. The ranking of sentence severity 
under the current law as contained in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, along with its 
predecessor, the Criminal Justice Act 1991, works in the form of a pyramid, requiring courts 
to “pass a threshold test before moving a case from one form of sentence up to the next.”73 
The courts may only impose a community sentence if the offence is ‘serious enough’ to 
warrant such a sentence.74 Similarly, a custodial sentence may only be imposed on an 
offender if the offence is ‘so serious’ that such a disposal is warranted.75 This approach scales 
severity purely in terms of the type of sanction: any custodial penalty is assumed to be more 
severe than any community penalty, which itself is more severe than any financial sanction.  
This does not conform with the empirical findings on perceived sentence severity which 
demonstrate that the severity of a punishment relies on the quanta as much as it does the 
type. 
 
Austin Lovegrove claims that a short term of imprisonment is not necessarily more severe 
than a sufficiently punitive non-custodial sentence.  
“Imprisonment is more severe than other sanctions only in the sense that for an equivalent period of 
imposition it places a greater burden on an offender… It is not more severe in the sense that any term 
of imprisonment is harsher than any term of another sanction; other sanctions if imposed for a 
sufficiently long period can be made more severe than the shorter term of imprisonment.”76  
 
                                                          
72 Ibid 
73 Ashworth (1992a), at 242 
74 S.6(1) Criminal Justice Act 1991, replaced by s.148(1) Criminal Justice Act 2003  
75 S.1(2)(a) Criminal Justice Act 1991, replaced by s.152(2) Criminal Justice Act 2003 
76 Lovegrove (2001), at 130-131 
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To set a threshold delineating custodial from non-custodial penalties on the basis of offence 
seriousness is misguided. As Spelman concluded, “the stark partition [between custodial 
and non-custodial sentences] exists only in penal codes [and] not in the minds of most 
offenders. A wide variety of alternatives to incarceration can deliver more punishment than 
can a short…prison term…”77 This analysis of surveys has highlighted a long-cast doubt 
over the validity of a sentencing hierarchy with custody at the top end, and discharges at the 
lower end. Although the English legislature has assumed this hierarchy since 1991, the 
reality of sentence severity appears to be far more complex. Not only is the type of penalty 
relevant, but the extent, duration or amount of that penalty is equally valid as a determinant 
of sentence severity. 
 
 
2.2.2.2 Comparing Non-custodial Sentences 
 
Community service (CPO) has traditionally been viewed as more punitive than probation 
(CRO) and thus is placed higher on the sentencing tariff, but changes to probation have led 
some to question whether this is still the case.78 Unlike community service, probation 
requires the offender’s active participation in a (sometimes lengthy) programme, self-
analysis, confronting his past behaviour and making plans to reduce the risks of future 
offending.79 Community service does not require such self-analysis and there is a lower 
expectation placed on the offender that he will change.80 The emphasis of community 
service is based on punishment (hence the term community punishment order), with little 
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expectation of rehabilitation or a contribution to crime reduction.81 It is misleading to claim 
that a CRO is generally less severe than a CPO since most CROs involve fewer contact hours 
than most CPOs, as the severity of a CRO cannot solely be linked to the number of contact 
hours. To do so fails to take into consideration other restrictions and burdens placed on 
probationers such as disclosure of private matters to the supervising officer, and the 
duration of the order.82 
 
 
2.2.3 Proportionality and Young Offenders 
 
Most of the writings on proportionality have focused on the position with adult offenders. 
More recently, there has been some attempt to explore how the principle might, and ought 
to, relate to young offenders. There appears to be no justification for excluding young 
offenders from a desert-based sentencing regime, although the principal aim of the youth 
justice system is the prevention of crime.83 Although it might be desirable to deflect young 
offenders away from a life of crime, retributivists would argue this does not mean that the 
young offender should face a disproportionately severe (or lenient) penalty in order to do 
so. What matters is that the offender is sentenced on the basis of what he himself has done, 
regardless of age,84 although the sanction most likely to be effective in steering the offender 
toward a law-abiding future might then be selected from the pool of proportionate 
sentencing options. The young offender should not face sentencing under an entirely 
different regime purely on the ground of his age.  
 
                                                          
81 See von Hirsch, Wasik & Greene (1989), at 611-612 where it was argued that rather than being regarded as 
rehabilitative, community service should more plausibly be regarded as a punishment; “a sanction that deprives a person 
of leisure, and exacts unpaid labour, in a community setting.” 
82 Rex (1997), summarised in Bottoms (1998), at 72-75 
83 Section 142A CJA 2003, inserted by section 9 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The principal aim 
originates from section 37 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
84 Although age may be a mitigating factor. 
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The available literature on the topic suggests that if young offenders were to be sentenced 
under a desert-based framework similar to that of adult offenders, some modifications to the 
proportionality scheme would have to be made to take into consideration the young 
offenders’ age. Von Hirsch has recognised three reasons for doing so based on (i) juveniles 
having reduced culpability; (ii) criminal sanctions bearing a greater punitive bite upon 
young offenders, and (iii) the concept of adolescence being a ‘time of testing’.85 Only a very 
brief overview of each can be given here. 
 
 
2.2.3.1 Reduced Culpability86 
 
The notion that the young offender is in someway less culpable than his adult counterpart 
may rest on either of two premises. Firstly, that young offenders “have not acquired the 
capacity to realise as fully as adults the consequences of their actions.”87 The argument does 
not purport to suggest that the young offender is unaware that his criminal activity is 
wrong, but rather he cannot be expected to fully appreciate the harm caused by his doing. 
Von Hirsch gives the example of domestic burglary: 
“While the 15-year-old house burglar may be quite aware that he has entered his victim’s flat illegally 
and is stealing his television set, he may well have less grasp of how his presence affronts that victim’s 
legitimate sense of the dwelling as personal space, and of how his entry might make that person feel 
vulnerable and insecure.”88 
 
Secondly, a young person is less able to exercise self-control and resist peer pressure, 
attributes we might develop through time. Consequently, the young offender is less 
culpable because he has had less opportunity to develop impulse control.89 
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2.2.3.2 Punitive bite 
 
A second line of argument claims that the seriousness of the offence, in terms of harm and 
culpability, may not be reduced, but that punishments are more onerous when meted out to 
young offenders. Zedner has noted that the deprivations of incarceration and the stigma 
suffered upon release might have greater adverse effect on a young person during his 
formative period of development.90 Von Hirsch observes that impacting on a young person’s 
needs for a nurturing atmosphere, adequate learning opportunities, exposure to role models 
and chances to make ties with friends, makes a punishment more onerous upon the young 
person than it would be on an adult.91 
 
 
2.2.3.3 Tolerance towards adolescence as a ‘time of testing’ 
 
The third basis for imposing lighter punishments on the young provides a sentence discount 
for juveniles. This approach, favoured by von Hirsch, hinges on youth as being a time for 
experimentation. A young person should benefit from a discounted sentence because, when 
a young offender makes his own decision, it may well be the wrong one. Some sympathy 
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2.3 Proportionality in England and Wales 
 
2.3.1 Proportionality and the Criminal Justice Act 1991 
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1991 was the first legislative attempt to provide a more principled 
approach to sentencing. Before this, sentencers enjoyed a wide discretion, not least when 
determining the purposes of sentencing to be applied.93 Although the Act did not use the 
terms ‘desert’ or ‘proportionality’, it did identify with the proportionality theory by 
referring to ‘commensurability’ and the need for the ‘seriousness of the offence’ to determine 
sentence.94 Other than for serious crimes of a violent or sexual nature from which the public 
needs protection,95 the 1991 Act required courts to impose sentences based on the 
seriousness of an offence. 
 
The 1991 Act effectively produced a sentence hierarchy based on type of penalty, with courts 
having to pass a threshold before moving a case from one penalty type up to the next.96 At 
the top of the hierarchy were custodial sentences, which could only be imposed if the 
offence “was so serious that only such a sentence [could] be justified for the offence.”97 The 
use of the word ‘only’ suggests that the use of custody was to be limited to cases where no 
other sentence was appropriate, thereby placing custody above all other penalties on the 
hierarchy. Similarly, the court had to consider the seriousness of the offending when 
determining the length of any custodial sentence. Except where the offence was of a violent 
                                                          
93 See Sargeant (1974) 60 Cr App R 74. However, Thomas, (1992), claims that the principle of desert was already a major 
player in the determination of sentence within the common law. The 1991 Act merely translated the established common 
law principles into legislation. At page 232 
94 Ashworth (1992b), at 759 
95 Section 2(2)(b) CJA 1991. Also see von Hirsch & Ashworth (1996); Clarkson (1997); Dingwall (1998). 
96 A. Ashworth (1992a), at 242 
97 Section 1(2)(a) CJA 1991, subsequently replicated in section 79(2)(a) PCCSA 2000. 
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or sexual nature from which it was necessary to protect the public,98 the term of any 
custodial sentence was required to be “commensurate with the seriousness of the offence.”99 
The problem of the custody threshold was that the Act offered no guidance to the courts as 
to how offence seriousness should be construed. If seriousness is a composite of harm and 
culpability, as von Hirsch has claimed, the Act made no reference to this. This led the courts 
in some cases to impose custody due to the local prevalence of offending of that sort,100 or to 
consider what the right-thinking members of the public would deem to be offences whose 
seriousness justified custody. 101 Ashworth and von Hirsch criticised both of these 
approaches as being insufficiently principled, and called for seriousness to be determined by 
reference to notions of harm and culpability.102 
 
Below custody sat community sentences on the sentence hierarchy. Section 6(1) of the 1991 
Act provided that a community sentence could only be imposed where the court was of the 
opinion that the offence “was serious enough to warrant such a sentence.”103 This threshold 
implies that a community sentence would only be appropriate if the offence was too serious 
for either a fine or discharge.104 Section 6(2) required the particular community order 
imposed to be “the most suitable for the offender”,105 and more importantly in terms of 
desert, that the restrictions on liberty imposed by the order “must be commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offence.”106 Wasik and von Hirsch suggested that the proper way to 
reconcile the need for commensurability and suitability was to first determine which 
community orders would appropriately reflect the seriousness of the offence. The court 
                                                          
98 Section 2(2)(b) CJA 1991, subsequently replicated in section 80(2)(b) PCCSA 2000 
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100 Cunningham (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 444 
101 Cox (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 479; Keogh (1994) 15 Cr App R (S) 279 
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104 Ashworth (1992a), at 246 
105 Section 6(2)(a), subsequently replicated in section 35(3)(a) PCCSA 2000 
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would then be free to select the order most appropriate for the offender.107 In other words, 
“desert will actually determine the size of the penalty. Suitability will then dictate its 
form.”108 This would safeguard the principles of proportionality as apparently central to the 
1991 Act. 
 
In some respects, the defining role of proportionality under the 1991 Act was promptly 
curtailed. Shortly after the commencement of the Act, the government enacted the Criminal 
Justice Act 1993, which diluted some of the proportionality principles previously contained 
in the 1991 Act. Chief amongst these changes was the greater role afforded to previous 
convictions at the sentencing stage, and the abolition of the unit fine.109  
 
 
2.3.2 Proportionality and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 
The English sentencing framework has undergone considerable recent change due to the 
implementation of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Most of the new provisions in the 2003 Act 
stem from The Halliday Report110 and the White Paper Justice for All111. The provisions 
within the Act have raised considerable criticism,112 most notably for its fundamental lack of 
clarity. Section 142(1) of the Act lists five potentially conflicting purposes of sentencing for 
which the courts must have regard.113 It states: 
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“Any court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must have regard to the following 
purposes of sentencing -  
(a) the punishment of offenders, 
(b) the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence), 
(c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders, 
(d) the protection of the public, and 
(e) the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences” 
 
An ideologist may well look upon this list with approbation. But how likely is it that all five 
purposes can be satisfied by imposing one sentence on an offender? The government have 
neglected to provide any guidance on which of these aims should take priority. The 
purposes listed are “self-evidently a recipe for inconsistency of approach.”114 Sentencers 
may be willing to applying different purposes in different situations, perhaps depending on 
the type of offence and offender antecedents,115 but the framework does not point to such an 
approach as being desirable or even advisable.  
 
To complicate matters further, whilst adopting various consequentialist aims (crime 
reduction, rehabilitation of offenders and public protection), the Act also maintains a desire 
to retain a proportionality framework by making reference to offence seriousness in a 
number of its provisions. Firstly, when determining the seriousness of the offence, the Act 
requires the court to “consider the offender’s culpability in committing the offence and any 
harm which the offence caused, was intended to cause or might foreeeably have caused.”116 
Secondly, the Act retains, albeit with some alterations, both a custody threshold and a 
community threshold. Section 148(1) provides that “a court must not pass a community 
sentence on an offender unless it is of the opinion that the offence, or a combination of the 
offence with one or more associated with it, was serious enough to warrant such a 
sentence.” To all intents and purposes, this is the same wording as was previously provided 
                                                          
114 Ashworth (2004), at 529 
115 See for example Raper [2009] EWCA Crim 2380 in which the court expressed the need for public protection pursuant to 
section 142(1)(d) of the CJA 2003 following a conviction for burglary upon an offender with 26 previous convictions for 
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by section 6(1) of the 1991 Act, the only difference being a change from the word “shall” to 
“must”. Section 152(2) provides that a custodial sentence can only be passed if the offence 
“was so serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified for the 
offence.”  This is similar to the earlier custody threshold criteria laid down in s.1(2)(a) of the 
1991 Act; the only noteworthy difference being the words “only such a sentence can be 
justified for the offence” are replaced with “neither a fine alone nor a community sentence 
can be justified for the offence.”  The earlier provisions made custody a last resort, whereas 
now the courts can impose custody in cases where a fine and a community sentence have 
been considered, and subsequently rejected.117 The final reference to principles of 
proportionality made by the 2003 Act is contained in section 153(2), which requires that 
where a custodial sentence is imposed, that sentence “must be for the shortest term…that in 
the opinion of the court is commensurate with the seriousness of the offence…” This latter 
provision is particularly important. When determining the length of imprisonment, it would 
seem that the court should not impose an exemplary sentence aimed to deter the offender 
away from subsequent offending behaviour or to protect the public, even though both of 
these are listed in section 142(1) as legitimate purposes of sentencing.  
 
The Act’s approach to sentencing in terms of both desert and crime reduction provides for 
some sentencers to retain desert as the primary sentence determinant, whilst others may 
relegate desert and focus instead on some of the other purposes of sentencing listed in 
section 142(1).118 The problem is compounded by the lack of a primary sentencing aim, or a 
hierarchy into which these purposes should be placed, thereby enabling sentencers to set 
their own priorities.119 The sentence imposed will invariably be influenced by what the court 
is trying to achieve in an individual case, which may not reflect the same practices in other 
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118 Dingwall (2008), at 401 
119 On the need for a primary sentencing objective, see Bagaric (2001) chapter 2 
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cases.120 This opportunity for such divergent practices is unfortunate and can do nothing to 
encourage consistency in sentencing approach. 
 
In their guidelines on Overarching Principles, the Sentencing Guidelines Council focuses 
almost entirely on the proportionality principle by stating “the sentencer must start by 
considering the seriousness of the offence.”121 After quoting the five purposes of sentencing, 
the Council does not return to the consequentialist aims under s.142, and makes it clear that 
the requirement for proportionality should underpin all future guidelines it produces. As 
one commentator concluded: 
“By focusing on issues of harm and culpability, the Council has ensured that desert has retained a 
surprisingly central role after the Criminal Justice Act 2003… There are indications not only that desert 
is still breathing but that it is in surprisingly good health.”122 
 
The 2003 Act has not entirely “jettisoned” desert principles from sentencing,123 but the Act 
does require the courts to consider a number of other sentencing purposes which may be 
difficult to reconcile with desert theory. It appears that proportionality has been retained by 
the Act, although the role of desert was more clearly established under the 1991 Act.124 
 
 
2.4 Previous Convictions 
 
The sentencing role played by previous convictions has received considerable and ongoing 
academic attention.125 On the one hand, claims are made that prior offending should be 
disregarded at the sentencing stage; to do otherwise is to have the effect of punishing an 
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offender twice for his prior criminality. On the other hand, it is argued that a first time 
offender should be sentenced less severely than a repeat offender. This may be based on a 
number of claims. Intuition may dictate that recidivists126 should be punished more severely 
than first time offenders.127 Utilitarians rely on prior conduct as a predictor of future risk. An 
offender with a number of previous convictions is more likely to reoffend than a first 
offender.128 Harsher punishments should therefore be imposed on a recidivist with the aim 
of reducing their risk of reoffending through incapacitation, deterrence or rehabilitation. 
 
Nevertheless, the relevance of prior conduct as a determinant at sentencing has been 
somewhat less straightforward to reconcile with desert theory than with utilitarianism. 
Desert dictates that the sentence imposed should be proportionate to the seriousness of the 
offence committed. Prima facie, previous criminal history should be irrelevant under a desert 
framework as it is not immediately relevant to the assessment of offence seriousness. 
 
Broadly there are four approaches to dealing with previous convictions. Firstly, they could 
be ignored altogether for sentencing purposes, thereby creating a flat-rate system whereby 
offenders are sentenced without reference to their criminal record. Such an approach could 
be attractive to some desert theorists as it provides for the sentence to be determined solely 
on the basis of the offence seriousness.129 Secondly, previous convictions could be used as a 
basis for imposing progressively more severe sanctions for each new offence under a 
cumulative sentencing system, leading to the very real possibility that an offender 
(particularly a persistent petty offender) would be sentenced principally on his record and 
                                                          
126 Here, the term ‘recidivist’ is used as a synonym of all repeat offenders. 
127 Stuart (1986), at 49 
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not in reference to the current offence. A cumulative approach may be attractive to 
utilitarians but would not be adopted by a purely desert-based sentencing system.  
 
Desert theorists have sought to steer a path between these two extremes by developing a 
third approach to dealing with previous convictions. This ‘progressive loss of mitigation’ 
approach affords a limited role to previous convictions, whereby the first time offender 
receives a degree of mitigation for his previous good character.130 For each subsequent lapse, 
this mitigation is reduced until eventually it is exhausted. Once the offender has 
accumulated sufficient convictions for the mitigation to be lost, any subsequent convictions 
would not be aggravating. Effectively, the progressive loss of mitigation approach envisages 
a sentence ceiling, set in terms of the seriousness of the offence. Once the mitigation for 
previous good character has been exhausted and this ceiling is reached, no greater 
punishment can then be imposed which would exceed the ceiling.  
 
Progressive loss is based on notions of lapse and tolerance.131 Human frailty may lead us to 
make poor decisions, including criminal decisions, which may be particularly acute in the 
context of peer pressure and social deprivation.132 Accordingly, the sentencing system 
should recognise these aberrations of weakness by offering a sentence discount as limited 
tolerance of the lapse; “a transgression…is judged less stringently when it occurs against a 
background of prior compliance.”133 This tolerance reduces with subsequent offending until, 
eventually, the discount is exhausted. At this point, the offender is no longer able to 
legitimately claim that these aberrations are uncharacteristic lapses.134 Therefore, no 
discount is given from this point onwards. The offender’s plea that the act was out of 
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keeping with his previous behaviour is most persuasive when he has no previous 
convictions. The persuasiveness is progressively lost with each subsequent transgression.135 
 
The progressive loss of mitigation model avoids the criticism aimed at cumulative models 
that affording previous conduct a role at the sentencing stage results in an offender being 
punished twice for his crime. By offering a discount for a first offence, the offender is not 
being punished again for the earlier crime where that discount is then reduced or removed 
following reconviction.136 Rather, he is being sentenced according to the seriousness of his 
offence, although he can no longer claim that he deserves a scaled down penalty.137 After a 
certain number of offences have been accrued, the plea for mitigation is exhausted and the 
offender would (deservedly) receive the full measure proportionate to his crime.138 If he 
continues to offend after this, the penalty should not be increased. Although the discount in 
mitigation is no longer due, the sentence ceiling for the offence has been reached, and 
further transgressions by the offender cannot aggravate the deserved sentence beyond this 
ceiling. To do otherwise would undermine principles of proportionality: 
“Were it permissible to keep increasing the response with each subsequent repetition, even minor 
offences could eventually receive very severe punishments with a sufficient number of repetitions.”139 
 
More recently, an alternative approach – a recidivist premium - has been reintroduced by 
Julian Roberts which, in keeping with the progressive loss of mitigation principle, aims to 
deal with previous convictions within the confines of desert theory.140 Unlike progressive 
loss, this theory does not work on the notion of mitigation for a first time offender, but 
rather it connotes a ‘recidivist premium’ for repeat offenders whereby greater punishment 
should be imposed on repeat offenders to reflect their enhanced culpability. The net effect of 
                                                          
135 von Hirsch (1981), at 597 
136 von Hirsch & Ashworth (2005), at 148 
137 von Hirsch (1981), at 598 
138 Ibid, at 616 
139 von Hirsch (1985), at 88 
140 The theory of a recidivist premium was originally put forward by G. P. Fletcher (1982) 
45 
 
this premium is the same as with progressive loss: the repeat offender is subject to greater 
punishment than the first-time offender. The difference lies in how the sentence is reached. 
In progressive loss, the first offender receives a discount from the prescribed sentence. A 
repeat offender (who has exhausted this source of mitigation) would receive the prescribed 
sentence. Under a recidivist premium model, the first offender would receive the prescribed 
sentence, whereas the repeat offender would receive an inflated punishment greater than 
that which is ordinarily prescribed for the offence. The principle behind progressive loss is 
not that a repeat offender deserves to be punished again for his earlier crime, but rather that 
he deserves the full measure of blame for his current offence.141 The sentence ultimately 
imposed is determined by the seriousness of the instant offence, and not on the prior 
conduct, which only affects the level of discount deserved (if any).142 
 
Two problems with the progressive loss of mitigation approach have never been adequately 
dealt with. Firstly, how great a discount should be offered for the first offence? Von Hirsch 
has offered nothing more concrete than to suggest that a “modest discount” should be 
granted.143 Owing to the fact that the seriousness of the offence should be the principal 
sentence determinant, a discount of 50 percent would give too much weight to the offender’s 
character. The discount granted should be sufficient to substantiate the mitigation owed to a 
first time offender without breaching the confines of proportionality by substantially 
reducing the role of offence seriousness. A discount of around 20 percent of the prescribed 
sentence may be sufficient to comply with principles of desert whilst also offering a discount 
appropriately reflecting the offender’s clean record. Doing so would maintain the central 
function of offence seriousness in determining sentence. 
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The second (and somewhat related) problem not previously dealt with concerns the 
question of the rate of progressive loss: after how many convictions should the discount be 
exhausted? Von Hirsch has suggested that the discount may be lost after a fourth or fifth 
offence, although no reasoning is offered as to why.144 Similarly, Martin Wasik proposed the 
discount would be exhausted after five convictions.145 Subsequently, von Hirsch and 
Ashworth claim that this is a matter of judgement: “a possibility would be that the discount 
should be lost after about three prior convictions, but there are no magic numbers.”146 The 
point at which the discount is exhausted should coincide with the moment when the 
offender can no longer convincingly suggest that his conduct was uncharacteristic. A fourth 
conviction (i.e. where the offender has amassed three prior convictions) may be the point at 
which this persuasiveness is lost.  
 
 
2.4.1 Previous Convictions and the Criminal Justice Act 1991 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, the progressive loss of mitigation 
approach to previous convictions had received support within the common law. The Court 
of Appeal in Queen147 had ruled that: 
“The proper way to look at the matter is to decide on a sentence which is appropriate for the offence 
for which the person is before the court. Then in deciding whether that sentence should be imposed or 
whether the court can properly extend some leniency to the offender, the court must have regard to 
those matters which tell in his favour; and equally to those which tell against him, in particular his 
record of previous convictions.”148 
 
The Court’s reference to the potential to extend leniency and the reference to previous 
convictions seemingly suggested that a lack of previous convictions would be a factor to 
                                                          
144 Ibid.  
145 Wasik (1987), at 118 
146 von Hirsch & Ashworth(2005), at page 155. Elsewhere Ashworth has suggested that “the third offence may be fully 
censured.” Ashworth (2010a), at 202. 
147 (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 245 
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consider in extending some leniency toward the offender. The presence of previous 
convictions, on the other hand, might lead the court to conclude that no such leniency 
should be extended. This was followed by the 1990 White Paper, which also appeared to 
embrace the principle of progressive loss by making reference to the decision in Queen.149 
 
Under the 1991 Act, the seriousness of the offence was of paramount importance in 
determining the appropriate sentence. Section 29(1) of the Act provided that, “an offence 
shall not be regarded as more serious…by reason of any previous convictions of the offender 
or any failure of his to respond to previous sentences”, and section 28 permitted the court to 
have regard to any mitigating factors, which may have been intended to include a clean 
prior record. Combined, the two sections appeared to offer additional approval of a 
progressive loss of mitigation approach. The Court of Appeal in Bexley150 confirmed that 
section 29(1) “embodies the principle…that an offender who has been punished for offences 
in the past should not in effect be punished for them again when being sentenced for a fresh 
offence”,151 although this was of course the legislative intention.  
 
Section 29(1) led to some unrest within the judiciary and magistracy who claimed the section 
prevented them from taking into account an offender’s criminal record.152 Ultimately the 
government repealed section 29 and replaced it with a new provision, inserted by section 
66(6) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993: 
“In considering the seriousness of any offence, the court may take into account any previous 
convictions of the offender or any failure of his to respond to previous sentences.” 
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The proportionality constraints contained elsewhere in the 1991 Act remained, requiring the 
court to principally determine sentence on the basis of offence seriousness.153 Wasik and von 
Hirsch have argued that the new section 29 should not be viewed as having conferred a 
wide discretion upon sentencers to aggravate the sentence on the basis of previous 
convictions, as this would be impossible to reconcile with other key provisions contained 
within the 1991 Act.154 Following the enactment of the new section 29, some Court of Appeal 
authorities pointed to the courts’ use of previous convictions as a source of aggravation, 
having little regard for a sentence ceiling set to reflect offence seriousness. In Spencer & 
Carby,155 the Court ruled that “without doubt the offences for which [the offenders] were 




2.4.2 Previous Convictions and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 
Following a Home Office announcement of considered changes to sentencing policy placing 
greater emphasis on offenders’ previous record,157 the Halliday Report proposed that 
sentence severity should reflect the seriousness of the offence as well as the offender’s 
relevant criminal history.158 Halliday based the need to extend the recidivist premium by 
affording previous convictions a more central role in the sentencing decision on two main 
rationales: firstly, that repeat offenders somehow deserve greater punishment, and secondly, 
                                                          
153 That a custodial sentence could only be imposed if the offence was “so serious” that only custody could be justified 
(section 1(2)(a) CJA 1991),  that the length of a term of imprisonment must be commensurate with the seriousness of the 
offence (section 2(2)(a)), a community sentence could only be imposed if the offence was “serious enough” to justify such 
a sentence (section 6(1)), and the restrictions placed on the offender were to be commensurate with the seriousness of the 
offence (section 6(2)(b)). 
154 Wasik & von Hirsch (1994), at 412 
155 (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 482 
156 Per McCowan LJ, at 485-486 
157 Home Office (2001) para 2.76 
158 Halliday (2001), chapter 2 
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affording previous convictions a more central role in the sentencing decision would provide 
greater scope for efforts to reform criminals.159 Neither of these claims was sufficient to 
convince von Hirsch that it was necessary, or desirable, to place greater emphasis on 
previous convictions.160 Nonetheless, the CJA 2003 enacted an enhanced role for previous 
convictions by generating a “step function, with severity increments accruing with every 
previous conviction” providing it was relevant and sufficiently recent.161 According to 
section 143(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the court must treat each previous conviction 
as an aggravating factor if the court believes that the prior history can reasonably be so 
treated, having regard to the nature of the offence and the time lapsed since conviction. 
 
This move was likely to deflect the sentencing system away from the progressive loss of 
mitigation approach which had been previously adopted and appears to have enacted a 
cumulative approach by reference to the term “each previous conviction”. The 2003 Act 
retains thresholds for custodial and community sentences based on the seriousness of the 
offence. By increasing the role of previous convictions, the Act created further tension 
between retributivist and utilitarian sentencing objectives.162 By affording previous history a 
role as an aggravating factor, the 2003 Act implies that the seriousness of an offence is 
increased where the offender has a criminal record and this increased seriousness justifies 
more severe punishment, although the Act does not explain why an offender’s culpability is 
enhanced by reoffending. One view is that where an offender is reconvicted, culpability 
could be enhanced by his defiance of the law, although Roberts claims that a new conviction 
may not constitute legal defiance, but rather “a violation of a naive judicial expectation that 
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punishment should result in desistence.”163 It is certainly not clear why reoffending, 
although presenting a disappointment to the court, would increase an offender’s culpability. 
 
The 2003 Act places a reasonableness test on the use of an offender’s prior history at the 
sentencing stage: previous convictions should only be aggravating if the court views them as 
relevant and recent. The Sentencing Commission Working Group, established in 2007 to 
examine the feasibility of creating a Sentencing Commission to replace the SGC and SAP, 
found discrepancies amongst the meaning of ‘relevant’. Some appear to consider previous 
convictions as relevant only if they are of exactly the same nature as the current offence. For 
an offender sentenced for theft, only previous theft convictions would be considered. Others 
however viewed as relevant those convictions of broadly the same nature as the current 
offence.164 Consequently, previous convictions for a raft of other dishonesty offences may be 
taken into consideration when sentencing for theft. Julian Roberts’ interviews with offenders 
found a consensus view that ‘specialists’ should be dealt with more severely than those who 
offend across the whole catalogue of the criminal law, although no explanation for this view 
was given.165 Some interviewees had, however, noted that similar previous convictions tell 
something about the offender’s need which should be taken into consideration by the 
sentencing court.166 But this is not to say that specialists deserve greater punishment. Rather, 
the court should look at the criminal cause when determining the type of sentence, but not 
the amount of punishment. Ashworth raises a question of whether specialisation is 
necessarily worse than versatility.167 Specialisation may signify an offending pattern behind 
which lies a character trait (e.g. poverty or drug addiction for habitual acquisitive criminals) 
which the court may want to take into account when sentencing by considering a 
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rehabilitative penalty. But such behaviour is not necessarily worse than offending across the 
spectrum of the criminal law. Indeed, versatility may be worse than specialisation: the 
versatile offender may be inherently ‘bad’ rather than offending out of ‘need’, and there may 
be little chance of curbing his offending behaviour. 
 
Prior to the commencement of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, numerous commentators had 
questioned the role of similarity between the current offence and the previous conviction(s). 
Wasik claimed that similarity between offences ought to be relevant because “it confirms in 
the starkest possible manner that such misbehaviour is characteristic of the [offender].”168 
Similarly, Julian Roberts asserted that if a prior conviction is of a dissimilar nature to the 
current offence, its effect on sentencing should be “heavily discounted”.169 Von Hirsch, on 
the other hand, gives similarity such a wide meaning so as to render it largely irrelevant: 
“...the acts of force, theft and fraud that make up the bulk of the criminal law are all intentional 
violations of the manifest rights of others. When punishing a person for one such intentional, 
victimising crime, it thus seems appropriate to consider previous intentional victimising crimes, even 
if the technique was different. When someone is convicted of white-collar swindle, for example, it 
would be appropriate to consider prior convictions involving not only other frauds but also outright 
thefts and acts of force, as these acts involve wilful injury.”170  
 
It is unlikely that the 2003 Act was enacted with the intention of taking too narrow a view of 
similarity and relevance. As Ashworth claims, it would be absurd to suggest that placing too 
great an emphasis on similarity would “imply that everyone is entitled to one discounted 
crime of violence, one discounted fraud, one discounted sexual offence and so on.”171 The 
Halliday Report had noted that most persistent offenders have a criminal record including a 
variety of offences and so “less weight should be given to whether previous and current 
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offences are in the same category.”172 Rather, “the key point is whether the previous offences 
justify a more severe view” being taken.173 
 
By enacting a cumulative approach to previous convictions, the 2003 Act fails to have proper 
regard to the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on sentencing consistency, which states: 
“Previous convictions should not, at any stage in the criminal justice system, be used mechanically as 
a factor working against the defendant. Although it may be justifiable to take account of the offender’s 
previous criminal record within the declared rationales for sentencing, the sentence should be kept in 
proportion to the seriousness of the current offence(s).”174  
 
Whilst the then Criminal Justice Bill was passing through Parliament, statements had been 
made to avow that the new provision would “not mean wildly disproportionate sentences, 
because the sentences will operate within the principle, which is established later in the 
[Act], that the severity of the resulting sentence should reflect the seriousness of the current 
offence… The clause modifies the proportionality principle that previous relevant offences 
can act as an aggravating factor.”175 Although section 143(2) discloses no such constraint,176 
it appears that parliamentary intention was that courts would apply section 143(2) within 
confines set by other provisions reflecting the need to uphold principles of proportionality. 
 
 
2.5 Sentence Types 
 
Discussion now turns to the types of penalty the courts have at their disposal when 
sentencing for theft.177 To reflect the sentencing hierarchy under the 1991 and 2003 Criminal 
                                                          
172 Halliday (2001) at para 2.17 
173 Ibid 
174 Council of Europe (1992), para D1-D2 
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Justice Acts, penalties are categorised within four bands: custodial sentences, community 
sentences, financial penalties, and discharges. 
  
 
2.5.1 Custodial Sentences 
 
2.5.1.1 Immediate Imprisonment 
 
Since the abolition of the death penalty, imprisonment has been the ultimate sanction in 
England and Wales. By its very nature, it imposes a greater deprivation on liberty than any 
other available sanction. Inmates have various elements of their lives affected and controlled 
by incarceration, which would not be so controlled by any non-custodial option. Limitations 
on physical movement, activity, education, association with others, separation from family, 
friends and the community are just some of the deprivations imposed.178 These deprivations, 
along with the economic costs of imprisonment, have led the English legislature to limit the 
use of imprisonment to occasions where the offence committed is so serious that only 
custody can be justified.179 
 
The legislative limitations placed on the use of imprisonment have been discussed 
elsewhere.180 Suffice to say here, the legislature in England has sought to limit the use of 
imprisonment primarily to offences which are so serious that only custody can be 
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justified.181 Moreover, where a custodial sentence is imposed, its length must be 
commensurate to the seriousness of the offence.182 
 
Prison has been criticised as a paradoxical form of crime control. On the one hand, it 
produces certain incapacitative benefits by safeguarding society against further offending by 
the offender. At the same time, it is inherently likely to cause damage to the offender which, 
upon his release, may turn him to further crime.183 
 
 
2.5.1.2 Detention and Training Order 
 
The detention and training order (DTO) is the standard custodial sentence for young 
offenders aged 10-17. As a custodial sentence, the seriousness of the offence must satisfy the 
custody threshold before the court may impose a DTO. The provisions surrounding the 
DTO highlight the welfarist approach to youth justice, and the desirability of avoiding 
placing young offenders in custody. Where the offender is aged under 15, the court may 
only impose a DTO if the offender is a ‘persistent offender’,184 a term which is not defined by 
the Act.185 If the offender is aged under 12, the court must be satisfied that “only a custodial 
sentence would be adequate to protect the public from further offending by him.”186 The 
order may run only for lengths as specified in section 101 of the PCCSA 2000, namely 4, 6, 8, 
                                                          
181 Similar sentiments have been echoed since at least the 1970s. The Radical Alternatives to Prison Group was founded 
with the aim to wholly abolish imprisonment for all but the most violently dangerous offenders; Radical Alternatives to 
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186 Section 100(2)(b) 
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10, 12, 18 or 24 months. Only half of the length of the order is spent in custody. For the 
remainder of the order, the offender is placed under supervision. 
 
 
2.5.1.3 Suspended Sentences of Imprisonment 
 
The suspended sentence is a custodial sentence even though, as Wasik describes, it only 
potentially leads to the offender being admitted into custody.187 Upon deciding to suspend a 
custodial sentence, no doubt the courts hope to spare the offender from being incarcerated 
as he “will be deterred from further offending by the knowledge that he is subject to the 
suspended sentence.”188 
 
Under the Criminal Justice Act 1991, as consolidated under the PCCSA 2000, a court could 
suspend a sentence of not more than two years’ imprisonment,189 provided that a term of 
immediate imprisonment would have been imposed were it not for the power to suspend,190 
and that the suspension could be “justified by the exceptional circumstances of the case.”191 
Judicial guidance appeared to strictly interpret the meaning of “exceptional circumstances”. 
Okinikan192 ruled that an offender’s age, previous good character or early guilty plea are 
common features and are thus not exceptional. In his review of the decision to suspend 
sentences of imprisonment, Nigel Stone examined 33 cases in one county where the sentence 
was imposed in the first operational year of the 1991 Act (October 1992-September 1993).193 
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In some cases within his sample, there appeared to be no exceptional factors which would 
have justified the suspension of a prison sentence.194 
 
The operational period of the suspension was limited to not less than one and not more than 
two years.195 A suspended sentence could be breached where an offender was convicted of 
an imprisonable offence during the operational period of the sentence. According to section 
119(1) of the PCCSA 2000, the courts had four options when dealing with a breach: (a) to 
order that the suspended sentence be activated in full, (b) to activate part of the sentence, (c) 
to extend the operational period of the suspended sentence by up to two years, or (d) to take 
no action. There was an expectation, which accorded with the purpose of a suspended 
sentence, that the court should activate the sentence in full unless it was “of the opinion that 
it would be unjust to do so in view of all the circumstances”.196 
 
The problem under the 1991 Act was that the notion of a suspended sentence of 
imprisonment does not sit well within a desert-based sentencing framework.197 It may be 
difficult to imagine a large number of cases where custody is justified in accordance with the 
threshold test of section 79(2)(a) of the PCCSA 2000198, but where the offender does not need 
to serve a prison sentence and, furthermore, does not require any real punishment. Where 
an offender complies with the conditions of the suspended sentence, under the 1991 Act 
regime, he would suffer no deprivation or other consequence to his offending other than the 
marking of a conviction on his criminal record. Consequently, the suspended sentence 
under the 1991 Act more closely resembled a conditional discharge than an immediate 
custodial sentence. Certainly in the early days of the suspended sentence, there was a 
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tendency of the courts to use the sentence as a non-custodial option, rather than as a 
custodial sentence as it was, and remains, intended.199  
 
Whereas under the 1991 Act sentences of imprisonment could only be suspended in 
“exceptional circumstances”, the enactment of the 2003 Criminal Justice Act has provided 
the courts with a power to suspend any custodial sentence of between 14 days and 12 
months. During the suspension period, which must run for between six months and two 
years, the offender must be ordered to comply with one or more of the requirements listed 
in section 190 of the Act, which are the same requirements as may form a community 
sentence.200 Whereas under the 1991 Act a suspended sentence could only be breached by 
the offender committing a further offence during the operational period, the addition of 
these requirements gives rise to a second potential ground for breach: the failure to comply 
with one or more of the attached requirements.201 The imposition of these requirements 
means that a suspended sentence may no longer be viewed as a “let-off”, synonymous with 
a discharge. It might however now more closely resemble a community sentence. Therefore, 
the long-standing view held by sentencers that the suspended sentence is a non-custodial 
sentence may have been compounded by the obligation to impose additional community 
requirements, which may act to draw closer similarities between the suspended sentence 
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2.5.2 Sentences within the Community 
 
Both the 1991 and 2003 Criminal Justice Acts created a sentence hierarchy based on penalty 
type. According to both Acts, community-based sentences are less severe than custodial 
sentences, but more punitive than fines and discharges. The diverse range of community-
based sentencing options available to the courts under the 1991 Act were not necessarily of 
comparable severity; a criticism raised by the Halliday Report.202  
 
 
2.5.2.1 Community Punishment Order 
 
A community punishment order (CPO)203 is available to all criminal courts when dealing 
with an offender, aged 16 or over, who has been convicted of an imprisonable offence. The 
order requires the offender to perform unpaid work within the community for between 40 
and 240 hours as specified by the order.204 The number of hours of unpaid work required 
should reflect the seriousness of the offence. The court must be satisfied that the offender is 
suitably fit to undertake the work,205 and that appropriate work is available locally.206 It has 
been said that the attraction of a CPO rests on the fact that the offender is genuinely 
punished by the loss of his leisure time whilst performing unpaid work, whilst at the same 
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2.5.2.2 Community Rehabilitation Order 
 
A community rehabilitation order (CRO)208 could be imposed by any court when sentencing 
an offender aged over 16. Whilst subject to the order, the offender was required to accept the 
supervision and keep in regular contact with a probation officer. The order could last for 
between six months and three years. Wasik claims that the criteria for fixing the length of the 
order is unclear, but is presumably based on the seriousness of the offence and the 
offender’s needs.209 According to section 41(1) of the PCCSA, the purposes of the CRO were 
to rehabilitate the offender whilst also protecting the public from harm or preventing the 
offender from committing further offences.  
 
 
2.5.2.3 Community Punishment and Rehabilitation Order 
 
As its name suggests, the community punishment and rehabilitation order (CPRO) was a 
combination of a CPO and CRO.210 The courts could only impose a CPRO if the offender 
was aged 16 or over and had committed an imprisonable offence,211 and the court was 
satisfied that the offence was serious enough to comply with the community sentence 
threshold contained in section 35(1) of the PCCSA 2000. The supervision element of the 
CPRO was dealt with in the same manner as if the offender had been subject to a CRO, and 
the unpaid work was dealt with in the same way had the offender been subject to a CPO.212 
The period of supervision was specified in the order and had to run for between one and 
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three years.213 The offender could only undertake unpaid work of between 40 and 100 
hours,214 somewhat less than the maximum 240 hours under a CPO. It was envisaged that 
the CPRO would “be particularly suitable for some persistent property offenders...sentenced 
for burglary, theft, handling, fraud and forgery.”215 
 
 
2.5.2.4 Curfew Order 
 
Pursuant to section 37 of the PCCSA 2000, the curfew order was available for an offender of 
any age216 who has committed an offence for which the sentence is not fixed by law. As a 
community order, a curfew could only be imposed where the offence was “serious enough 
to warrant a community sentence” according to the community sentence threshold 
contained within section 35(1) of the PCCSA 2000. The curfew restricted the offender to 
remain in a given place for two to twelve hours per day, for a period of up to six months.217 
Where an offender has a propensity to offend at a particular place or time, the curfew could 
be an appropriate and cost effective way of incapacitating the offender from being capable of 
reoffending at those places or during those times. In the White Paper Crime, Justice and 
Protecting the Public, which resulted in the Criminal Justice Act 1991, the Government stated 
that: 
“Curfews could be helpful in reducing some forms of crime, thefts of and from cars, pub brawls and 
other types of disorder. A curfew order could be used to keep people away from particular places...or 
to keep them at home in the evenings or weekends.”218  
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2.5.2.5 Action Plan Order 
 
When dealing with a young offender, the court had the power to impose an action plan 
order (hereafter APO). The Government described the APO as “a short intensive 
programme of community intervention combining punishment, rehabilitation and 
reparation to change offending behaviour and prevent further crime.”219  
 
As with all other community sentences, the court must be satisfied that the offence is 
“serious enough to warrant a community sentence.”220 The court could impose an APO 
either to rehabilitate the offender or otherwise prevent him from further offending.221 The 
order could only last for three months, during which period the offender would be placed 
under supervision222 and would be obliged to comply with certain requirements pertaining 
to his “actions and whereabouts”.223 The types of requirements which could be included in 
the order were listed in section 70(1) of the 2000 Act, and included participation with certain 
activities, exclusion from particular places, and compliance with educational arrangements. 
The 1997 White Paper had indicated that the requirements contained within each order 
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2.5.2.6 Supervision Order 
 
The supervision order was the youth justice equivalent of the CRO. Introduced by section 12 
of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, a supervision order may be imposed on an 
offender aged 10–17 for a period of up to three years. The aim of the order is to reduce 
reoffending, reform and protect the public.  
 
 
2.5.2.7 Referral Order 
 
The referral order is the mandatory disposal for 10-17 year olds who plead guilty at their 
first prosecution, providing that the court is not proposing to impose either custody225 or an 
absolute discharge.226 The intention of the order is to remove the courts discretion to 
‘punish’ the offender for his first offence, provided that he enters a guilty plea and the 
offence is not so serious to warrant custody.227 The legislation is silent as to when the guilty 
plea must be entered. There appears therefore to be no requirement for the offender to admit 
guilt at an early stage. Under the order, the offender is referred to a youth offending panel 
for 3-12 months. The panel is charged with formulating a contract with the offender 
concerning his behaviour. Once complete, the conviction becomes spent so the offender does 
not face the ongoing burden of carrying a criminal record. 
 
A number of problems have arisen in respect of the referral order, two of which will be 
briefly outlined here. Firstly, the order offers an incentive for an offender to plead guilty. 
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Knowing what the outcome will be and, more importantly, not being burdened by a 
criminal record, reduces the stigma attached to being branded a criminal and gives the 
offender a chance of a fresh start. But by doing so, the system is “speeding up the criminal 
process by inducing guilty pleas by the promise of a rapid return to a clean record.”228 
Secondly, where the offender pleads guilty, the minimum penalty (unless the offence is 
sufficiently trivial to justify an absolute discharge) is a three month referral order. Where the 
offender pleads not guilty, the court could impose a small fine or a conditional discharge for 
the same offence. If an offender then reoffends, the referral order is not available so the 
courts may impose a lesser penalty of a fine or conditional discharge. In short, the minimum 
penalty appropriate following a guilty plea may be higher on the tariff than the minimum 
available for a not guilty plea.229 
 
 
2.5.2.8 Reparation Order 
 
When dealing with a young offender, section 73 of the PCCSA 2000 provided the courts with 
a power to impose upon the offender a reparation order, requiring the offender to make 
reparation to the victim or someone otherwise affected by the offence, or to the community 
at large.230 Under such an order, the offender would be required to make reparation by 
completing no more than 24 hours of work.231 The reparation order specifically precludes 
the payment of compensation as reparation.232 An order could not be imposed without 
consideration by a youth offending team of the type of work suitable to the offender and the 
                                                          
228 Zedner (2004), at 228 
229 See Greenlow (2003), at 267 
230 Section 73(1) PCCSA 2000 
231 Section 74(1)(a) PCCSA 2000 
232 Section 73(3) PCCSA 2000 
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victim’s attitude to the proposed order.233 The terms of the order were required to be 
commensurate to the seriousness of the offence.234  
 
 
2.5.2.9 Attendance Centre Order 
 
Offenders aged under 21 could be “required to attend and be given under supervision 
appropriate occupation or instruction”.235 Most centres were open on alternate Saturday 
mornings or afternoons and were run by volunteering police officers, prison officers or 
school teachers.236 There was an expectation that the order would run for 12 hours, unless 
the offender was aged under 14 and 12 hours was thought to be excessive.237 Furthermore, 
the order could not exceed 12 hours unless the court felt that this would be inadequate, in 
which case 24 hours was the maximum for an offender aged under 16, or 36 hours if the 
offender was over 16.238 Each session could not exceed three hours.239 Consequently, 
although the offender was not deprived of his liberty for a particularly long time, the order 
would not usually be completed in fewer than four sessions running over eight weeks. 
During the sessions, the offender would be kept under firm discipline and would be 
expected to engage in various activities including handicrafts, first aid, citizenship and 
physical training.240 The aim of the order was not only to punish the offender through the 
deprivation of his leisure time, but also to encourage him to use his leisure time more 
constructively once it was restored to him.241  
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234 Section 74(2) PCCSA 2000 
235 Section 62(2) PCCSA 2000 
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2.5.2.10 Drug Treatment and Testing Order 
 
For an offender aged 16 or over, the court had the power to impose a drug treatment and 
testing order (DTTO) if it was satisfied that the offender was dependent on, or had a 
propensity to misuse drugs, and that dependency may be susceptible to treatment.242 As 
with all other community sentences, the court must be satisfied that the offence is “serious 
enough to warrant a community sentence” The order could be long-reaching, lasting for 
between six months and three years. During the course of the order, the offender would be 
treated for his dependency, with an aim of tackling the dependency. The offender would 
also be subject to regular testing to ascertain whether he was still using drugs.   
 
 
2.5.2.11 The Generic Community Sentence and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 
Following a recommendation made by the Halliday Report, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
replaced the myriad of community orders previously available with a single, generic 
community sentence. Halliday had criticised the earlier provisions relating to community 
sentences as being unduly complex, with different orders being subject to different statutory 
restrictions.243 The regime offered no indications of the punitive weight of each order, 
rendering proportionality largely unachievable.244 The positioning of community penalties 
on the sentencing hierarchy had also become unclear. Community penalties had once been 
thought of as alternatives to imprisonment, but this notion had been abandoned and 
                                                          
242 Section 52(3) PCCSA 2000 
243 For one thing, different orders were available for different age groups. CRO, CPO, CPRO and DTTO was available for 
offenders aged over 16, supervision and action plan orders were available for offenders aged 10-17, an attendance centre 
order could only be imposed on an offender aged under 21, but a curfew was available for offenders of any age. 
244 Halliday (2001) at para 6.4 
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community sentences were since deemed to be sentences in their own right. The Act 
provides 12 requirements which the sentencing court may attach to a community 
sentence.245 Many of these requirements replace similar options previously available. For 
example, the drug treatment and testing order has been directly replaced with the drug 
rehabilitation requirement, which still requires the offender to undergo treatment and 
testing for drug misuse. As with the DTTO, before imposing a drug rehabilitation 
requirement, the court must be satisfied that the offender is dependent on, or has a 
propensity to misuse drugs, and that the dependency may be susceptible to treatment. 
 
The community sentence threshold was retained by the 2003 Act. According to section 
148(1) of the Act, the court must only pass a community sentence if, in the court’s opinion, 
the offence is serious enough to warrant such a sentence. This prohibits the use of 
community sentences where the offence is not serious enough, but does not compel the 
court to impose a community sentence whenever the threshold is passed: “even where the 
threshold for a community sentence has been passed, a financial penalty or discharge may 
still be an appropriate penalty.”246 In addition to the seriousness threshold given in section 
148(1) of the Act, the courts also have a power to impose a community sentence on an 
offender who has previously been fined on three or more occasions, whose current offence 
does not satisfy the seriousness threshold under section 148(1), and where the court believes 
that it is in the interests of justice to impose a community sentence. This may be an attractive 
provision for the courts when dealing with persistent petty offenders (including shoplifters), 
but the SGC has warned that “great care will be needed in assessing whether a community 
sentence is appropriate since failure to comply could result in a custodial sentence.”247 
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Ultimately, this provision could lead to offenders being subjected to severe penalties which 
are disproportionate to their minor crimes.248  
 
 
2.5.3 Financial Penalties 
 
The fine is the most commonly invoked penalty for summary offences and either-way 
offences sentenced by the magistrates’ court. The fine has been described as “the ideal penal 
measure. It can be easily calibrated, so that courts can reflect differing degrees of gravity and 
culpability”,249 although this is equally true of other penalties. The fine also “involves no 
physical coercion and is non-intrusive since it does not involve supervision or the loss of 
[the offender’s] time”,250 a point which Ashworth clearly regards as a positive. Studies on 
reoffending tend to suggest that fines correspond with lower reconviction rates than other 
penalties, although this does not necessarily demonstrate the fine’s efficacy in reducing 
crime. As Bottoms has rightly highlighted, fines tend to be imposed on offenders whose 
lives demonstrate some stability, which may be associated with a lower risk of 
reoffending.251 Consequently, the fact that offenders who are fined are less likely to reoffend 
than offenders sentenced by other means is not necessarily reflective of the penalties’ 
effectiveness in reducing crime. 
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1991 introduced the ‘unit fine’ scheme whereby fines were 
calculated in reference to the seriousness of the offence and the offender’s financial means. 
The system was heralded by some for its fairness, precision and consistency.252 Section 18(2) 
                                                          
248 Ashworth (2010a), at 341 
249 Ashworth (2010a), at 327. See also, von Hirsch, Wasik & Greene (1989), at 611 
250 Ibid, page 327-328 
251  Bottoms (1973) 
252 Moore, (2003), at 14. See also Greene, (1998) 
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of the 1991 Act provided for the amount of the fine to be determined by reference to a 
number of units “commensurate with the seriousness of the offence” and a value given to 
each unit  which represents “the offender’s disposable income.” Sentencers opposed the 
scheme due to the perception of large fines being levied on wealthy offenders whilst less 
affluent offenders were given what appeared to be low level fines.253 This was, of course, the 
intention of the scheme: that the penal bite of a fine should be maintained regardless of the 
offender’s wealth by imposing fines where the amount is fixed according to the offender’s 
financial status. 
 
The unit fine scheme was relatively short lived, being abolished by the Criminal Justice Act 
1993. Under the 1993 regime, which was carried over into the consolidating Powers of the 
Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, greater flexibility was reintroduced into the fining 
system. The level of fine was still required to reflect the seriousness of the offence,254 and the 
offender’s means was still a relevant factor in determining the level of the fine. Before 
imposing a fine, the court was under an obligation to inquire into the offender’s financial 
circumstances,255 and would consequently take these circumstances into account when 
determining the level of the fine to be imposed.256 The level of fine could then be adjusted on 
account of the offender’s financial means by “increasing or reducing the amount of the fine” 
to be paid.257 The 1993 regime was criticised by some for lacking the clarity of the unit 
scheme under the 1991 Act.258 
 
By taking into account the offender’s financial position, the fine remains a viable sentencing 
option for all offenders, regardless of wealth. Where the seriousness of an offence warranted 
                                                          
253 Moore (2003), at 14; Ashworth (2010a), at 330; Raine & Dunstan (2009), at 17. 
254 Section 128(2) PCCSA 2000 
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256 Section 128(3) 
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a fine, the level of the fine could be inflated for a wealthy offender or reduced for an 
impoverished offender, whilst maintaining an equal and fair penal bite. Furthermore, it is in 
the interests of justice for the level of the fine to be realistically payable by the offender; 
fixing a fine so large that the offender cannot pay is counterproductive and may entice the 
offender into further criminality in order to be able to make the payment.259  
 
This approach to fines was re-enacted in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. As with the PCCSA 
2000, the level of the fine should reflect the seriousness of the offence.260 The courts should 
also take into account the offender’s financial circumstances in determining the amount of 
the fine,261 which may have the effect of either increasing or reducing the level of the fine.262 
 
Determining the level of the fine on the basis of the offender’s means ought to safeguard 
against wealthy offenders avoiding a custodial sentence where the offence would usually 
warrant imprisonment. It also ensures the impoverished offender is not imprisoned for an 
offence which merely warrants a fine but for which he lacks the means to pay. 
 
Ultimately, the principle is that where an offence warrants a fine, that is the penalty which 
ought to be imposed. The penal bite can be ensured by fixing the level of the fine in terms of 
the offender’s financial means. It would not be desirable for a court to fix the level of fine 
without having regard to the offender’s means,263 as Martin Wasik has noted, “punishment 
does not lie in the amount of the fine but in the degree of hardship and inconvenience 
caused by the need to pay it.”264 
 
                                                          
259 Zedner (2004), at 208. On fine enforcement, see Whittaker & Mackie (1997). 
260 Section 164(2) CJA 2003 
261 Section 164(3) 
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263 The importance of ‘equity of impact’ attached by the courts in the context of fine setting was noted by Raine & Dunstan 
(2009). 






2.5.4.1 Conditional Discharges 
 
When sentencing an offender for which the offence is not fixed by law, a court has the power 
to discharge him if it is of the opinion that it would be “inexpedient to inflict punishment”, 
having regard to the “nature of the offence and the character of the offender”. 265 The 
discharge may be either absolute, or made on the condition that the offender does not 
reoffend during the operational period of the order, which may run for up to three years.266 
If the offender is made subject to a conditional discharge and subsequently reoffends during 
this period, he is liable to be sentenced for the new offence and resentenced for the original 
offence in accordance with section 13(6) of the PCCSA 2000. In view of the fact that a 
discharge may only be imposed where the court considers it “inexpedient to inflict 
punishment”, it has been suggested that a discharge is not a punishment at all.267 
 
Ashworth describes the conditional discharge as the courts offering a warning to the 
offender. The court is willing to impose no punishment for the offence on the condition that 
he does not reoffend during the operational period of the discharge.268 A conditional 
discharge may pose an attractive disposal option to the courts where the offender is unlikely 
to reoffend (subject to the seriousness of the offence not being such that punishment is 
necessary). Indeed, the Halliday Report concluded that “the evidence shows that 
[discharges] are an effective disposal, attracting better than predicted reconviction rates.”269 
                                                          
265 Section 12(1) Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 
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However, the effectiveness of discharges in reducing reoffending could be due in part to any 
number of offender characteristics and not necessarily due to the disposals themselves.270 If 
discharges are imposed on offenders whom the courts do not feel pose a threat of 
reoffending, it is only logically that (assuming the courts’ assessment of reoffending risk is 
accurate) the reconviction rate will be lower than for offenders made subject of alternative 
sentence types (be it financial, community, or custodial). 
 
In his review of Crown Court sentencing practice, Moxon found that the conditional 
discharge was mostly associated with single (rather than multiple) non-serious offending by 
offenders with no more than two previous convictions.271  
 
 
2.5.4.2 Absolute Discharges 
 
An absolute discharge is the least severe order available to the courts upon conviction. It is 
not a punishment in any real sense, and does not place upon the offender any conditions or 
restrictions to his future conduct.272 Upon an absolute discharge being imposed, the offender 
is effectively free to go without any real consequence for his offending, other than a 
conviction being recorded.  
 
Absolute discharges are rarely imposed by the courts, being applied in 0.7 percent of all 
cases in 2008.273 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the absolute discharge is imposed by the Crown 
                                                          
270 This fact has led the Ministry of Justice to ignore comparisons of reoffending by disposal option in its annual 
Reoffending of Adults series.  
271 Moxon (1988), at 47-48 
272 A. Ashworth (2010a), at 320 
273 Ministry of Justice (2010b), Supplementary Table 5.1 
72 
 
Court with exceptional rarity.274 In his review of the use of absolute discharges,275 Wasik 
found that the order may be imposed where the offender was technically guilty of an offence 
but was not morally blameworthy, meaning that it is not in the public interest to impose any 
measurable punishment upon the offender.276 Alternatively, an absolute discharge may be 
imposed where an offender is sentenced for multiple offences at the same time. The court 
may impose a more punitive penalty only for the most serious offence. Other lesser offences 





Proportionality has been of significant importance under the sentencing framework of both 
the 1991 and 2003 Acts. Although the 2003 Act also makes reference to non-proportionality 
based considerations, sentences are still required to reflect the seriousness of the offence, 
although the legislation has made some movement away from a purely proportionality-
based sentencing model by making reference to crime-reduction sentencing purposes and 
affording an increased role to previous convictions. Paradoxically, the 2003 Act is in some 
respects clearer on the meaning of proportionality than its predecessor. The 1991 Act offered 
no guidance to the courts in how to construe offence seriousness, yet the 2003 Act points the 
courts attention toward the offender’s culpability and the level of harm in determining 
seriousness.277 
 
                                                          
274 In 2008, only 68 cases sentenced in the Crown Court resulted in an absolute discharge, representing less than 0.1 
percent of all cases sentenced by the Court. See ibid, Supplementary Table 2.1A 
275 M. Wasik (1985) 
276 See for example, Harrison [2004] EWCA Crim 1547, in which an absolute discharge was imposed upon an insulin-
dependent diabetic, who was convicted for dangerous driving. The dangerous driving was brought on by a hypoglycaemic 
attack, for which the offender could not be held to blame. 
277 Section 143(2) CJA 2003 
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For a desert-based system to be workable and adopted by the courts, proportionality should 
be construed so as to allow the courts to select the most appropriate sentence for an 
offender, within the confines set by proportionality. 
“Tailoring punishments that are appropriate to the seriousness of the offence yet responsive to the 
needs of individual offenders prioritises the effectiveness of sentences in reducing re-offending and 
recognises the dysfunctional consequences of short prison sentences.”278 
 
 This has become a staple requirement concerning community sentences. Section 35(3)(a) of 
the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 provided that a community 
sentence could only be imposed if the court was satisfied that the specific order was the 
most suitable for the offender.279 Furthermore, before imposing a drug treatment and testing 
order, the court needed to be satisfied that the offender’s propensity to misuse drugs was 
susceptible to treatment.280 Tailoring punishments that are appropriate for the offender is 
perhaps particularly important where repeated acquisitive crime is driven by criminogenic 
need. Providing the offender is susceptible to treatment, a rehabilitative approach may be 
worthy of careful consideration, benefiting as it would both the offender and the wider 
community by reducing his propensity to reoffend. But where the offender is not susceptible 
to treatment, striving toward a rehabilitative goal would be fruitless. 
 
Where proportionality has failed to retain its central function is in the perceived greater role 
afforded to previous convictions at sentencing, by the 2003 Act rescinding the progressive 
loss of mitigation approach and favouring a cumulative approach. Cumulative sentencing 
cannot fit easily within a desert framework. An offender’s lengthy criminal record may 
overshadow the seriousness of the current offence as the primary sentence determinant.   
 
  
                                                          
278 Ashworth & Player (2005), at 836 
279 The same provision was subsequently re-enacted under section 148(3)(a) CJA 2003 











This chapter will move from the generic sentencing principles discussed in the foregoing 
chapter, to consider issues specifically relating to sentencing for theft. The purpose here is to 
evaluate the perceived seriousness of the offence, with particular reference to the courts’ 
sentencing powers and offence-specific guidelines. 
 
 
3.2 Theft and the Courts’ Sentencing Powers 
 
3.2.1 The Statutory Maxima and Courts’ Sentencing Powers 
 
Section 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968 provides: 
A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another 
with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; and ‘thief’ and ‘steal’ shall be 
construed accordingly.1 
 
The offence is triable either way and was originally punishable with a maximum of 10 years’ 
imprisonment on indictment,2 but this was later reduced to seven years by section 26 of the 
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive analysis of the substantive law of theft, see Griew (1995) chapter 2, and more recently Ormerod & 
Williams (2007) chapter 2. 
2 Section 7 Theft Act 1968 
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Criminal Justice Act 1991.3 When tried summarily, magistrates’ sentencing powers currently 
extend to a maximum six months’ imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding £5,000.4 Where 
the magistrates’ court sentences an offender for two or more offences, the sentences (each no 
greater than 6 months’ imprisonment) can be ordered to run consecutively. The aggregate 
term of imprisonment must not exceed 12 months.5 Consequently, where an offender is to be 
sentenced for more than one offence, the extended available sentence may lead the 
magistrates to retain jurisdiction rather than referring the case to the Crown Court. The 
enactment of section 154 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 will lead to increased sentencing 
powers for magistrates from six to 12 months’ imprisonment for each offence, although 
there are currently no plans to bring this provision into force.6 For offences such as theft 
where a maximum penalty is prescribed, that maximum should be used only in the most 
serious examples of behaviour falling within the offence.7 For other (less serious) forms of 
the offence, a lesser penalty would be appropriate. The most serious form of an offence may 
be difficult, or impossible, to identify and may be heavily informed by subjective notions of 
seriousness: the same views of offence seriousness may not be universally held by all. 
Furthermore, even if the most serious form of an offence exists in theory, it may not exist in 






                                                          
3 This reduction in maximum penalty was ruled by the Court of Appeal to have retrospective effect; Shaw [1996] 2 Cr App R 
(S) 278 
4 Section 78(1) Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 
5 Section 133(2) Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 
6 The upper limit of six months’ imprisonment for one offence does not apply where the offence’s statutory maxima is less 
than six months. The magistrates may only impose a maximum of six months’ imprisonment or the statutory maxima, 
whichever is the less.  
7 Advisory Council on the Penal System (1978), page 38 
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3.2.2 Mode of Trial 
 
As an either way offence, theft may be tried (and sentenced for) in either the magistrates’ 
court or the Crown Court. According to the National Mode of Trial Guidelines,8 theft should 
be tried summarily unless the magistrates’ court considers that its sentencing powers are 
insufficient,9 and the offence involved either (i) a breach of trust by a person in a position of 
substantial authority, (ii) theft committed in a sophisticated manner, (iii) theft committed by 
an organised gang, (iv) offending against a particularly vulnerable victim, or (v) theft of high 
value goods which were not recovered.10 Accordingly, a theft trial will usually only reach 
the Crown Court where the magistrates are of the opinion that the seriousness of the offence 
warrants trial in the higher court.11 Alternatively, the Crown Court may hear a theft trial 
where the defendant exercises his right to elect a jury trial in the Crown Court, leading to the 
possibility of the Crown Court hearing cases involving even the most minor forms of the 
offence. 
 
In his review of the mode of trial decision, Cammiss found that theft from a motor vehicle 
would almost always be deemed suitable for summary trial.12 Furthermore, shop theft was 
generally excluded from his study as it would almost never be viewed as sufficiently serious 
to justify referral to the Crown Court.13 Cammiss did conclude, however, that where the 
value of the property stolen is over £10,000 the case would be “deemed to be unsuitable for 
summary trial regardless of any other case features.”14 It is quite probable that offences 
involving such high values would be committed by persons in a high position of trust who 
                                                          
8 Practice Direction (Criminal Proceedings: Consolidation) [2002] 1 WLR 2870, para. 51 
9 Ibid, at para.51.3(f) 
10 Ibid, at para. 51.7 
11 However, Herbert (2004) found a variation in mode of trial decision-making patterns between different magistrates’ 
courts, with decisions seemingly being influenced by local culture. 
12 Cammiss (2004), at 227 
13 Ibid, at 185 
14 Ibid, at 259 
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have access to such sums, perhaps in company or client accounts, and may rightly justify 
transference to the Crown Court in accordance with the National Mode of Trial Guidelines.15  
 
 
3.2.3 Committal for Sentencing 
 
Following a conviction or guilty plea before the magistrates, the court can proceed to pass 
sentence, albeit within the confines of its limited sentencing powers.16 Following a finding of 
guilt, the magistrates have the power to commit a case to the Crown Court for sentencing if 
the magistrates are of the opinion that the offence, together with any associated offences, 
was “so serious that greater punishment should be inflicted for the offence than the court 
has power to impose”.17 Similarly, they may also commit to the Crown Court following the 
offender’s indication of a guilty plea.18 Where a case is committed to the Crown Court for 
sentencing, the Court may proceed to sentence the offender in the same way as if he were 
convicted on indictment, thereby utilising its greater sentencing powers.19 
 
 
3.3 Out of Court Disposals 
 
On occasion, an offender may escape a court appearance by being issued with, and 
accepting, an out of court disposal. These options, which include cautions, conditional 
                                                          
15 Either under para 51.7(a), “breach of trust by a person in a position of substantial authority…” or where the property has 
a value in excess of £10,000 and is not recovered (para 51.7(e). 
16 Herbert (2003) has cast doubt on any claim that the magistrates’ increased sentencing powers under section 153 CJA 
2003 (once enacted, if ever) will have the anticipated effect of lowering the committal rate. 
17 Section 3(2)(a) Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. Once section 41 and Schedule 3 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 are enacted, magistrates will lose their power to commit to the Crown Court once they have accepted to 
hear the case, unless the criteria for an extended sentence or sentence for public protection are met. Magistrates will 
retain their power to commit for sentencing following an offender’s guilty plea before venue. 
18 Section 4 Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. 
19 Section 5(1) Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 
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cautions, warnings, reprimands, and penalty notices for disorder, aim to deal with less 
serious offences quickly, by avoiding court procedures entirely, and may reduce the 
likelihood of reoffending by saving the offender from the negative effects which stem from 
acquiring a criminal record:20 “once a person is publically identified as a deviant…it 





When dealing with adult offenders, police have a discretion to issue a formal caution as an 
alternative to prosecution. This discretion is regulated by the National Standards for 
Cautioning,22 which state that a caution may only be issued where there exists sufficient 
evidence against the offender to give rise to a realistic prospect of conviction.  Additionally, 
the offender must admit the offence, and a caution must be in the public interest.23 
 
 
3.3.2 Conditional Cautions24 
 
More recently, the police have been granted powers to issue to an adult offender a caution 
complete with certain conditions.25 The conditions attached may aim to facilitate the 
offender’s rehabilitation or may require the offender to undertake reparation.26 The 
requirements to be met before a conditional caution may be imposed are listed in section 23 
                                                          
20 These out of court disposals are recorded by the police but do not count as criminal convictions. The subject thereby 
escapes acquiring a criminal record. 
21 Rock (2007), at 31. 
22 Contained within Home Office Circular 18/1994 
23 Ibid, at paragraph 2 
24 For a review of the perceived advantages and disadvantages of conditional cautions, see Brownlee (2008). 
25 Conditional cautions were created by sections 22-27 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
26 Section 22(3) 
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of the 2003 Act, and include: that the evidence against the offender must be sufficient to 
instigate charge proceedings, the offender must admit the offence, and the conditional 
caution must be deemed to be an appropriate disposal. 
 
 
3.3.3 Warning and Reprimands 
 
The power to formally caution a young offender was revoked upon the enactment of the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which now provides the police with a discretion to reprimand 
or warn a young offender. Either may only be imposed where, (a) there is evidence that an 
offence has been committed, (b) evidence is sufficient for a realistic prospect of conviction, 
(c) the offender admits to having committed the offence, (d) the offender has no previous 
conviction, and (e) it is not in the public interest for the offender to be prosecuted.27 In 
addition to these conditions, a reprimand may only be imposed where the offender has not 
previously been reprimanded or warned. A second reprimand or a reprimand following an 
earlier warning or conviction is thereby prohibited.28 A warning may be granted where the 
offender has previously been reprimanded, but not warned, or where the offence for which 
a previous warning was given was committed more than two years’ ago and the seriousness 
of the offence does not require a prosecution.29 
 
In 2008, 60,284 offenders were issued with a caution, conditional caution, warning or 
reprimand.30 Of these 28,677 were aged under 18, who would have received a reprimand or 
                                                          
27 Section 65(1) Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
28 Section 65(2) 
29 Section 65(3) 
30 The Criminal Statistics deal with all four disposal types collectively. Consequently, it is not possible to identify the 
number of each disposal individually, although the statistics are broken down by age group, so it is possible to calculate the 
number of warnings and reprimands imposed (albeit not separately) as opposed to cautions and conditional cautions. 
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warning. The remaining 31,607 were over the age of 18, and would have been issued with a 
caution or conditional caution.31 
 
 
3.3.4 Penalty Notices for Disorder 
 
Since late 2004, an offender caught committing retail theft of property with a value of less 
than £200 (but not usually greater than £100) has been able to avoid a court hearing by 
accepting a Penalty Notice for Disorder (PND), carrying an on-the-spot £80 fine.32 In 2008, 
PNDs were imposed on 45,616 occasions for offences of retail theft.33 This disposal is only 
available where it is deemed to be the most suitable option, taking into account the interests 
of justice, and is therefore not considered appropriate for repeat or prolific offenders or for 
known substance misusers.34 It has therefore been established that PNDs are not suitable for 
all offenders. Indeed, even if prima facie the criteria for imposing a PND are satisfied, an 
offender may still be prosecuted either because the offender wishes to have a court hearing, 




3.3.5 Out of Court Disposals and the Impact on Sentencing 
 
Each of the out of court disposal options considered above require the offender to admit the 
offence of which they are accused. This opens up the disposal options to criticism as unduly 
pressurising a suspect into giving a false admission for the offence in order to avoid the risk 
                                                          
31 Ministry of Justice (2010b) Table 3.7a 
32 Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment No 2) Order 2004, SI 2468 
33 Ministry of Justice (2010b) Table 3.10e 
34 Home Office (2005) para 6.20-6.21 
81 
 
of prosecution.35 This should be safeguarded against by the requirement that no out of court 
disposal may be issued without sufficient evidence to support a prosecution. Claims have 
been made however that some suspects are cautioned because of a lack of evidence to secure 
a conviction.36 It must also be remembered that none of the above disposal options 
constitute a conviction. By accepting the option, the offender avoids the risk of acquiring a 
criminal record. This alone may offer a compelling enough reason to accept the disposal 
option. 
 
Any increase in the use of out of court disposals, which is not explained by an increase in the 
crime rate, will have a corresponding effect on the number of offenders proceeded against in 
the courts and may consequently have an impact on the numbers sentenced by the courts.37 
This may be particularly true with thefts against retailers where, in addition to the powers to 
issue a caution, warning or reprimand (which may be available for all forms of theft) the 
police may also deal with the offence by way of a PND.38 
 
 
3.4 Theft and Sentencing Guidelines 
 
The diversity in types of theft and their relative seriousness is made apparent when 
consulting the various guidelines emanating from the Court of Appeal and Sentencing 
Guidelines Council (SGC). On the one hand, breach of trust has been identified for many 
                                                          
35 Sprack (2004), at 70 
36 Sanders (2002), at 154 
37 Professor Ashworth noted the strong movement towards the use of diversionary disposals had resulted in a 
“considerable reduction in the number of indictable offenders sentenced by the courts” during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Ashworth (2001), at 84 
38 It is difficult to conclusively examine how a rise in the use of out of court disposals may affect the number of sentenced 
offenders as any change in the number of sentences imposed may be explained by a change in the crime rate. Although 
figures for recorded crime (along with a clear-up rate) are published (A. Walker, J. Flatley et al, Crime in England and Wales 
2008/09 (Home Office Statistical Bulletin 11/09, 2009, Home Office)) these cover the fiscal year, whereas sentencing 
statistics are based on the calendar year, rendering comparisons difficult. 
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years as a particularly serious form of theft, often deserving a period of immediate 
imprisonment. However, more recently, the Court of Appeal and SGC have agreed that theft 
from a retailer is somewhat less serious, usually warranting a non-custodial penalty. Theft 
has, over the years, been the subject of a number of sentencing guidelines. The Magistrates’ 
Association Sentencing Guidelines included a guideline for theft, with a separate entry for 
theft committed in breach of trust to provide for the more serious nature of the offence. The 
Court of Appeal over the years provided a number of guideline judgments relating to 
specific forms of the offence, although not all forms were covered. The SGC now includes 
entries in its sentencing guidelines relating to four forms of theft: theft from the person, theft 
from a dwelling, theft from a shop, and theft in breach of trust. 
 
 
3.4.1 Magistrates’ Association Sentencing Guidelines39 
 
The Magistrates’ Association Sentencing Guidelines (2000) provided detail on sentencing for 
a range of offences including theft.40 For each offence, magistrates were presented with the 
maximum penalty prescribed for the offence, and were directed to a prescribed sentence 
band (either a fine, discharge, community penalty or custodial sentence). The Guidelines 
also provided magistrates with a list of relevant aggravating and mitigating factors that 
ought to be taken into consideration when deciding on the appropriate sentence, although 
the list was not exhaustive and the guidelines did not go so far as to suggest the weight that 
ought to be placed on each of these factors: sentencers retained a judicial discretion in 
deciding the importance to be placed on the presence (or absence) of each factor.  
                                                          
39 These guidelines have been superseded by guidelines emanating from the Sentencing Guidelines Council (SGC), but are 
included here as they were applicable to this study’s sample of cases. 
40 This single volume is currently being replaced by the Sentencing Guidelines’ Council’s definitive guidelines, being issued 
piecemeal. The latter are of wider application, requiring every sentencing court in England and Wales to “have regard to 




The Association’s Guidelines included an entry for theft along with a separate guideline for 
theft committed in breach of trust, highlighting the perceived difference in seriousness 
between breach of trust cases and other thefts. For theft (non-breach of trust cases), the 
guideline was a community sentence. The list of aggravating factors included stealing 
property of high value, committing the offence as part of an organised team, committing the 
offence against a vulnerable victim and involving children in the commission of the crime. 
The list of mitigating factors in theft cases was limited to only two entries: offending on 
impulse and stealing property of a low value, for both of which the opposite (planned 
offending and high value respectively) amount to aggravation. For value and planning (or 
lack thereof) there is no neutral middle ground: the factors will either aggravate or mitigate. 
Once again it ought to be emphasised that the lists of factors were not exhaustive and 
allowed magistrates to consider any other factors which may present themselves. 
 
Where theft was committed in breach of trust, magistrates had at their disposal a separate 
entry in the Association Guidelines. Whereas the guideline sentence for other thefts was a 
community sentence, the guideline for breach of trust was custody. As with theft, a number 
of aggravating factors (including casting suspicion on others, prolonged offending, 
offending by a senior employee) and mitigating factors (including impulsive offending, low 
value, a single transaction, and offending by an unsupported junior employee) were listed 
which may influence the magistrates’ decision. The weight to be attributed to each factor is, 








3.4.2 Court of Appeal Guideline Judgments 
 
Crown Court judges were not bound to follow the Magistrates’ Association Sentencing 
Guidelines. However, they were required to have regard to guideline judgments emanating 
from the Court of Appeal.41  When hearing an appeal against sentence, the Court would 
occasionally take the opportunity to provide guidance to the sentencing courts “as to the 
principles which should underlie sentencing in cases of that kind.”42 But the Court of 
Appeal could only create a guideline judgment if and when an appropriate case was 
brought before it. Tying the guideline and appeal systems together places an inherent 
restriction on the type of cases for which guidance can be offered. This raises two related 
points: firstly, an appeal would only reach the Court if the trial court’s decision as to 
sentence is claimed to be too severe by the defendant or too lenient by the Attorney-
General.43 Consequently, only a “very skewed sample of cases”44 go before the Court of 
Appeal. Secondly, the bulk of cases before the Court are at the serious end of the spectrum 
and are of limited application to the magistrates.45 Since the vast majority of either-way 
cases are dealt with at the magistrates’ court, Court of Appeal judges are not well placed to 
devise guidelines on these offences;46 their past experience is based primarily in dealing 
with more serious offending. Indeed, even where a guideline judgment for an either-way 
offence is given, the Court of Appeal may still focus on the more serious forms of the offence 
which are primarily of relevance to the Crown Court.47 Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal 
has never provided a guideline judgment on theft in general, nor has it provided guidelines 
                                                          
41 More recently, the role of producing guidelines has passed to the Sentencing Guidelines Council. See section 167-173 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003. As a sentencing court, the Crown Court must “have regard to any guidelines which are 
relevant to the offender’s case” under section 172(1)(a) Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
42 Wasik (2003), at 240 
43 Ibid, at page 243 
44 Ibid. 
45 Wasik (2001a), at373 
46 Wasik (2003), at 243 
47 See for example Barrick (1985) 7 Cr App R (S) 142 and Clark [1998] 2 Cr App R (S) 95 at section 3.4.2.1 below. 
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for all of the sub-categories of theft (such as theft from the person and theft from a dwelling). 
Under its role as deliverer of guideline judgments, the Court of Appeal principally 
considered two forms of theft: in breach of trust and from a shop. The main guideline 
judgments will now be discussed. 
 
 
3.4.2.1 Theft in Breach of Trust 
 
The first theft-related guideline judgment to be issued by the Court of Appeal was Barrick,48 
which dealt with the ‘top end’ of the range of breach of trust offending; where the offender 
had been placed in a position of trust, for example, an accountant, solicitor, postal worker or 
bank employee, who abused the position to embezzle funds. The guidelines therefore would 
not extend to less serious thefts by employees, or thefts committed against friends or family 
members even where the victims had placed trust in the offender. The Court ruled that, 
except where the amount of money stolen is small, an immediate custodial sentence is 
inevitable, despite the fact that the offender will often be of good previous character and is 
unlikely to reoffend, not least because he will never again secure similar employment to 
facilitate future (similar) offending. The guideline terms of imprisonment were based 
principally on the amount of money stolen, although the Court emphasised that other 
factors will have to be considered. 
 
These guideline terms were reviewed in Clark49 to account for inflation and the reduction in 
the statutory maxima from ten to seven years. Where the amounts appropriated are not 
small but are less than £17,500 an immediate custodial sentence of up to 21 months was 
deemed appropriate. Cases involving sums not exceeding £100,000 would warrant two to 
                                                          
48 (1985) 7 Cr App R (S) 142 
49 [1998] 2 Cr App R (S) 95 
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three years’ imprisonment, rising to up to four years where the sums did not exceed 
£250,000. Offences involving sums not exceeding £1million would merit sentences of up to 
nine years, made possible by the use of consecutive sentences for multiple counts. Where a 
case involved sums exceeding £1million a sentence exceeding 10 years’ imprisonment may 
be imposed. 
 
As mentioned above, the Court of Appeal in Barrick had acknowledged that offenders who 
enjoy a position of trust are unlikely to find future similar employment and would 
doubtfully reoffend. Despite this, the Court had recognised the need for significant terms of 
imprisonment in cases involving breaches of a high position of trust where significant sums 
are appropriated. This punitive attitude is not founded on the need to rehabilitate or 
incapacitate offenders. Rather, no doubt, it is based on the need to punish and, perhaps, 
deter potential offenders. 
 
With reference only being made to significant sums of money, the guideline judgments of 
Barrick and Clark focused only on the more serious forms of breach of trust offending. The 
judgments are of limited application to the magistrates’ courts, with the sentences 
prescribed all falling outside of the magistrates’ jurisdiction. 
 
 
3.4.2.2 Theft from Shops 
 
Towards the end of 2004, the Court of Appeal took the opportunity to provide some 
guidance for the sentencing of individual adult shoplifters in Page, Maher and Stewart.50 The 
guideline judgment expressly excluded thefts committed by organised gangs or young 
                                                          
50 [2004] EWCA Crim 3358 
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offenders. The guiding principles offered by the Court were far from comprehensive, and 
were limited to only four points. Firstly, custody should be reserved as the sentence of last 
resort,51 and would almost never be appropriate for a first offence except where the offence 
is aggravated by including the use of a child as an instrument for the commission of the 
offence. A number of earlier cases have called for immediate imprisonment in cases 
involving a child;52 these rulings were to remain authoritative. Secondly, where the offence 
is attributable to a drug addiction, a drug treatment and testing order (DTTO) would often 
be the most appropriate sentence in an attempt to combat the cause of the offending 
behaviour, notwithstanding the order’s low success rate.53 It is worth noting here that in 
Attorney General’s Reference No 64 of 200354 the Court held inter alia that such an order should 
only be imposed where there is a realistic prospect of reducing an offender’s drug 
dependency. The Court had also noted that these orders will often be appropriate in cases of 
acquisitive offending such as theft. Thirdly, for offenders who perpetually commit minor 
forms of the offence, a custodial term not exceeding one month may be appropriate. Where 
the offender has also prepared equipment to facilitate the commission of the offence, up to 
two months’ imprisonment may be called for. Finally, even where an offender is being 
sentenced for a number of retail thefts, the offence’s comparatively low seriousness would 
rarely require a sentence beyond two years’ imprisonment following a guilty plea, and 
would often merit not more than 12 to 18 months. 
 
This final point particularly highlights the wide discretion left to sentencers by the Court of 
Appeal. The guideline judgment was undeveloped. Other than the single reference to 
                                                          
51 This was a restatement of an already well-established principle, both in English and International Law, that is of general 
application and not limited to cases of theft. See for example,  Council of Europe, Consistency in Sentencing 
Recommendation (R)92(17) (1993) at para 5; R v Kefford [2002] 2 Cr App R (S) 495 
52 R v Oakley (1979) 1 Cr App R (S) 366; R v Moss (1986) 8 Cr App R (S) 276; R v Goldrick (1988) 10 Cr App R (S) 346; R v 
Mariconda 10 (1988) Cr App R (S) 356 
53 In one sample, only 30 per cent of DTTOs made were successfully completed; 67 per cent were revoked. However, the 
two-year reconviction rates of those whose orders were completed (53 per cent) was significantly lower than for revoked 
orders (91 per cent). See Hough et al (2003), at page 3 
54 [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) 22 
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DTTOs, the judgment ignored non-custodial sentencing options, which the statistics given 
above indicate are far more commonly imposed than terms of imprisonment.55 
Consequently, the judgment failed to consider the appropriate sentencing levels for the 
majority of shoplifting offences, preferring instead to concentrate on the more serious 
incidents of the offence. That being said, the Court had provided a clear message on the use 
of imprisonment: custody should be used as a last resort, and when imposed the terms of 
imprisonment would usually be relatively short. This is reflective of other statements given 
by the Court of Appeal on the use of imprisonment over the last three decades56 and is also 
mirrored in the relatively short average custodial sentence lengths detailed in the recent 
sentencing statistics discussed above. 
 
 
3.4.3 Sentencing Guidelines Council Guidelines 
 
Since the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the newly-formed Sentencing 
Guidelines Council (SGC) bears ultimate responsibility for formulating sentencing 
guidelines in England and Wales.57 Following advice from the Sentencing Advisory Panel 
(SAP), the SGC published its draft guideline on the sentencing of adult offenders convicted 
of theft (and non-domestic burglary) in March 2008. This was followed by the definitive 
guideline in December of the same year. 58 As with all of its other guidelines, the SGC strives 
toward forming guidelines based on proportionate sentencing, where the seriousness of the 
offence is reflected in the severity of the penalty imposed. The theft guideline begins with an 
identification of the primary purpose of sentencing: assessing the seriousness of the offence 
                                                          
55 See section 3.2.2 
56 For example, Bibi (1980) 71 Cr App R (S) 360; Ollerenshaw (1999) 1 Cr App R (S) 65; Seed; Stark [2007] EWCA Crim 254 
57 More recently, section 118(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 has created a new body which will replace the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council and Sentencing Advisory Panel with a single Sentencing Council for England and Wales. For a 
review of the new Council’s powers, duties and membership, see Ashworth (2010b) 
58 SGC (2008) 
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by determining an offender’s culpability and the harm caused, risked or intended. The 
notion that offence seriousness is a composite of culpability and harm has been recently 
recognised by the English and Welsh legislature in section 143(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003.59 The issue of offence seriousness has itself been the subject of a guideline from the 
SGC.60 According to the Council’s theft guideline, an offender convicted of theft will often 
have demonstrated a high level of culpability since the offences require the offender to have 
acted both dishonestly and intentionally,61 although the precise level of culpability is shaped 
by the presence of factors such as motivation, the degree of planning, and whether the 
offender was in a position of trust.62 In assessing the harm caused by the offence, the Council 
takes the view that the starting point should be the loss suffered by the victim, and that the 
seriousness of the offence will increase in line with the extent of the loss63 but, as with 
assessing the offender’s culpability, the precise level of harm will be affected by other factors 
such as the vulnerability of the victim and whether the offender intended to steal property 
of a greater or lesser value than that actually taken.  
 
Whereas the Court of Appeal’s guideline judgments traditionally took on a narrative form 
rather than the numerical approach favoured by many of the American sentencing 
commissions,64 the Council’s guidelines have moved someway toward the numerical. Four 
forms of theft are each represented by a separate guideline; theft in breach of trust, theft 
from a shop, theft from the person, and theft in a dwelling. For each form, a number of 
descriptions (either three or four) are given, each one describing a “type” of the offence 
which is more serious than the one below it. Then for each type a sentencing range and 
prescribed starting point is given.  
                                                          
59 Proportionality theorists have long identified harm and culpability as the two elements which make up offence 
seriousness. See for example von Hirsch (1985) chapter 6 
60 SGC (2004a) 
61 SGC (2008), page 4 
62 Ibid  
63 Ibid  






3.4.3.1 Theft in Breach of Trust 
 
A version of the SGC’s guideline for theft in breach of trust is given below. As with the 
earlier guidance on theft in breach of trust, the main factor used in determining sentence is 
the value of funds appropriated. However, the SGC has widened the scope of the guidance 
previously offered by the Court of Appeal to encapsulate the less serious forms of the 
offence, which should now provide greater guidance for the magistrates’ court.  
 
Theft in breach of trust remains to be viewed as the most serious form of theft, often 
deserving a custodial sentence where the offender enjoyed a high position of trust and stole 
significant sums. However, the guidelines indicate that a non-custodial sentence may be 
appropriate in the least serious forms of the offence. This is not necessarily contrary to the 
earlier guideline judgments emanating from the Court of Appeal, which ignored all but the 













SOURCE: Sentencing Guidelines Council, Theft and Burglary in a Building other than a Dwelling: Definitive 




3.4.3.2 Theft from a Shop 
 
Retail theft is the only form of the offence for which the SGC guidelines prescribe a 
conditional discharge within the sentence range at the lower end of the offending scale. At 
the same time, custodial sentences remain an important fixture of the guidelines, 
particularly at the higher reaches of the offence seriousness, indicating the wide scope of 




As with the other forms of theft, for more serious offending, the guidelines prescribe 
sentences beyond the jurisdictions of the magistrates’ courts, thereby requiring some cases 
of each type of theft to be referred to the Crown Court. 
 
Table3.2: SGC Guideline on Retail Theft 
SOURCE: Sentencing Guidelines Council, Theft and Burglary in a Building other than a Dwelling: Definitive 








3.4.3.3 Theft from the person and theft in a dwelling 
 
The descriptions, starting points and sentence ranges for theft from the person and theft in a 
dwelling are identical to one another and so can be dealt with together. They each provide 
three types of the sub-categories of theft based on the vulnerability of the victim and any 
intimidation or force used. 
 
Table3.3: SGC Guideline on Theft in a dwelling and from the person 
SOURCE: Sentencing Guidelines Council, Theft and Burglary in a Building other than a Dwelling: Definitive 
Guideline (2008, Sentencing Guidelines Council), page 13 and 15 
 
As with other forms of the offence, courts are guided to utilise a range of sentencing options 
when dealing with theft from the person or in a dwelling. The most serious forms of the 
offence (where the theft is committed against a vulnerable victim and involves intimidation) 
will, it appears, always warrant a custodial sentence attracting as it does a sentence range of 
12 months to three years’ imprisonment. Where the offence is committed against a non-
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vulnerable victim, the offender may escape a custodial sentence. In light of the prescribed 
starting points and sentence ranges, the SGC guidelines appear to view theft from the 
person and in a dwelling as less serious than thefts in breach of trust but more serious than 
thefts against retailers. 
 
 
3.4.3.4 Application and Effects of the SGC’s Guidelines 
 
The Council’s guidelines apply to first-time offenders at a contested trial; a guilty plea 
should be rewarded with a sentence discount in line with the separate guideline, Reduction 
in Sentence for a Guilty Plea.65 In short, the SGC recommends a discount of one third where an 
offender enters a guilty plea at the earliest opportunity, falling to one tenth where the plea is 
entered “at the ‘door of the court’ or after the trial has begun”.66 In accordance with section 
143(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, any previous convictions must be treated as a source 
of aggravation, thereby increasing the seriousness of the offence, and the presence of such 
may place the offence over the custody or community sentence thresholds “even though the 
other offence characteristics would otherwise warrant a lesser sentence.”67 The Council 
expects the sentencing court to identify the offence description (from the three or four 
“forms” of the offence provided in the guideline) that most closely matches the facts of the 
instant case. This will provide the sentencing court with the appropriate starting point. The 
court must then take into account any aggravating and mitigating factors to reach the 
provisional sentence. Therefore, a discount may be granted to an offender who enters a 
guilty plea before trial, but a sentence increase could be added where the offender has a 
history of similar behaviour. 
                                                          
65 SGC (2007) 
66 Ibid, at 5 




Sentencers retain greater power by the fact that they may depart from the prescribed 
sentence ranges: having taken into account all relevant factors, it may be appropriate for a 
court to pass a sentence which falls outside (either above or below) the range given. For 
example, an offender with no previous convictions, who entered an early guilty plea and 
was able to rely on a number of mitigating factors, may have imposed upon him a sentence 
below the range prescribed for his conduct type. If, on the other hand, an offender had a 
lengthy criminal record and his case involved a number of aggravating features which 
significantly increased the seriousness of the offence, the sentence may fall above the 
sentence range set. Although this may appear to curtail the usefulness of the guidelines, it 
does address the concerns that guidelines markedly fetter judges’ discretion in sentencing 
by recognising that the guidelines cannot hope to cover all eventualities.68 Ultimately, if a 
court believes that imposing a sentence within the guidelines prescribed range in a given 
case would lead to an injustice, the sentencer is in the best position, having knowledge of the 
full details surrounding the case, to ensure the sentence passed is just. In practice, sentencers 
may be apprehensive of passing a sentence beyond the prescribed range as this may give the 
offender good grounds for appeal claiming that the penalty imposed is manifestly excessive. 
 
The disparity in English sentencing across most crimes (as well as other jurisdictions) is well 
known.69 One aim of any guidelines system is to promote a consistent approach in 
sentencing, and its success may well be measured on the basis of its ability to inhibit 
disparity.70 Indeed, s.170(5)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 places a statutory duty on the 
SGC to have regard to “the need to promote consistency in sentencing” when framing its 
sentencing guidelines. So how likely is it that the Council’s guidelines on theft will lead to 
                                                          
68 On the perceived judicial opposition to guidelines see, Tonry (2002), at 99-100  
69 Bagaric (2001) page 253; Tarling (1979); Tarling (2006)  
70 Tonry (1987) 
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more consistent sentencing?  For a number of years, each magistrate has been armed with a 
copy of the Magistrates’ Association Sentencing Guidelines which offered little in the way of 
constructive guidance in helping the bench to decide on the sentence to be imposed. The 
guidelines provided a non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating factors, and 
furthermore they fundamentally failed to indicate the weight that each factor would carry. 
The provision of narrower versions of the offence, together with sentencing ranges and 
starting points within each bracket, could do much to promote a more consistent approach 
to sentencing, but there remains considerable leeway for magistrates to assess the effect of 
each aggravating and mitigating feature. Some offences (including theft) have a wide 
meaning and cover diverse types of behaviour. By distinguishing types (or forms) of the 
offence, the SGC has effectively created a larger number of more narrowly-focused offences 
which ought to be useful to sentencing judges and magistrates. At the same time, the 
Council’s guidelines are still open to interpretation. What, exactly, constitutes “some 
planning” rather than “little planning” both of which are used by the SGC?  Although the 
SGC offers an example of ‘some planning’ (committing a series of offences on the same day 
or where the offender goes equipped to steal), the sentencing courts will often have to use 
their own interpretation of these terms to decide which description best suits the offence 
before them, and there are no guarantees that each court will interpret the terms alike. 
Similarly, it will be left to the sentencing court to decide which of an offender’s previous 
convictions (if any) are relevant to the immediate offence, and the level of the premium to be 
added to the sentence in order to reflect these. 
 
For retail theft, the earlier guideline emanating from the Court of Appeal in Page, Maher and 
Stewart71 focussed on non-violent, non-organised offending and set a maximum of two 
years’ imprisonment for those offenders being sentenced on multiple counts of shop theft. In 
                                                          
71 [2004] EWCA Crim 3358 
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such instances the Court also ruled that sentences beyond 18 months will rarely be 
warranted. Even though the Court expressly excluded gang offending from the scope of its 
guideline judgment, it did make an obiter statement that where gang offending occurs 
repeatedly or on a large scale, sentencing of the order of 4 years may well be appropriate, 
even on a plea of guilty.”72 The same figure has been set by the Council, albeit for a single 
offence rather than a series of offences. The overall sentencing range prescribed by the SGC 
for retail theft is aligned with the earlier Court of Appeal guideline judgment. 
 
The main concern surrounding the Council’s guideline on shop theft is that the appropriate 
sentencing range (and therefore the ultimate sentence) depends chiefly on the level of 
intimidation, threats or use of force.73 Indeed, the highest sentencing range prescribed by the 
Council (36 weeks to four years’ custody) is reserved for offences involving both group 
offending and a level of intimidation, threats or use of force significant enough to fall just 
short of robbery. But where an offence involves such a high level of force, it is likely to 
warrant a separate charge for an offence against the person. Knowing that violence is 
afforded such a significant role as aggravation for a theft offence, in cases where the offender 
contests the violence (or degree thereof) or where the Crown Prosecution Service has 
insufficient evidence to charge for the violent conduct, the prosecution may rely on the 
violence as an aggravating feature of the theft. In short, where the offender is alleged to have 
committed a theft involving violence, there is a danger that he may be sentenced on the basis 
of the violence even where the charge (and conviction) does not reflect this. The allocation of 
violence and intimidation as such a strong source of aggravation provides the prosecution 
with an effective alternative to securing a separate charge for violent conduct. 
 
 
                                                          
72 Ibid, paragraph 2 
73 See Table 1, supra 
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3.5 Aggravation and Mitigation in Theft Cases 
 
In a rare example of empirical research into court sentencing practice, Flood-Page and 
Mackie identified a number of factors which were found to either increase or reduce the 
likelihood of a custodial sentence being imposed for theft.74 In the magistrates’ courts, 
custody was less likely to be imposed if the offender (i) had no previous convictions, (ii) was 
being sentenced for only one offence, (iii) was not subject to a court order at the time of the 
offence, (iv) had demonstrated remorse or offered to pay compensation to the victim, or (v) 
the offender was aged over 30.75 The authors found a correlation between the decision to 
impose a custodial sentence where the opposite of each of these factors was true. That is, 
custody was more likely to be imposed where the offender had previous convictions, was 
being sentenced for more than one offence, was subject to a court order at the time of the 
offence, had not demonstrated remorse or offered to pay compensation to the victim, or 
where the offender was aged 30 or younger. Additionally, the offender was more likely to 
receive a custodial sentence where he was sentenced for theft of, or from, a vehicle or where 
other offences were taken into consideration.76  
 
In the authors’ sample of theft cases being sentenced before the magistrates’ courts, 12 
percent of all thefts resulted in a custodial sentence. Where the offender had no previous 
convictions, only two percent were imprisoned. This figure increased to 15 percent for 
offenders with one or more previous convictions of any type, and rose further to 17 percent 
for those with one or more previous theft convictions.77 Without knowledge of other factors 
present in specific cases, from these figures it appears that the magistrates view prior history 
                                                          
74 The authors’ analysis of the use of community sentences, fines and discharges did not separate cases by offence. 
Consequently, there was no analysis specifically for theft. The study’s findings relating to these sentence types will not be 
considered further here. 





as an important factor in determining the sentence, which may result in the decision to 
impose a custodial sentence. The custody rate for offenders with any previous convictions 
(15%) and previous theft convictions (17%) are surprisingly similar, suggesting that the type 
of conviction is not so important in the decision to imprison.  
 
Flood-Page and Mackie found that custody was imposed in 42 percent of theft cases 
sentenced before the Crown Court. The authors found a negative correlation between the 
decision to imprison and (i) female offenders, (ii) offenders with no previous convictions for 
theft, (iii) mentally ill offenders, (iv) offenders who were not subject to a court order at the 
time of the offence, and (v) thefts involving goods valued £100 or less.78 Conversely, custody 
was more likely to be imposed where the offender was male, or had one or more previous 
theft convictions, was subject to a court order at the time of the offence, or where the value 
of the goods stolen exceeded £1,000.79 Unlike in the magistrates’ courts, there was no 
correlation between the decision to imprison and offenders with previous convictions of any 
type. The Crown Court therefore appears to place greater importance on the similarity 
between the type of previous conviction and the nature of the immediate offence. 
 
Prior to delivering its advisory guideline to the SGC, the SAP commissioned an empirical 
study to explore the practice of sentencing offenders convicted for retail theft in England 
and Wales.80 In view of the fact that very little was known about sentencing for theft from a 
shop which could guide the SAP in its advice to the SGC, the SAP deemed it beneficial to 
commission the research to understand which factors influence the sentencing decision. The 
report was published in 2006, simultaneously with the SAP’s consultation paper on 
sentencing for theft from a shop. 
                                                          
78 Ibid at page 84 
79 Ibid. 




The report collected data on 1,563 thefts from shops where sentence was passed from late 
2004 to early 2005; the same timeframe as for the cases included in this study. The study 
utilised a rank order analysis which ranks the severity of sentences according to type. 
Discharges are the least severe penalty, with fines being more severe than discharges. 
Community sentences are more severe than fines but less severe than custodial sentences. 
This reflects the sentencing hierarchy presented under the 1991 and 2003 Criminal Justice 
Acts. The most commonly imposed sentence type for shop theft was a community sentence, 
imposed in 32 percent of cases within the sample. Discharges and custody were imposed in 
similar numbers, 27 percent and 26 percent respectively. Fines were imposed in only 13 
percent of cases.81  
 
Using a chi-square test for the cross tabulation of variables, the study found a number of 
factors, either relating to the offence or the offender, which were statistically significant to 
the sentencing decision. Regarding the offence, there was a significant, albeit small, 
correlation between the sentence type and value of goods stolen. The courts were slightly 
more likely to impose a custodial or community sentence where the theft involved property 
valued at over £100.82 Custody was the most likely outcome where the offence involved 
damage caused to property, with 41 percent of such cases resulting in imprisonment,83 
although the report did not suggest what constitutes damage or the extent of the damage in 
each case. Custodial and community sentences were more likely to be imposed in cases 
involving physical injury, particularly where that injury left a visible mark after the event.84 
Notwithstanding the fact that involving children in the commission of an offence is an 
aggravating factor, even where the child is not used but is aware that the offence is taking 
                                                          
81 Ibid, Table 4.3 
82 Ibid, Table 5.1 
83 Ibid, Table 5.3 
84 Ibid, Table 5.4 
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place,85 the study conducted by Speed and Burrows on behalf of the SAP found that a 
discharge was the most likely outcome where the offender was accompanied by a child, and 
that custody was very rarely imposed in such cases.86 However, courts may be reluctant to 
impose a custodial sentence where the offender is the sole carer of a child owing to the 
negative effects such a punishment would have on the child. The sentencing decision in such 
cases may be based more on the offender’s circumstances and family life than on the 
seriousness of the offence. 
 
Where there was evidence that the offender was under the influence of drugs at the time of 
the offence, there was a greater use of community sentences (including drug treatment and 
testing orders).87 By association, the study found a higher than average use of custody and 
community sentences where drugs were the motivation behind the offending. Although not 
unheard of, discharges and fines were less likely to be imposed in such cases.88 
 
On the issue of previous convictions, the Speed and Burrows study had found that custody 
was an unlikely outcome for first offenders except where other aggravating factors were 
present (such as high value of goods stolen).89 Generally, the greater number of previous 
convictions amassed by the offender, the higher the sentence would be.90 A discharge was 
imposed on 63 percent of first time offenders, compared with only 21 percent of offenders 
with six or more previous convictions.91 
 
In their conclusions, Speed and Burrows highlighted seven factors which were most 
associated with the imposition of a custodial sentence. This was not a multivariate analysis: 
                                                          
85 See SGC (2008), page 17 
86 Speed & Burrows (2006) Table 5.5 
87 Ibid, Table 5.6 
88 Ibid, page 43 
89 Ibid, Table 5.8 
90 Ibid. 
91 Figures modified from ibid, Table 5.8 
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each of the seven factors was individually associated with a greater use of custody. The 
seven factors were, (i) receiving a custodial sentence for the offender’s last conviction for 
theft from a shop, (ii) being remanded into custody, (iii) having no fixed abode, (iv) being 
labelled as a persistent offender, (v) being sentenced by a District Judge, (vi) being male, and 
(vii) being dealt with by the court at the same time for another offence.92 It is interesting to 
note that none of these factors directly relate to the seriousness of the offence. The decision 
to remand an offender may be based on offence seriousness, but the information within the 
report did not make clear why each offender was placed on remand, and whether this 
decision was made due to the seriousness of the offence. Consequently, it would appear that 
the decision to imprison is, in some cases at least, based principally on matters other than 
the seriousness of the offence. 
 
 
3.6 Abstracting electricity93 
 
Under the Larceny Act 1916, which preceded the Theft Act 1968, stealing electricity was 
dealt with as a separate offence as electricity was not capable of being taken and carried 
away, a requisite of other forms of the offence.94 Although the Theft Act 1968 does not 
require the taking and carrying away of property,95 the provision of a separate offence for 
electricity was preserved by the Act, which created a new offence of abstracting electricity 
contrary to section 13. Owing to its purely intangible form, electricity “is excluded from the 
definition of stealing.”96 This position was endorsed in Low v Blease97 where the Divisional 
                                                          
92 Ibid, page 59 
93 For a comprehensive analysis of the substantive law of abstractive, see Ormerod & Williams (2007) chapter 11. 
94 Section 1(1) Larceny Act 1911, “A person steals who, without the consent of the owner, fraudulently and without a claim 
of right made in good faith, takes and carries away anything capable of being stolen with intent, at the time of such taking, 
permanently to deprive the owner thereof” (emphasis added). 
95 Rather the property must be appropriated. 
96 Criminal Law Revision Committee (1966), paragraph 85  
97 [1975] Crim LR 513 
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Court held that electricity was not capable of being appropriated, and so could not form the 
basis of theft. The implication of this is that burglary may be committed by a trespasser who 
lights a gas fire, but not by one who switches on an electric fire since gas is capable of being 
stolen, whilst abstraction of electricity is not one of the ulterior offences of burglary.98 
 
According to section 13, abstraction is committed by a person who “dishonestly uses 
without due authority, or dishonestly causes to be wasted or diverted, any electricity…” The 
offence is triable either-way, carrying a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment. 
Traditionally, the courts have identified a need for deterrent sentencing for this offence,99 
and have more recently observed the seriousness of the offence.100 
 
Unlike many property offences, abstraction of electricity has not been made subject of any 
guidelines emanating from the Court of Appeal or SGC. Neither did the offence feature in 
the Magistrates’ Association Sentencing Guidelines, although guideline entries for other 
offences may be influential to the magistrates when passing sentence for abstraction by 





Although theft may not be frequently considered as one of the most serious offences within 
the criminal catalogue, the above discussion has demonstrated that it is far from a trivial 
offence, often satisfying the seriousness tests under the custody and community sentence 
                                                          
98 See Ormerod & Williams (2007), page 324 
99 Hodkinson (1980) 2 Cr App R (S) 331 
100 Harrison [2001] EWCA Crim 2427, at [6] per Rant J: “This is quite a serious criminal offence and not to be taken lightly. 
After all, law-abiding members of the public have to pay their public utility bills and some people, such as retired folk or 
lone parents, find difficulty in doing so because of their limited means.” 
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thresholds. That being said, thefts will also often attract lesser penalties within the financial 
and discharge bands. 
 
Throughout this discussion it has become clear, in view of mode of trial guidelines, offence-
specific guidelines and findings from sentencing practice studies, that theft in breach of trust 
is invariably viewed as the most serious form of the offence. But this measurement of 
seriousness does depend, of course, on other factors: theft in breach of a junior position of 
trust or thefts of low value are not marked as seriously as high value thefts or thefts by 
persons in senior positions. The seriousness of breach of trust cases depends greatly on the 
offender’s position of trust and the value of the property stolen. 
 
The recent sentencing guidelines issued by the SGC depict retail theft as the least serious 
form of the offence for which a specific guideline exists.101 Nonetheless, custodial sentences 
are still imposed reasonably frequently, and the SGC makes provision for significantly 
lengthy terms of imprisonment where the offence is committed by an organised gang and 
involves intimidation or threats of violence. 
 
All of this assumes that sentencers are following the letter of law, and are only imposing 
custodial and community sentences where the seriousness thresholds are satisfied. There 
may be, of course, an alternative explanation. Where an offender has a lengthy criminal 
history, his current offence may not be sufficiently serious to warrant a custodial sentence, 
but the courts have no choice but to impose a term of imprisonment. The offender may be 
unwilling to comply with a community order and may not have the funds to pay a fine. 
Consequently, the courts may consider custody to be the only realistic option available. In 
                                                          
101 Theft of a cycle may be less serious still, but no separate guideline exists for this subcategory of the offence. 
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some cases, the decision to imprison may be based principally on the offender’s prior 
criminality and, perhaps, his failure to comply with previous court orders.  
 
A similar conclusion was reached by a report commissioned by the Prison Reform Trust, 
which examined sentencing in ‘cusp’ cases (i.e. sitting on the borderline of the custody 
threshold). The authors found that in the majority of cusp cases, the decision to impose a 
custodial sentence was driven by the nature of the offence and/or the offender’s previous 
convictions and failure to respond to earlier sentences, effectively ruling out non-custodial 
options.102 By looking at cusp cases, this study focused on cases where the seriousness of the 
offence was sufficient enough to lead the court to at least consider custody. Nonetheless, in 
some cases, the ultimate decision to impose a custodial sentence was based on factors not 




                                                          











This chapter will explain the methods and methodology employed in undertaking this 
study. As will be true for many research projects, during the course of the study, a few small 
problems presented themselves which necessitated slight changes to the scheduled research 
methods. These will be set out later in this chapter. Fortunately, subsequent opportunities 
for alternative methods also arose, which allowed for the focus and aims of the project to 
remain the same. Alterations were only made to the methods of data collection utilised. The 
sentencing decision in theft cases was always the focus of the research, although the 
methods employed to examine this were amended as the study progressed.  
 
 
4.2 Research aims and objectives 
 
The primary aim of the study is to assess the courts’ construction of proportionality (both in 
terms of offence seriousness and sentence severity) in theft cases, and to assess the extent to 
which the courts draw upon other sentencing philosophies which may or may not be 
consistent with proportionality. Following this, the research moved to consider the extent to 
which there is evidence of the courts applying a consistent sentencing approach that is in 




During the fieldwork, the researcher was located at the CPS Coventry office, whose 
workload feeds the Coventry courts, along with a small number of cases which are 
transferred to neighbouring court centres for efficiency purposes.1 Consequently, the study 
focuses on sentencing practice within the Coventry Magistrates’ and Crown Courts. 
 
Owing to its very nature, a proportionality-based sentencing framework requires the 
measurement of offence seriousness and sentence severity. In order for this project to meet 
its aim, it was important to consider, both in practice and in theory, how these may be 
measured. Sentencing guidelines have long issued non-exhaustive lists of offence-specific 
aggravating and mitigating features, which affect the seriousness of the offence, but no 
guidance is offered to sentencers as to the weighting of each feature. The consideration of 
this became one objective of this project along with the extent to which there is an associated 
consistency amongst sentencers on the perceived weighting of various factors. An 
understanding of the perceived importance attached to various factors would facilitate a 
better appreciation of the measurement of the offence’s seriousness.  
 
These research aims and questions presented a number of possible methods to be used, 
including data collection through court and/or CPS files, direct observation in the 
courtroom, and/or by conducting interviews with decision makers and those linked to the 
decision making process (for example, probation officers as writers of pre-sentence reports). 
During the initial preparatory stages of the project, each of these methods was considered, 
although the direct courtroom observation was ruled out early on as being overly restrictive 
and insufficiently certain. In-court observation would offer no flexibility to the times (and 
pace) of the data collection, being as it is dependent on court workload. In addition, it is 
                                                          
1 Section 27A Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 
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conceivable that two or more courtrooms may hear theft cases during the same session, 
rendering it necessary for the researcher to select which case to observe, perhaps with no 
justification for choosing one over the other. Restrictions on public access to the Youth Court 
would also limit the scope of the project to consider adult offenders only. As the research 
project progressed, owing to the complexity of the sentencing decision and its associated 
processes, it became clear that no single method could be relied upon. 
  
 
4.3 Scope of the Project 
 
For this project, the term ‘theft’ has been interpreted according to its meaning under section 
1(1) of the Theft Act 1968 and, generally, only cases which fall under this section have been 
considered. Consequently, the project does not consider cases of, for instance, burglary with 
theft or robbery which require some action or circumstance additional to the committal of a 
simple theft.  Robbery, for example, is a composite of theft with the threat or use of violence 
in order to steal. Since robbery is a violent offence, offenders will rightly be sentenced on 
different grounds to those convicted of theft owing, in part, to the fact that the seriousness of 
the offence of robbery is aggravated by the use or threat of violence. The project does, 
however, consider a very small number of cases of abstracting electricity contrary to section 
13 of the Act. These cases were included since abstraction is, for all intents and purposes, the 
theft of electricity.2 By looking also at cases of abstraction, it may be possible to shed light on 
the importance (at the sentencing stage) of the distinction between sections 1 and 13.  
 
At the charging stage, theft is divided into several sub-offences, including theft from a shop 
or stall; from a dwelling; of a mobile phone; from the person; of a cycle; and theft by finding. 
                                                          
2 The reasons why electricity is subject to a separate offence are explained in section 3.6 above. 
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There was no apparent rationale for excluding any of these subcategories of the offence; so 
consequently, the project considers any type of theft, regardless of the category, providing 
that the charge (and conviction) fell under section 1 or section 13 of the 1968 Act. 
 
For sentencing purposes, offenders in England and Wales can be divided into three broad 
categories: adult offenders (those aged over 18), young offenders (aged under 18) and those 
suffering from a recognised mental disorder. This categorisation is significant since different 
policies and aims apply to different categories of offender. In cases of young offenders, a 
greater emphasis is placed on crime prevention.3  Moreover, for young offenders the courts 
have a distinct set of sentencing options at their disposal not available for other offenders. 
The referral order and the action plan order, for example, are only available to the courts 
when passing sentence on a young offender. The courts have a further set of sentences 
available when sentencing mentally disordered offenders, such as hospital and 
guardianship orders, both of which are found under section 37 of the Mental Health Act 
1983, which are designed to ensure the wellbeing of the offender. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the sample of cases in this study included a considerable number of cases concerning young 
offenders (45 in the youth court and one in the Crown Court). In none of the cases sampled 
were any of the offenders treated as having a mental disorder. Although one offender (in 
two cases) did demonstrate signs of schizophrenia by claiming that voices in his head told 
him to commit the offences, he was nonetheless sentenced as a mentally competent offender. 
In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of sentencing practice, none of the three 
categories of offenders were expressly excluded from the sample. However, the intention 
was not to actively secure a sample from each of the three categories. Rather, the cases 
                                                          
3 S.37 Crime and Disorder Act 1998: “It shall be the principal aim of the youth justice system to prevent offending by 
children and young persons…[I]t shall be the duty of all persons and bodies carrying out functions in relation to the youth 
justice system to have regard to that aim.” This aim is retained by s.142A Criminal Justice Act 2003, recently inserted  by 
s.9(1) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
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within the sample were selected randomly by using the first 250 cases sentenced within the 
specified time period.4  
 
There is however a noteworthy limitation to the project: it only considers the in-court 
sentencing of offenders convicted for theft. Consequently, the study does not include out-of-
court disposals, which are becoming increasingly relied on.5 Since November 2004, an 
offender caught committing retail theft of property with a value of less than £200 has been 
able to avoid a court hearing by accepting a Penalty Notice for Disorder (PND), carrying an 
£80 fine. This option is only available where it is deemed to be the most apposite disposal 
option, taking into account the interests of justice. Accordingly, it is not an appropriate 
measure for repeat or prolific offenders,6 or for those known to be substance misusers.7  
Therefore it is clear that the suitability and imposition of PNDs are restricted. Indeed even if, 
prima facie, the criteria for imposing a PND are satisfied, an offender may still be prosecuted 
on one of two grounds: either because the offender wishes to have a court hearing rather 
than accept the offered penalty, or through the CPS exercising its discretion to prosecute in 
accordance with The Code for Crown Prosecutors. The study does not incorporate PNDs in its 
scope as these penalties do not count as a criminal conviction8; rather, they are akin to 






                                                          
4 See below 
5 For retail thefts of less than £200 value, penalty notices for disorder were imposed on 21,997 occasions in 2005 (that 
being the first full year in which they were available for the offence). This figure rose year-on-year to 45,616 in 2008. See, 
Ministry of Justice (2010b), chapter 2. 
6 Home Office (2005), para. 6.20 
7 Ibid, at para 6.21 





In order to analyse the relevant principles and policies, it was necessary to consult the 
statutory provisions concerning general sentencing principles, along with reported cases 
which offer an interpretation of these provisions. Owing to the period of time in which 
sentence was passed in the project’s sample of cases, the Acts most relevant to this study are 
the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and the consolidating Powers of the Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000. Most of the sentencing provisions contained within the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 came into force on April 4th 2005,9 and so did not apply to this study’s 
sample of cases. The 2003 Act changed numerous aspects of the penal system which would 
not have had a bearing on the cases included in the study because, for the cases in the 
sample, sentence was passed before the 2003 Act was brought into force. The changes make 




4.5 Empirical work  
 
As mentioned above,10 the second arm of the overarching aim was to analyse a sample of 
recent cases in which the offenders had been sentenced for theft. In order to do this, data 
was collected from 250 cases where sentence was passed in either Coventry Magistrates’ or 
Coventry Crown Court. The data was collected using Crown Prosecution Service’s case files 
since they were readily accessible. As the case files were stored chronologically, recent case 
files could be easily identified without first knowing any details of the cases. Theft cases 
were then identified by sorting through all files within the CPS archive. The cases included 
                                                          
9 Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No. 8 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2005/950 
10 See section 4.2 
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in the sample were selected on the basis of the date on which sentence was passed, 
beginning at September 2004 and continuing until the desired total number of cases had 
been collected. Magistrates’ Court case files are held locally at the CPS for one year. The data 
collection began in September 2005. An alternative approach would have been to use the 
courts’ own files. This was preferable because the court files would include a copy of any 
pre-sentence report, where such a report had been ordered. However, due to the manner in 
which the courts’ files are stored, the theft cases could not be identified without first 
knowing the names and dates of birth of the offenders, together with the trial date. It follows 
that the court files could not be used as an initial source for the first phase of data collection. 
CPS files were selected as a suitable alternative data source, at least for details on the 
offender, victim, offence and sentence. 
 
A formal application was made to CPS Headquarters, with access being granted shortly 
thereafter. Following an initial meeting with local CPS staff, the researcher was given free 
and unobstructed access to the appropriate files for the magistrates’ court. A desk amongst 
the victim support staff, which was conveniently located adjacent to the file archive room, 
was provided and the researcher was granted free licence to set his own agenda. Since 
unobstructed access to the case files had been granted, the researcher was able to conduct 
the data collection without causing undue interference to CPS staff.  
 
CPS files pertaining to Crown Court cases are stored locally in CPS offices for a relatively 
short time before being relocated to central facilities in Sheffield. These files were identified 
by CPS workers using a computerised index of all Crown Court cases, and were transported 
back from Sheffield to Coventry for the purposes of this project. The number of Crown 
Court cases available was very small, but they were included for the purposes of pursuing a 




The data collected from the CPS files was recorded in a specifically designed pro-forma. One 
pro-forma was completed for each case or, in cases with co-offenders, one per offender. The 
data collected fell into one of four broad categories, relating to: the offender (including age, 
gender, employment and previous convictions); the victim (including age, gender, 
vulnerability and relationship with the offender); the offence (including the presence of 
aggravating and mitigating features); and the sentence imposed. 
 
For the sample of cases chosen, sentence was passed on the offenders between September 
2004 and March 2005. These dates were selected for a number of reasons. Magistrates’ case 
files are held at the CPS Coventry office for 12 months (six months for Crown Court cases) 
and are then either destroyed or sent into central storage. As a result, when the data 
collection began in September 2005, the earliest cases available were those decided in 
September 2004. It was felt that more reliable data could be collected from earlier cases since 
there would be less chance of a pending appeal against sentence, or indeed conviction. Since 
the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 came into force on 4th April 2005, it 
was neither possible nor desirable to consider cases where sentence was passed under the 
2003 Act’s framework. To do so would effectively have split the sample between those 
sentenced under the 2003 Act and those sentenced under the pre-existing legislation (most 
notably the Criminal Justice Act 1991), rendering it impossible to draw any reliable 
comparisons between the two groups of cases due to the policy changes made under the 
2003 Act (that is, the move away from a sentencing framework based primarily on 
proportionality to a regime incorporating both proportionality and crime-reduction models). 




A total of 250 cases were included in the sample. These were selected chronologically from 
the CPS Coventry Office’s archive, starting with cases where sentence was passed in 
September 2004 and included all theft cases until the desired quantity (250) had been 
collected. As would have been expected, most of the cases within the sample were sentenced 
for in the magistrates’ court. Of the 250 cases considered sentence was passed in Coventry 
Crown Court in 12 of them. In seven of these, the offender was committed to the Crown 
Court for sentence, having been convicted in the magistrates’ court. The offenders’ guilt was 
established in the Crown Court in only four cases. The one remaining Crown Court case was 
an appeal against the sentence. For the remaining 238 cases, sentence was passed in 
Coventry Magistrates’ Court, or by the magistrates’ court sitting as a youth court in cases 
with young offenders. The 12 Crown Court cases consisted of all theft cases sentenced by the 
Court between September 2004 and March 2005. The 238 magistrates’ cases consisted of all 
theft cases heard by the court between September 1st 2004 and February 28th 2005; cases 
heard after February 2005 were not included as this would have taken the total number of 
cases in the sample beyond the desired number of 250. Although data was collected from 
250 CPS case files, some cases had involved either single thefts committed by multiple 
offenders or multiple thefts committed by a single offender. These cases had to be divided to 
include a single theft committed by one offender. Consequently, two thefts committed by 
one offender or one theft committed by two co-offenders would each be separated into two 
cases. This exercise effectively increased the number of cases by 42 to a total of 292.  
 
As mentioned above, the intention when collecting data from the CPS files, was to record 
data from 250 cases. This was done by taking each theft case in chronological order until all 
250 cases had been accrued. There were a few cases identified that were not suitable for 
inclusion in the study. In a small number of cases the offender was originally charged for 
theft, that charge later being amended to a non-section 1 offence (for example, where theft of 
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a motor vehicle might be altered to a charge of taking a motor vehicle without consent). 
Since the sentence passed upon conviction or guilty plea is not in reference to a theft charge 
(even where the action might properly amount to theft), these cases were excluded from the 
sample. One further notable case was excluded from the sample: a Crown Court case where 
no note relating to the sentence imposed had been included in the CPS file, rendering the 
case inappropriate for inclusion in the study. 
 
Much of the data collected from the CPS files was numerically coded and subjected to 
quantitative analysis using SPSS (version 14). However, since the data contained within the 
CPS files focuses mainly on the prosecution of the defendant rather than the sentence, it was 
desirable to seek further data purely relating to the sentence imposed. For this, it was hoped 
that the courts’ case files could be used. Having completed the data collection from the CPS, 
the appropriate cases had been identified, thereby providing the means to locate the 
corresponding court files. It was envisaged that the court files could provide additional 
material on the sentencing process by viewing the sentencing reasons form and any pre-
sentence reports (PSR) contained within. A formal request was made to Her Majesty’s Court 
Service (HMCS), but was turned down on two grounds. Firstly, concerns were raised over 
the confidentiality of the reports’ sensitive data and respect for the anonymity of the report 
writer. Secondly, HMCS were not convinced that they themselves had the right to grant 
access to the PSRs as it was believed by them that the courts were merely custodians of the 
reports, which remained the property of West Midlands Probation. Probation, on the other 
hand, was unwilling to grant access as they believed the PSRs, as court-ordered reports, 
were the property of the courts. Consequently, neither HMCS nor West Midlands Probation 







HMCS and West Midlands Probation did, however, offer to consider a request to interview 
a small number of magistrates, judges and probation officers who work within the Coventry 
courts. Whereas the interviews with probation officers were a subsequent inclusion within 
the study, the interviews with sentencers had always been a scheduled aspect of the project. 
Conducting these interviews allowed for a further analysis of sentencing practice by 
explaining in more detail how courts sentence thieves, and the aims and philosophies which 
underpin these practices. Unlike the factual data collection from the CPS case files, the 
interviews acted as a direct source for understanding the core philosophies applied by the 
judges and magistrates. The specific issues covered were shaped, to a large extent, by the 
findings from the earlier empirical work. The questioning began by asking the magistrates 
and judges about the purposes of sentencing in theft cases, and their views of pre-sentence 
reports and the extent to which the sentence recommendations contained within are 
followed by the courts. Questions then moved on to consider the courts’ sentencing powers 
and the occasions in which various types of sentence may be imposed.  Interviewees were 
also asked about the importance of various mitigating and aggravating factors which may 
impact on the choice of sentence imposed. These include factors relating to the offence (such 
as planning, the value of the property stolen, the victim’s vulnerability and whether the 
offence was committed on bail) which act to increase or reduce the seriousness of the 
offence. Questions were also asked concerning offender mitigation, the impact of a guilty 
plea, and the role of previous convictions and sentences.  Magistrates were asked about their 
opinions and utilisation of the sentencing guidelines made available to them to aid in the 




Interviews with sentencers were held in the appropriate court buildings. In total ten 
sentencers were interviewed. Since the majority of theft cases are heard before the lower 
court, most of the interviews were conducted with those who pass sentence in the 
magistrates’ court, with seven lay magistrates and one District Judge (Magistrates’ Court).  
Only two Circuit Judges were available for interview, but since such a small number cases 
within the sample were sentenced in the Crown Court, this was felt to be an adequate 
representation of sentencers from the higher court. All interviewees were self-selected 
having volunteered to be interviewed. 
 
The interviews, which lasted for between 30 and 55 minutes, were voice-recorded and then 
transcribed. The data obtained from them was analysed qualitatively and without recourse 
to computer software, so that an accurate account of the interviewees’ comments could be 
made.  
 
For magistrates and judges, the interviews took place during court recess between the 
morning and afternoon session. The only magistrates available had either sat in court on a 
morning bench and had remained at the court after the session had ended, or those 
magistrates who were due to sit in the afternoon and had arrived at court early.  
 
Generally, it is preferable to conduct meetings with interviewees individually, particularly 
where the purpose of the interview is to uncover individualised responses which reflect an 
individual’s opinions. Nevertheless, occasionally it becomes necessary to undertake joint 
interviews, which may cast doubt on the truth of an interviewee’s responses if they fear 
disagreeing with the co-interviewee, or if they have no opinion on a matter but would rather 
offer the same opinion as others rather than provide no response at all. On one occasion, the 
morning court session had overrun, reducing the time available to conduct interviews before 
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the commencement of the afternoon session. Consequently, there was insufficient time to 
conduct two separate interviews, resulting in Magistrates Two and Three being interviewed 
together. The two Crown Court Judges were also interviewed together due to constraints on 
their own time. 
 
Unlike the interviews with sentencers, interviews with probation officers were not an 
originally scheduled part of the study. Rather they were conducted as an alternative to 
accessing the PSRs. As the authors of pre-sentence reports, the contents of which might be 
taken into consideration by the court at the sentencing stage, it was felt that the interviews 
would offer a useful addition to the study by providing a further perspective on the 
determination of sentence and the importance of various factors. A formal request to West 
Midlands Probation was duly submitted and eventually granted, although concerns over the 
demands placed on the probation officers’ time meant that an initial run of only six 
interviews could be scheduled. The semi-structured interviews took place in July 2009, with 
one additional interview being arranged and conducted in October 2009, were to some 
extent an extension to earlier interviews with magistrates and judges. Having asked the 
magistrates and judges about their sentencing practices and upon finding that the 
magistrates were often willing to follow any recommended sentences suggested to them by 
the Probation Service, it was important to establish the extent to which the views of 
probation officers (as reflected in their reports presented at court) were in line with those of 








4.7 Practical Constraints 
 
The current chapter has highlighted two practical constraints which arose during the course 
of the study, leading to some research methods being abandoned or replaced with 
alternatives. Firstly, it had been envisaged that court files could be used as primary data 
sources. However, access problems became apparent early on in the project. Court files, 
whilst stored locally, are archived according to defendant surname, without which the 
appropriate files could not be identified. The focus then shifted to the potential use of CPS 
files, which, it was anticipated, would contain broadly the same information as the court 
files, albeit without a copy of any PSR. This offered the only suitable alternative to the use of 
the court files.11  
 
The second practical constraint arose upon making a subsequent request to access the court 
files for the purpose of viewing the PSRs contained within.  
The request was met with opposition by Her Majesty’s Court Service on the grounds of data 
protection and ensuring the anonymity of the reports’ authors. Moreover, questions were 
also raised as to whom the reports belonged: the Court Service claimed they were the 
property of West Midlands Probation, whereas the latter claimed the opposite. This 
uncertainty over ownership meant that permission to view the reports would not be 
forthcoming. After considerable and lengthy discussions with the authorities, it was decided 
that any further attempts to access the court files would not be fruitful. The request was 
subsequently abandoned. This led to a further reconsideration of the methods to be 
employed. Consequently, the series of interviews with probation officers were conducted as 
an alternative to accessing the PSRs. Despite these problems, the aims and scope of the 
                                                          
11 Courtroom observation was also an alternative but its restrictive nature proved undesirable. 
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project remained unchanged. As each methodological challenge arose, alternative 









IMPACT OF OFFENCE CHARACTERISTICS AND PROCEDURAL 
ISSUES ON THE SENTENCING DECISION 
 
 
This chapter analyses various offence-related factors and explores how these appear to 
impact on the sentencing decision. The Criminal Justice Act 1991, as consolidated in the 
Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (hereafter PCCSA), required the courts 
to impose custodial and community sentences only on the basis of offence seriousness. To 
the extent that this legislative guidance is upheld by the courts, this chapter may be expected 
to reveal various factors which might influence the sentencing decision. 
 
In addition to offence-related factors, the chapter also explores the apparent importance of a 
number of features surrounding the offence, including the sentencing venue (be it the 
magistrates’ court or Crown Court), any other offences for which the court simultaneously 
passes sentence, and the impact of guilty plea. 
 
 
5.1 Sentencing Court 
 
Table 5.1 shows the number of offences for which different sentences were imposed in the 
magistrates’ court and Crown Court. It details only the most severe penalty in each case 
based on the sentencing hierarchy under the Criminal Justice Act 1991. For example, if an 
offender was sentenced to a community rehabilitation order as well as being ordered to pay 
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compensation and costs, only the CRO is counted here. The table shows that the magistrates’ 
court utilised a wider range of sentencing options than the Crown Court (explainable by the 
fact that the Crown Court heard only 14 cases) although both rely on the use of immediate 
custody more than any other sanction. This is perhaps not surprising in relation to the 
Crown Court cases, but it is less obvious for cases dealt with in the magistrates’ court.  
 
13 of the 14 Crown Court cases were either committed for sentence or referred to the Crown 
Court for trial. The remaining case was an appeal against sentence imposed by the 
magistrates’ court. Predictably, the Crown Court was significantly more likely to impose a 
term of immediate imprisonment than the magistrates’ court, with 11 cases (78.6%) 
sentenced by the higher court receiving an immediate custodial sentence compared with 67 
(24.1%) in the magistrates’ court. This is almost certainly explained by the fact that the 
Crown Court hears more serious cases and sentences accordingly. On the other hand, the 
fact that sentence is passed in the Crown Court does not necessitate the imposition of a 
sentence beyond the magistrates jurisdiction. Two Crown Court cases resulted in the 
imposition of a non-custodial sentence. In case 280, the Court imposed a two-year CPRO 
and six-month curfew upon an offender following an early guilty plea for stealing 
confectionary valued £21.50 from a newsagent. In case 289 the offender had appealed 
against the terms of a five-year CRASBO imposed by the magistrates for stealing 
confectionary worth £8. The appropriate clause, which had prevented the offender from 








Table 5.1 Sentence Type and Court 
 
Court 








 Immediate custody N. 67 11 78 
%  24.1% 78.6% 26.7% 
Suspended sentence N. 2 1 3 
%  .7% 7.1% 1.0% 
Detention Training Order N. 4 0 4 
%  1.4% .0% 1.4% 
CRO N. 39 0 39 
%  14.0% .0% 13.4% 
CPO N. 4 0 4 
%  1.4% .0% 1.4% 
CPRO N. 6 1 7 
%  2.2% 7.1% 2.4% 
DTTO N. 35 0 35 
%  12.6% .0% 12.0% 
Curfew N. 5 0 5 
%  1.8% .0% 1.7% 
Attendance Centre N. 1 0 1 
%  .4% .0% .3% 
Supervision Order N. 14 1 15 
%  5.0% 7.1% 5.1% 
Fine N. 31 0 31 
%  11.2% .0% 10.6% 
Discharge N. 41 0 41 
%  14.7% .0% 14.0% 
Referral Order N. 20 0 20 
%  7.2% .0% 6.8% 
Reparation Order N. 2 0 2 
%  .7% .0% .7% 
CRASBO N. 1 0 1 
%  .4% .0% .3% 
Costs N. 1 0 1 
%  .4% .0% .3% 
Compensation N. 5 0 5 
%  1.8% .0% 1.7% 
Total N. 278 14 292 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 






In seven cases (involving three offenders), the Crown Court imposed custodial sentences 
outside of the magistrates’ jurisdiction. The offender in cases 282-284 pleaded guilty to two 
counts of theft from a dwelling, one count of theft from a machine and one count of 
obtaining by deception, having stolen bank cards belonging to two elderly victims who were 
under the offender’s care. The cases therefore involved a breach of trust. She had withdrawn 
funds from one of the accounts, and fraudulently used the other card to purchase goods 
from a shop, purporting to be the cardholder. She had no previous convictions and was 
sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment for each offence, ordered to run concurrently. In 
cases 286-288, a 25 year-old male offender with 64 previous convictions, including 30 thefts, 
was sentenced to a total 26 months’ imprisonment for three counts of shoplifting, two counts 
of breaching a conditional discharge, and single counts of a public order offence and failing 
to surrender to bail. In case 286, he had stolen clothing valued £280 from a shop and was 
shortly after detained whereupon he admitted the offence. In case 287, the offender stole 
spirits valued £70, was detained at the scene but did not admit the offence until his 
appearance in court. The offender again stole spirits valued £88 in case 286. Upon being 
challenged by staff, he became violent and was thereby charged with an offence contrary to 
section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986.The final case in which the Crown Court imposed a 
custodial sentence beyond the magistrates’ powers was case 292, involving an offender who 
had pleaded guilty to theft by an employee and false accounting, having appropriated 
£27,600 from his employer in apparent breach of trust, was ordered to serve concurrent 
sentences of 12 months’ imprisonment for each offence.  
 
Cases sentenced before the Crown Court were less likely to involve low-value goods and 
may therefore be regarded as more serious, although attention must again be drawn to the 
small number of cases dealt with by the higher court. 72.3 percent of magistrates’ court cases 
in the sample involved thefts where the value was below £100, compared to 50 percent 
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(seven cases) of Crown Court cases. Relatively few cases before the magistrates’ court (12.2 
percent) involved property exceeding £250 in value compared with 42.9 percent (six cases) 
of the Crown Court sample. Two of the three cases within the sample involving property of 
a value exceeding £5,000 were dealt with by the Crown Court.1 Various aggravating factors, 
including thefts committed by organised groups or offences involving children, were not 
present in any of the Crown Court sample but were present within the magistrates’ sample. 
 
Although the number of Crown Court cases is too few to provide any definitive conclusions 
regarding the sentencing venue, it appears that the value of the property stolen and the 




5.2 Type of Theft 
 
Table 5.2 shows the frequency with which each type of sentence was imposed for the 







                                                          
1 The only magistrates’ court case involving property valued greater than £5,000 was case 276 in which an 18 year-old 
white male with eight previous convictions, including two for theft, was handed a two year CPRO for theft of a vehicle 
valued £15,000 and theft of car keys. He had entered an office and opportunistically stolen the set of car keys which had 
































































































N 55 8 1 2 3 0 2 2 1 0 3 1 78 
% 24.8% 47.1% 33.3% 28.6% 50.0% .0% 22.2% 66.7% 50.0% .0% 75.0% 6.7% 26.7% 
Susp sent. N 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
% .9% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 11.1% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.0% 
DTO N 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
% 1.8% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.4% 
CRO N 31 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 39 
% 14.0% 17.6% .0% .0% .0% .0% 11.1% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% 20.0% 13.4% 
CPO N 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
% .5% .0% .0% 14.3% 33.3% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.4% 
CPRO N 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 
% 1.4% 5.9% 33.3% .0% .0% .0% 11.1% .0% .0% .0% .0% 6.7% 2.4% 
DTTO N 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 
% 15.8% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 12.0% 
Curfew N 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 
% .9% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 20.0% 1.7% 
ATO N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 6.7% .3% 
Supervision  N 11 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 15 
% 5.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 11.1% 33.3% .0% .0% 25.0% 6.7% 5.1% 
Fine N 23 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 31 
% 10.4% 11.8% .0% 28.6% 16.7% 50.0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% .0% 6.7% 10.6% 
Discharge N 36 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 41 
% 16.2% 5.9% .0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% 13.3% 14.0% 
Referral 
Order 
N 14 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 20 
% 6.3% .0% 33.3% 28.6% .0% .0% 22.2% .0% .0% .0% .0% 6.7% 6.8% 
Reparation 
Order 
N 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
% .9% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .7% 
CRASBO N 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
% .5% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .3% 
Costs N 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
% .5% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .3% 
Comp. N 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 
% .5% 11.8% .0% .0% .0% .0% 11.1% .0% .0% .0% .0% 6.7% 1.7% 
Total N 222 17 3 7 6 2 9 3 2 2 4 15 292 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 







5.2.1 Theft from a shop 
 
Retail theft constituted 76 percent of the cases within the sample and was thus by far the 
most common type of theft presented. Custodial sentences (comprising of immediate 
imprisonment, detention and training orders, and suspended sentences) were imposed in 
27.5 percent of thefts against retailers, 37.4 percent resulted in community-based sentences, 
whilst financial penalties were imposed in 11.3 percent of cases, and 16.2 percent were 
discharged. Immediate imprisonment was the most commonly imposed sentence, arising in 
55 (24.8 percent) shoplifting cases. Immediate imprisonment was also the most commonly 
imposed penalty in the sample overall, albeit only in a minority of cases. 
 
Many retail thefts (123 of the 222 shopliftings in the sample) occurred under common 
circumstances: the offender would enter the store, select the goods (usually of a modest 
value), conceal the property and attempt to leave the shop without offering payment. The 
offender would then be detained at the scene, where the property would be recovered and 
the offender would admit the crime.2 Whilst these offences may commonly have been 
planned they would otherwise lack many of the sources of aggravation found elsewhere 
within the sample. For example, the value of the property was usually below £100 (82.9 
percent), a fact which may provide a source of mitigation, and in only 4.5 percent of cases 
did the property exceed £250. The property was recovered in 83.8 percent of shopliftings, 
thereby reducing the financial losses incurred by the victim. It was quite rare for the offences 
to involve damage caused to other property; an aggravating factor present in only 7.2 
percent of thefts against retailers. Overall, this general lack of aggravation may explain why 
only just over one quarter of retail thefts in the sample resulted in a custodial sentence. 
 
                                                          
2 These offences are hereafter described as ‘typical shopliftings’ 
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Thefts against shops accounted for 74.5 percent of thefts committed by young offenders 
within the sample, which explains the relatively high incidence of referral orders and 
supervision orders imposed for shoplifting; 70 percent of referral orders and 73.3 percent of 
supervision orders were imposed for retail theft. DTTOs were only imposed for shoplifting. 
Although DTTOs were not imposed in all cases committed by drug addicts who stole to 
fund their dependencies; of the 58 cases in which the motive was known to be drug related, 
55 were shopliftings. The infrequency with which drug addicts would commit other forms 
of theft explains why all DTTOs were imposed for thefts committed against retailers. 
 
 
5.2.2 Theft from a vehicle 
 
17 cases concerned thefts from a vehicle, eight of which (47.1 percent) resulted in the 
imposition of a custodial sentence and a further four (23.5 percent) resulted in a community-
based sentence.3 Consequently, the majority of offences falling within this category were 
regarded as sufficiently serious to cross the community sentence or custody thresholds, with 
only five cases (29.4 percent) resulting in either a financial penalty or a discharge.4 
 
Thefts from vehicles commonly involved the offender stealing goods (often audio 
equipment) of a value greater than £100. This is in addition to the extent of any damage 
caused (as occurred in eight case), which together could lead the court to view offending of 
this sort as particularly serious. Additionally, in a large minority of cases (41.2 percent) the 
property was known not to be recovered, thereby increasing the harm caused to the victim. 
                                                          
3 In Flood-Page & Mackie (1998) theft from a vehicle was the most likely subcategory of theft to result in a custodial 
sentence; at page 25. 
4 Although a discharge was imposed in case 037 in which the offender was at the time serving 5 years’ imprisonment for an 
unrelated burglary. The decision to discharge the offender absolutely may have been made on the basis that the court 




5.2.3 Theft of a vehicle 
 
Theft of a vehicle might be considered to be one of the more serious forms of theft owing to 
the value of the property and the potential for great inconvenience and intrusion upon the 
victim. Three such cases were included in the sample. Cases 091 and 093 concerned two co-
offenders, a 22-year-old and 17-year-old white male, who pleaded guilty to the theft of a car 
valued at £600. It was not known whether the property was recovered. The former offender 
had 42 previous convictions including 10 for theft and was sentenced to five months’ 
imprisonment.5 The latter was made the subject of a three month referral order. Since the 
offender had pleaded guilty and had no previous convictions, the court was obliged to 
impose a referral order unless it considered imposing a custodial sentence. The fact that it 
decided not to do so (whilst imposing custody on the other offender) suggests that either the 
custody threshold is set higher in relation to young offenders, or that the offence did not 
cross the custody threshold and that the adult offender in case 091 was imprisoned either 
due to his previous convictions or on the basis of the totality of his offending behaviour. 
 
The offender in case 276, an 18 year old white male with eight previous convictions, 
including two for theft, was handed a two year CPRO for theft of a vehicle and theft of car 
keys.6 He had entered an office and opportunistically taken a set of car keys left unattended. 




                                                          
5 This offender was also sentenced for driving whilst disqualified, theft from a vehicle (both 5 months’ imprisonment 
concurrent to the theft), and using a vehicle without insurance (no separate penalty). 
6 The latter, case 277, was charged as ‘theft: not otherwise coded’. 
130 
 
5.2.4 Theft from the person 
 
Thefts from the person occurred in seven cases and were committed exclusively by 
offenders aged under 30, including two young offenders both of whom were made subject 
to referral orders. Of the remaining five cases, two resulted in a custodial sentence, one 
offender received a community-based penalty, and two were fined. Where known, the value 
of the goods was low (below £20 in four cases), with only one (141) offence involving 
property valued in excess of £100. The offender had stolen a purse valued £162 which had 
been left in an ambulance by a paramedic whilst she escorted a patient into hospital. The 
offender had 27 previous convictions, 13 of which were for theft, and received a four-month 
custodial sentence. The act of targeting a member of the emergency services may have been 
considered by the court as a significant aggravating factor. Offenders commonly pleaded 
guilty (as occurred in 85.7 percent of cases), although this appears in two cases to have been 
part of a plea bargain in which the offenders had initially been arrested for robbery.  
 
 
5.2.5 Theft by an employee 
 
Thefts committed by employees will often involve breaching a position of trust, and may 
therefore be regarded as one of the more serious forms of theft. Instances of theft by an 
employee arose in only six cases, three of which resulted in a term of immediate 
imprisonment. Case 292 was the only theft by employee case to reach the Crown Court. The 
offender, a 30 year old Asian male, was employed as a manager at a large DIY store. Over a 
fourteen month period, he authorised a number of cash refunds or refunds made onto his 
debit card for purchases not made. The total value of funds appropriated was a little over 
£27,600. The offender, who had a clean prior record, admitted the offences were motivated 
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by greed and also entered a guilty plea for false accounting. He was sentenced to 12 months’ 
imprisonment for theft, and 12 months’ concurrent for false accounting. Custodial sentences 
were also imposed on the offender in cases 060 and 061, concerning a 20 year old white 
female with seven previous convictions, including three for theft as well as cautions for 
shoplifting and criminal damage. On the first day of her employment in the shop, the cash 
registers were down £138.63. Two days later, the next occasion that the offender was 
working, the registers were again markedly short by £166.65. Upon being searched by the 
police, the offender’s purse was found to contain £155 at which point she fully admitted 
taking the money. The magistrates sentenced her to three months’ imprisonment for each 
count to run consecutively. 
 
Cases 114 and 115 both involved a 30 year old white male offender with no previous record, 
who pleaded guilty to misappropriating £1,800 from a company account over a number of 
transactions. The magistrates imposed a 150-hour CPO and ordered the offender pay £1,542 
compensation (equal to the funds taken in case 114) and costs. The sentence may have 
reflected the seriousness of the offence, whilst the offender’s clean prior record may have 
deterred the court from imposing a custodial sentence. The only theft by an employee not to 
result in a custodial or community sentence was case 210 in which the offender, who was 
employed as a warehouse man, attempted to leave the works’ premises two hours before the 
end of his shift. He was stopped by security staff and found to be concealing a DVD player 
and accessories valued at £250. He fully admitted stealing the goods with a view to selling 
them on. The offender had four previous convictions, only one for theft, which were all at 






5.2.6 Theft from a dwelling 
 
Nine cases in the sample concerned thefts from a dwelling, two of which involved young 
offenders who received referral orders for their offences. Of the remaining seven cases, three 
resulted in a custodial sentence (including one suspended sentence), a further three were 
dealt with in the community, and one was ordered only to pay compensation and costs. 
Custody was only imposed in those cases heard in the Crown Court. Dwelling thefts often 
involved relatively high-value goods, with the property value exceeding £100 in six of the 
nine cases, and exceeding £300 in four of these. Indeed one case (281) involved the theft of a 
£10,000 diamond ring which resulted in the imposition of a suspended sentence. These cases 
were also likely to involve vulnerable victims, including cases 282 and 283 (where the 
offender had stolen two bank cards belonging to elderly victims for whom the offender 
acted as a carer), and cases 006, 013 and 179 in which each offender had stolen property 
belonging to an unsuspecting family member. 
 
 
5.2.7 Theft from an automatic machine or meter 
 
Two out of the three thefts from an automatic machine or meter resulted in the courts 
imposing a custodial sentence.  The only case of this type that did not attract custody was 
case 247 where the young offender entered a self-service laundrette, broke into five washing 
machines and stole £5 from the moneyboxes within, causing significant damage to the 
machines. The offender was handed a 12 month supervision order, a three month curfew 
order and told to pay compensation of £205 to reflect the value of goods stolen and the 
associated damage caused. Under not altogether dissimilar facts, in case 263 the police were 
called to a public telephone box following the activation of its alarm. The moneybox was 
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found to have been removed. The offender, a 32-year-old male with 105 previous 
convictions including 22 for theft, was seen in the area carrying a bag containing £267.10 in 
coins. He was also found to be in possession of a lock-knife and was thereby also charged 
with going equipped for theft. Having pleaded guilty, he was sentenced to serve three 
months’ imprisonment for theft, with a concurrent three month term for going equipped. 
The decision to imprison the offender may have been influenced by the value of the goods 
stolen, the related damage (estimated at £275), the offender’s lengthy record and the 
apparent planning behind the offence.  
 
The theft from a machine in case 284 was one of five charges for which the offender was 
sentenced.7 The offender, a 21 year old African-Caribbean female with no previous 
convictions, was employed by a local agency to care for the elderly. She had stolen bank 
cards belonging to two elderly victims, whom she was charged to care for. The offender had 
used one of the bank cards to withdraw £300 from an automatic teller machine; the basis of 
the charge in this case. She had admitted all charges and was sentenced by the Crown Court 
to 18 months’ imprisonment for each of the first four charges, to run concurrently and five 
months’ imprisonment concurrent for the charge of possession of a false instrument. Upon 
viewing the totality of the offending, no doubt the Court was of the opinion that the 






                                                          
7 The offender was also sentenced for two counts of theft from a dwelling, obtaining property by deception, and being is 




5.2.8 Theft by finding 
 
Theft by finding was one of the least common subcategories of theft present in the sample, 
appearing only twice. Case 069 concerned the theft of two pieces of gold jewellery by 
finding. The goods, valued £650, had been placed on display at a local art gallery. 
Unfortunately, the CPS case file did not explain how or where the offender had acquired the 
goods. The offender, a 39 year old white male with 67 previous convictions including 15 for 
theft, was arrested when he attempted to sell the jewellery to a pawn broker. He entered a 
guilty plea and was sentenced to two months in custody explicable perhaps by reference to 
the value of the property and the offender’s prior record. Case 139 concerned a 25-year-old 
male offender who had found a bank card on a railway station platform. Subsequently, 
whilst on the train the offender dropped the card, asked the warden if he had found a card 
but when asked the offender was unable to identify the name shown on the card. The 
warden refused to return the card to the offender and he was arrested. He entered a guilty 
plea for theft and was handed a £250 fine. The court here had taken a less serious view of the 
offending, perhaps due to the fact that the bank card had not been used to make fraudulent 
purchases or appropriate funds from the cardholder’s account since he had not had an 
opportunity to do so. As such, no real financial loss had been suffered other than the costs to 










5.2.9 Theft of a bicycle 
 
Theft of a bicycle was another uncommon subcategory of theft, appearing only twice in the 
sample. It is the only subcategory of theft not to attract a custodial sentence.8 Case 007 
involved a 35 year old white male with 51 previous convictions, including seven for theft, 
who stole a bicycle to the value of £260 belonging to an adult female victim. The offender 
had admitted the offence and the property was recovered. At the same hearing the offender 
was also sentenced for theft of electronics valued at £350 from a dwelling. Despite the 
relatively high value of the goods and the offender’s criminal history, the seriousness of the 
offending on totality was not deemed sufficient to deserve a custodial sentence. The 
offender was ordered to undertake a 12-month CRO. In case 175 the victim, a 16 year old 
white male, had left his bicycle unlocked outside a shop whilst he went to make a purchase. 
Upon leaving the store, he found his bike was missing and had been replaced by a second 
bike. The offender, a 28 year old male, was identified on CCTV. Upon arrest, he fully 
admitted taking the bike claiming he took it as it was in better condition than his own. The 
property was subsequently stolen from the offender so was not recovered. The offender had 
one previous conviction (for shoplifting eight years earlier) and a caution for a similar 
offence in 2004. He was handed a 12 month conditional discharge and ordered to pay £50 







                                                          
8 Abstraction of electricity similarly was dealt with by non-custodial means in all cases, but is not technically a form of theft. 
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5.2.10 Theft of a mobile telephone 
 
Four cases involved an offender being sentenced for theft of a mobile telephone,9 three of 
which resulted in the offender being sentenced to a period of immediate imprisonment. 
Case 040, the only incident of theft of a mobile phone by a young offender, involved the 
offender stealing a mobile telephone to the value of £300 from his school teacher whilst the 
victim was out of the room. Upon his return to the classroom, the victim spotted the 
offender standing at the teacher’s desk and soon after found his mobile telephone was 
missing. The offender admitted stealing the phone, claiming it was an opportunistic offence. 
He was sentenced to a 12 months’ supervision order.  
 
Case 203 concerned a 24 year old male who stole a mobile telephone to the value of £50. The 
offender was seen in a snooker hall asking the patrons for money. One customer, the victim, 
noticed his mobile phone was missing and followed the offender outside. Initially the 
offender denied any wrongdoing, but subsequently admitted taking it, claiming he was only 
borrowing it. He entered a plea of not guilty and was sentenced to six weeks’ imprisonment. 
Cases 290 and 291 concerned the same offender, an 18 year old Asian male, who stole two 
mobile telephones - valued £300 and £100 - on the same day. In the first count, the offender 
had enticed the 16-year-old victim into parkland and asked if he could borrow his mobile 
telephone. Once the victim had agreed, the offender refused to return the property to the 
owner and made threats toward the victim that he was carrying a knife.10 On the same day, 
the offender had entered a take-away restaurant, the workplace of the second victim, noticed 
that the mobile telephone had been left unattended, took it and ran off making good his 
escape. He was subsequently arrested five days later and, following not guilty pleas, was 
                                                          
9 Case 003 factually involved the theft of a mobile phone belonging to the childminder of the offender’s child. The offender 
was charged and subsequently sentenced not for theft of a mobile phone, but rather for theft from a dwelling other than 
an automatic machine or meter.  
10 Although the offence was charged as theft, the use of threats may have alternatively given rise to a charge for robbery. 
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sentenced by the Crown Court to a total of three months’ imprisonment. Separate sentences 
for each count were not indicated. Even if it is true that the courts take a severe view of 
offending of this type, the decision to imprison may have been heavily influenced by the 
totality of the offending and the fact that the offender had made threats toward the victim, 
rendering the offence akin to robbery. 
 
 
5.2.11 Other thefts 
 
In 15 cases the offenders were charged with a theft not falling into one of the other categories 
given, the charge being listed as “theft: not otherwise coded”. Usually there was no 
alternative theft subcategory into which the offence would fit, although case 256 concerning 
an offender who stole electronic goods valued £100 that he claimed to have found in the 
street could have been charged as theft by finding (assuming the court was accepting his 
account of the facts) and case 196 concerning the theft of electronics whilst the offender was 
staying at a friend’s house could have been suitably categorised as theft from a dwelling. 11 
 
Since this type of theft captures all offences not covered by other categories of the offence, 
the cases incorporate a variety of offending circumstances rather than sharing a common 
theme. Drawing similarities between these offences is undesirable because they are 
generally not comparable.  
 
 
                                                          
11 Additionally, cases 027, 028, 029 and 198 might have been suitable for a charge of burglary. In cases 027-029 the three 
co-offenders had pleaded guilty to theft having climbed a fence to and stolen scrap metal (of an unknown value) from a 
merchant’s yard. Each offender was disqualified from driving for 12 months and placed under a four or five month curfew. 
In 198, the offender had removed a piece of fencing to gain entry to a warehouse’s delivery area from where he stole 
groceries valued £2. He was ordered to pay a £75 fine 
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5.2.12 Abstraction of Electricity 
 
Abstraction of electricity appeared in two cases within the sample (004 and 034) neither of 
which resulted in the imposition of a custodial sentence. Owing to the nature of the offence, 
both cases had similar facts: the offender had interfered with an electricity meter so as to 
bypass the reader. Both offences were committed by unemployed white males in their early 
30s who fully admitted the offences. The offender in case 034 had 17 previous convictions, 
including 11 for theft, whereas the offender in 004 had a clean prior record. Both were 
sentenced towards the bottom end of the hierarchy, with 034 receiving a 12-month 
conditional discharge, and 004 being ordered to pay a £50 fine, compensation and costs. The 
value of the electricity abstracted in both cases was unknown and the victims had both 
stipulated that the loss would be invoiced to the defendants once it had been calculated.  
 
 
5.3 Secondary Offence 
 
In a large number of cases, the offender was sentenced for more than one offence, be it a 
further theft (which was counted as another case within the sample), a property offence 
other than theft, a non-property offence or a combination of these. Depending on its nature, 
a non-theft offence could be perceived by the court as either more or less serious than the 
theft itself. If more serious, the gravity of the non-theft may heavily influence the sentencing 
decision, and the theft may be rendered little more than a ‘bolt-on’ to the more serious 
offence. Table 5.3 shows the relationship between the secondary offence and the sentence 
type imposed. Of the 292 cases in the sample, 163 (55.8%) were sentenced for only one theft, 
leaving a remaining 129 cases (44.2%) in which the court sentenced the offender for more 
than one offence. Those who were sentenced to two or more offences were more likely to 
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face a custodial sentence (43.4%) compared to those who were sentenced to only one theft 
(17.8%), regardless of the nature of the second (or indeed third) offence. This might be 
evidence of the courts sentencing on totality: whilst each individual offence may not warrant 
imprisonment, when taken as a whole the offending behaviour may cross the custody 
threshold. An offender sentenced for two or more offences was less likely to be given a 
discharge, with only five (3.9%) such offenders receiving this sentence compared with 36 
(22.1%) people sentenced for a single theft. Similarly financial penalties were more 
commonly imposed for single offences (19 percent compared with 4.7 percent for multiple 
offending). Overall, when sentencing an offender for more than one offence, the courts were 


































 Immediate custody N. 25 23 4 10 16 78 
%  15.3% 34.3% 66.7% 45.5% 47.1% 26.7% 
Suspended sentence N. 3 0 0 0 0 3 
%  1.8% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.0% 
Detention Training Order N. 1 2 0 1 0 4 
%  .6% 3.0% .0% 4.5% .0% 1.4% 
CRO N. 20 10 0 6 3 39 
%  12.3% 14.9% .0% 27.3% 8.8% 13.4% 
CPO N. 2 0 0 0 2 4 
%  1.2% .0% .0% .0% 5.9% 1.4% 
CPRO N. 2 2 0 0 3 7 
%  1.2% 3.0% .0% .0% 8.8% 2.4% 
DTTO N. 15 9 0 2 9 35 
%  9.2% 13.4% .0% 9.1% 26.5% 12.0% 
Curfew N. 5 0 0 0 0 5 
%  3.1% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.7% 
Attendance Centre N. 1 0 0 0 0 1 
%  .6% .0% .0% .0% .0% .3% 
Supervision Order N. 8 4 1 1 1 15 
%  4.9% 6.0% 16.7% 4.5% 2.9% 5.1% 
Fine N. 28 2 1 0 0 31 
%  17.2% 3.0% 16.7% .0% .0% 10.6% 
Discharge N. 36 4 0 1 0 41 
%  22.1% 6.0% .0% 4.5% .0% 14.0% 
Referral Order N. 12 8 0 0 0 20 
%  7.4% 11.9% .0% .0% .0% 6.8% 
Reparation Order N. 2 0 0 0 0 2 
%  1.2% .0% .0% .0% .0% .7% 
CRASBO N. 0 0 0 1 0 1 
%  .0% .0% .0% 4.5% .0% .3% 
Costs N. 1 0 0 0 0 1 
%  .6% .0% .0% .0% .0% .3% 
Compensation N. 2 3 0 0 0 5 
%  1.2% 4.5% .0% .0% .0% 1.7% 
Total N. 163 67 6 22 34 292 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 








Although planning is often regarded as a potentially aggravating factor,12 for the most part, 
it does not appear to have impacted greatly on the type of sentence imposed in the sample of 
cases. This may be surprising as planning may also be linked with other aggravating factors, 
including sophistication, offending by groups, and thefts where high-value goods are 
targeted. At the same time, planning might be graded according to its extent. The planning 
as part of a large-scale embezzlement by an employee may be significantly more 
aggravating than the more limited planning which precedes many typical shopliftings. 
 
The apparent statistical significance between planning and the sentence may be misleading. 
Some high-value thefts are planned, as are some much lower value cases and that probably 
accounts for the relatively high numbers of cases resulting in custodial sentences and fines 
and discharges. 
 
Table 5.4 shows that whilst immediate imprisonment was the most commonly imposed 
penalty for planned offending (imposed in 22.7 percent of such cases), less punitive 
sanctions including fines and discharges were also frequently imposed (in 9.7 percent and 
14.5 percent of cases respectively).  During interviews, magistrates often identified planned 
offending as an example of aggravation which might take the offence beyond the custody 
threshold.13 It may be, however, that there were other offence characteristics which 
mitigated what would otherwise have been a tougher sentence. However, Table 5.4 above 
shows that all sentencing options are used by the courts in cases involving planning. There 
is also no noticeable difference in the use of custody for planned or impulsive offending, 
although the nine impulsive offences resulting in custody often had other significant sources 
                                                          
12 Magistrates’ Association (2004); SGC (2004a), page 6 
13 See Section 7.2.4 
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of aggravation. For example, cases 069, 190 and 221 all involved the theft of high value 
goods (£650 in the former and £2,000 each in the latter two). Three impulsive cases where the 
offender pleaded not guilty to theft of a mobile telephone also received custodial sentences 
(cases 203, 290 and 291). 
 
The Table also shows that a planned offence is more likely to be met with a CRO (15%) or 
DTTO (15.5%) than an offence committed on impulse (2.7% each). However this probably 
has less to do with the planning and more to do with other factors such as motive (DTTOs 
were only  imposed for offences committed to fund a drug habit) and previous convictions. 



















Table 5.4 Sentence Type and Planning 
 
Planning 








 Immediate custody N. 47 9 22 78 
%  22.7% 24.3% 45.8% 26.7% 
Suspended sentence N. 1 1 1 3 
%  .5% 2.7% 2.1% 1.0% 
Detention Training Order N. 2 0 2 4 
%  1.0% .0% 4.2% 1.4% 
CRO N. 31 1 7 39 
%  15.0% 2.7% 14.6% 13.4% 
CPO N. 3 1 0 4 
%  1.4% 2.7% .0% 1.4% 
CPRO N. 4 3 0 7 
%  1.9% 8.1% .0% 2.4% 
DTTO N. 32 1 2 35 
%  15.5% 2.7% 4.2% 12.0% 
Curfew N. 5 0 0 5 
%  2.4% .0% .0% 1.7% 
Attendance Centre N. 0 1 0 1 
%  .0% 2.7% .0% .3% 
Supervision Order N. 12 2 1 15 
%  5.8% 5.4% 2.1% 5.1% 
Fine N. 20 3 8 31 
%  9.7% 8.1% 16.7% 10.6% 
Discharge N. 30 7 4 41 
%  14.5% 18.9% 8.3% 14.0% 
Referral Order N. 13 6 1 20 
%  6.3% 16.2% 2.1% 6.8% 
Reparation Order N. 1 1 0 2 
%  .5% 2.7% .0% .7% 
CRASBO N. 1 0 0 1 
%  .5% .0% .0% .3% 
Costs N. 1 0 0 1 
%  .5% .0% .0% .3% 
Compensation N. 4 1 0 5 
%  1.9% 2.7% .0% 1.7% 
Total N. 207 37 48 292 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 








5.5 Recovery of Property 
 
In those cases in the sample where the offender is apprehended at the scene, it was likely 
that the stolen property would have been recovered. Although this reduces the level of harm 
caused to the victim, the SAP has suggested that the recovery of property in cases where the 
offender has no control over the recovery “should not influence the assessment of offence 
seriousness nor provide personal mitigation”.14 However, in other cases the offender may 
voluntarily return the stolen property, for which he should receive a sentence discount.15 
This credit offers an incentive for offenders to return the property, a point which the SGC 
appears to be in agreement with: “whether and the degree to which the return of stolen 
property constitutes a matter of personal mitigation will depend on an assessment of the 
circumstances and, in particular, the voluntariness and timeliness of the return.”16 
 
Although the recovery of property should not ordinarily influence the sentencing decision 
(unless the offender voluntarily returns the property or otherwise assists in its recovery), the 
courts may decide to impose an ancillary compensation order where the property has not 
been recovered.17 Section 130 of the PCCSA 2000 requires the court to consider making a 
compensation order in cases involving, inter alia, loss or damage to property, and to give 
reasons if no compensation order is made. 
 
Compensation was ordered in only one of the 210 cases (71.9 percent) in which all of the 
stolen property was recovered. Cases 067 and 068 involved an offender sentenced for two 
                                                          
14 SAP (2008a), at 3. Although this statement was made under the 2003 Act sentencing framework, the logic could just as 
easily have applied to the 1991 Act regime.  
15 Ibid, page 3-4 
16 SGC (2008), at 4 
17 In their review of sentencing practice in the 1990s, Flood-Page & Mackie (1998) found that the reason most frequently 




counts of theft from a vehicle. On two separate occasions, he stole a spare wheel from two 
cars, each valued £150. The offender was ordered to pay £300 in compensation to the victims 
notwithstanding the fact that in 067 the property had been recovered. The compensation 
ordered thus reflected the total value of the property stolen, despite the fact that effectively 
half of the property had been recovered. This might be explained in two ways. Firstly, 
according to s.130(5) of the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 where, as a 
result of an offence against the Theft Act 1968, the owner is temporarily deprived of his 
property but is subsequently rejoined with it, “any damage to the property occurring while 
it was out of the owner’s possession shall be treated…as having resulted from the offence”, 
rendering the offender liable to pay compensation even if he was not directly to blame for 
the damage caused. Consequently, if damage had been caused to the stolen property prior to 
its recovery, the offender would be liable for a payment of compensation. Perhaps more 
likely, upon realising that his spare wheel had been stolen the victim may have purchased a 
replacement, the cost of which he was compensated for when the offender was sentenced 
two months after the offence occurred. 
 
Where the stolen property was not recovered, there was a far greater incidence of 
compensation being awarded. Of the 52 cases where none of the property was recovered, 27 
(51.9%) did not result in an order for compensation. In 20 of the remaining 25 cases, the level 
of compensation awarded was equal to the value of the goods stolen. However, the 
compensation exceeded the value of the stolen property in case 247. The offender had stolen 
£5 by breaking into a laundrette’s washing machines and taking the cash from the 
moneyboxes inside. He was ordered to pay £205 compensation, which included £5 for the 
non-recovery of the stolen cash and £200 for the damage caused to the machines. In three 
further cases (006, 208 and 209), the compensation was less than the value of the non-
recovered property. In case 006, the offender had stolen electronics valued £350 and was 
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ordered to pay £80 in compensation. The alleged £350 value may have reflected the cost of 
the goods at new, whilst the court may have been of the opinion that £80 more accurately 
reflected the current market value. In cases 208 and 209, a 14-year-old offender had stolen 
from two victims electronics valued £80 and £130 respectively. She was ordered to pay £20 
in compensation to each victim; significantly less than the value of the stolen items. As with 
case 006, the reduced compensation may have been a more accurate representation of the 
true value of the property at the time of the offence. Furthermore, the offender’s age and 
lack of financial means may have led the court to believe that it was unrealistic to expect the 
offender to be able to pay more. One further case (004, an abstraction case) compensation of 
£120 was awarded but the value of the property stolen was unknown.18  
 
As previously mentioned, the sample included 27 cases in which the property stolen was not 
recovered and no compensation was awarded. There appear to be two principal reasons for 
the courts’ disinclination to impose an order for compensation. In thirteen of these cases the 
offender was subjected to an immediate custodial sentence. In one further case (037) the 
offender was handed an absolute discharge for the current offence but was at the time 
serving a period of five years’ imprisonment for burglary. Four cases (two of which also 
resulted in a custodial sentence) specifically stated that compensation was not ordered as the 
offender had no means to make such payment. Case 034 involved abstraction of electricity of 
an unknown value, which was expressed as being the reason for not ordering compensation 
to the victim. However in case 004, on very similar facts, the victim was awarded £120 
compensation despite the fact that the value of property abstracted could not be ascertained. 
Similarly with case 230, the offender had siphoned off fuel (of an unknown value) from a 
vehicle. Moreover, the owner of the vehicle was unknown, thereby preventing the payment 
                                                          
18 C.f. R v Donovan (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 192 where the Court held that “a compensation order is designed for the simple, 
straightforward case where the amount of the compensation can be readily and easily ascertained.” Per Eveleigh LJ, at 192. 
The decision was followed in the post-1991 Act case of Briscoe (1994) 15 Cr App R (S) 699. 
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of compensation.  On occasions, the courts have forgone awarding compensation but have 
still imposed a fine and/or an order for costs.  Cases 123 and 200 resulted in the imposition 
of fines of £50 and £100 respectively but no order for compensation was made despite the 
fact that the property was not recovered. Such a practice appears to be contrary to s.130(12) 
of the PCC(S)A 2000 which gives the imposition of compensation priority over a fine.  
 
 
5.6 Value of Property 
 
Table 5.5 shows the relationship between the monetary value of the stolen property and the 
type of sentence imposed. The value of the stolen property may be the prime determinant in 
assessing harm, particularly where the property is not recovered. Where an offender 
specifically targets high value goods, his culpability may also be enhanced.19 The Sentencing 












                                                          
19 SGC (2004), page 6 
20 Ibid, page 7 
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 Immediate custody N. 48 12 11 6 0 1 0 78 
%  23.1% 27.3% 47.8% 60.0% .0% 100.0% .0% 26.7% 
Suspended sentence N. 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
%  .5% 2.3% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% .0% 1.0% 
Detention Training 
Order 
N. 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
%  1.9% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.4% 
CRO N. 27 7 4 1 0 0 0 39 
%  13.0% 15.9% 17.4% 10.0% .0% .0% .0% 13.4% 
CPO N. 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 4 
%  .5% 4.5% .0% 10.0% .0% .0% .0% 1.4% 
CPRO N. 5 0 1 0 1 0 0 7 
%  2.4% .0% 4.3% .0% 50.0% .0% .0% 2.4% 
DTTO N. 26 7 2 0 0 0 0 35 
%  12.5% 15.9% 8.7% .0% .0% .0% .0% 12.0% 
Curfew N. 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 
%  1.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 75.0% 1.7% 
Attendance Centre N. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
%  .5% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .3% 
Supervision Order N. 12 0 3 0 0 0 0 15 
%  5.8% .0% 13.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 5.1% 
Fine N. 27 2 1 0 0 0 1 31 
%  13.0% 4.5% 4.3% .0% .0% .0% 25.0% 10.6% 
Discharge N. 34 6 1 0 0 0 0 41 
%  16.3% 13.6% 4.3% .0% .0% .0% .0% 14.0% 
Referral Order N. 14 4 0 2 0 0 0 20 
%  6.7% 9.1% .0% 20.0% .0% .0% .0% 6.8% 
Reparation Order N. 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
%  1.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .7% 
CRASBO N. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
%  .5% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .3% 
Costs N. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
%  .5% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .3% 
Compensation N. 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 5 
%  1.0% 6.8% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.7% 
Total N. 208 44 23 10 2 1 4 292 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 




There were four cases in which the monetary value of the property stolen was unknown.21 
Eight cases involved an offender stealing a bank card, which were described on the charge 
sheet as having either a ‘nominal value’ or an ‘unknown value’. For the purposes of 
consistency, the analysis here considers such cases to have involved stealing goods of a 
nominal value, thereby falling into the category of ‘monetary value of under £100’, although 
special attention must be placed on these cases owing to the potential value that bank cards 
have in gaining access to (significant) funds. In six of the eight cases involving thefts of bank 
cards, the offender had used the debit or credit card to obtain funds from the cardholder’s 
account,22 or used the card as payment of goods purchased.23 In such cases the extent of the 
card’s spend would be used to measure the monetary value of the goods stolen. That is, if 
the card was used to purchase goods to the value of £500, this figure would be taken as the 
monetary value of the property stolen.  
 
Cases involving the theft of bank cards were most commonly dealt with by way of 
community sentences or immediate imprisonment (each imposed in three cases). In each 
case, the decision to imprison may have been influenced by the presence of other 
aggravating factors, rather than being rooted on the type (and value) of the property. The 
offender in case 171 was employed as a waitress and removed two bank cards from a 
customer’s handbag. The cards were not used before being returned. However, the 
magistrates imposed a two-month custodial sentence, a decision which may have been 
influenced by the offender’s prior record which included 23 previous convictions (including 
                                                          
21 Case 004 in the sample concerned abstraction of electricity to a value unknown. Although the electricity board planned 
to invoice the offender £300 to cover the costs of making the power supply safe again, this charge has no bearing on the 
value of electricity abstracted. Furthermore, this £300 charge was not sought through criminal proceedings but would be 
added to the offender’s electricity statement. Therefore this administrative charge would be expected to have no effect on 
the sentence imposed and did not reflect the value of the property stolen. Cases 027, 028 and 029 all arose out of a single 
incident concerning three co-offenders who together stole scrap metal of an unknown value from a vehicle parts 
manufacturer. 
22 Relating to cases 013, 179 and 283, the offender withdrew £300 from the victim’s bank account, whereas in case 170 the 
offender had made three withdrawals totalling £750. 




nine thefts) for which she had received a number of fines and community-based penalties. 
The ineffectiveness of these previous sentences may have led the magistrates to regard 
custody as the only reasonable option. A custodial sentence was also imposed on the 
offender in cases 282 and 283, who had stolen two credit cards belonging to elderly victims 
over whom the offender acted as a carer. One card was used to withdraw £300 from the 
victim’s account whilst the other was used to fraudulently purchase goods valued £80. The 
offender pleaded guilty to three counts of theft and one of obtaining property by deception, 
for which she received four concurrent 18-month custodial sentences. 
 
Of the remaining two cases, one (170) involved a young offender with no previous 
convictions who received a mandatory referral order, whilst the other (139, in which the 
offender had admitted to finding a bank card on a railway platform but was apprehended 
before having an opportunity to use the card) resulted in a £250 fine. 
 
In the majority of cases (71.2%) the monetary value of the property stolen was under £100. 
As the value of the goods increased, the number of incidents falling into the value categories 
decreased. This is explained in part by the large number of thefts committed against 
retailers, where the value of property displayed on a shelf often will not exceed £100. Where 
stores do stock property of a greater value, such goods might be more difficult to steal with 
retailers employing additional anti-theft measures, thereby deterring potential offenders 
away from these goods. The sample also only included three cases of theft of a vehicle, often 
a high-priced commodity.24 This might also offer some explanation as to why the vast 
majority of cases involved relatively low value goods. 
 
                                                          
24 For details of these cases, see Section 5.2.3 above. 
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All six cases of theft by an employee involved property valued at greater than £100, 
although only once did the value exceed £5,000. Cases 060 and 061 were simple instances of 
an employee taking money from the cash register. Over the course of two days she was 
known to have taken a little over £300. The offender had seven previous convictions, three of 
which were for theft, and following a guilty plea was sentenced to three months’ 
imprisonment for each offence to run consecutively. Case 210 involved a theft from a shop 
by an employee (the offence was charged as theft by an employee rather than theft from a 
shop). Here the offender attempted to leave his works premises prior to the end of his shift 
whilst carrying a DVD player to the value £250. The offender had four previous convictions, 
only one of which was for theft, and his last court appearance was two years earlier. 
Following his guilty plea, the offender was fined. Cases 114 and 115 involved an offender 
who pleaded guilty to two counts of theft totalling approximately £1,800 from an employer 
and one count of false accounting. The offender had no previous convictions; the magistrates 
imposed a 150-hour community punishment order and a compensation order to cover the 
extent of the victim’s loss. Similarly in case 292, the manager of a hardware store 
misappropriated £27,600 by issuing fictional refunds either onto his debit card or 
authorising cash refunds for goods he had never actually purchased. He then altered the 
stock levels on the store’s systems to conceal his actions. Despite pleading guilty and having 
no previous convictions, the Crown Court sentenced him to 12 months’ imprisonment, no 
doubt in light of the seriousness of the offence involving as it did high value goods and a 
breach of a position of trust.25  
 
Generally it appears that as the value of the goods stolen increases so too does the chance of 
a custodial sentence being imposed, although the small numbers of cases falling within the 
                                                          
25 This offender was also sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for false accounting to run concurrently to the term for 
theft. A charge of obtaining a money transfer by deception, the only charge for which the offender pleaded not guilty, was 
ordered to lie on file. 
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higher value categories may impact on this apparent correlation.26 In cases where the value 
of the property stolen was less than £100, 48 (23.2%) offenders were ordered to serve a term 
of immediate imprisonment. This rises to 27.3% where the value is between £100-£250, 47.8% 
if the goods stolen are worth between £250 and £500, and 60% for goods between £500 and 
£5,000. No cases where the value was between £5,000 and £17,500 led to a term of immediate 
imprisonment, although one offender (50%) was given a suspended sentence. The sole 
offender who stole property of a value greater than £17,500 (case 292) received an immediate 
custodial term of 12 months’ imprisonment. 
 
When looking at all custodial sentences (including terms of immediate imprisonment, 
suspended sentences and detention and training orders), the same trend seems to arise: the 
proportion of custodial sentences increases in line with the value of goods. 53 (25.6%) of 
those who stole goods valued at less than £100 were given a custodial sentence. Where the 
property stolen was worth £100-£250, thirteen offenders (29.6%) received a custodial 
penalty. No suspended sentences or detention and training orders were imposed on 
offenders who stole property worth more than £250. 
 
 
5.7 Sophisticated Offending 
 
Guidelines in the past have cited sophistication as an aggravating factor, although a 
definition of the term is not provided.27 Sophistication is taken here to include offenders 
who have taken steps to avoid detection, or who are skilled in a particular area to enable the 
                                                          
26 Similarly, in their study of sentencing practice in retail thefts, Speed and Burrows (2006) found that custody and 
community sentences were more likely to be imposed where the value of the goods stolen was greater than £100; at page 
36. In addition, Flood-Page & Mackie (1998) found that, in thefts resulting in custody, the average amount stolen was £407 
compared with £294 for other sentences; at page 25. 
27 Magistrates’ Association (2004) 
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offending. Abstraction of electricity will often be deemed to have been sophisticated, 
particularly where the offender is an experienced electrician. Table 5.6 shows the 
relationship between sentence and sophistication. Five cases within the sample involved 
sophistication. In three of these, the offender had taken steps to avoid detection (cases 114, 
115 and 292). In cases 114 and 115, the offender pleaded guilty to two counts of theft by an 
employee and a single count of false accounting, having transferred almost £1,800 from a 
company bank account into his private bank account. He then closed the company account 
in an attempt to avoid detection. The offender was ordered to undertake a 150-hour CPO 
and pay compensation for the unrecovered funds. In case 292, the offender pleaded guilty to 
one count of theft by an employee and false accounting. The offender was employed as a 
store manager and, over a 16-month period, he had authorised a number of refunds in his 
own name totalling £27,600. He then altered the stock levels of the store’s computer systems 
in an effort to avoid detection. The Crown Court imposed a 12 month term of imprisonment, 
concurrent for each offence. In all three cases, the offenders had no previous convictions to 
influence the sentencing decision, but the seriousness of the offence may have justified the 
imposition of a community-based sentence or custody respectively, either in reference to the 
value of the property stolen or the breach of trust. The sophistication of the offence may 
have contributed to the sentencing decision but would not have been a significantly 
influential factor. 
 
The other cases involving sophistication (004 and 034) involved offenders abstracting 
electricity by bypassing an electrical meter. In both cases the value of the electricity was 
unknown, but both offences had occurred over a prolonged period of time. The offender in 
case 004 was ordered to pay a £50 fine, whereas a 12-month conditional discharge was 
imposed in case 034. Neither offence was deemed sufficiently serious to cross the 
community-sentence threshold (or indeed the custody threshold). Any impact that the 
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sophisticated nature of the offences had on the sentencing decision would appear to have 
been nominal. 
Table 5.6 Sentence Type and Sophistication 
 
Sophistication 








 Immediate custody N. 1 77 78 
%  20.0% 26.8% 26.7% 
Suspended sentence N. 0 3 3 
%  .0% 1.0% 1.0% 
Detention Training Order N. 0 4 4 
%  .0% 1.4% 1.4% 
CRO N. 0 39 39 
%  .0% 13.6% 13.4% 
CPO N. 2 2 4 
%  40.0% .7% 1.4% 
CPRO N. 0 7 7 
%  .0% 2.4% 2.4% 
DTTO N. 0 35 35 
%  .0% 12.2% 12.0% 
Curfew N. 0 5 5 
%  .0% 1.7% 1.7% 
Attendance Centre N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .3% .3% 
Supervision Order N. 0 15 15 
%  .0% 5.2% 5.1% 
Fine N. 1 30 31 
%  20.0% 10.5% 10.6% 
Discharge N. 1 40 41 
%  20.0% 13.9% 14.0% 
Referral Order N. 0 20 20 
%  .0% 7.0% 6.8% 
Reparation Order N. 0 2 2 
%  .0% .7% .7% 
CRASBO N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .3% .3% 
Costs N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .3% .3% 
Compensation N. 0 5 5 
%  .0% 1.7% 1.7% 
Total N. 5 287 292 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 





5.8 Offences Committed in the Presence of Children 
 
The fact that a child is present when a theft is committed is a further potential aggravating 
factor.28 The extent of the aggravation will depend upon the nature of the role played by the 
child. Where a child is used as an agent in committing the offence, this may affect both 
culpability and harm through the suggestion that the offence was planned (thereby affecting 
culpability) and by encouraging the child to view stealing as acceptable (affecting harm).29 
The SAP had concluded that “the mere presence of a child does not make the offence more 
serious. Only if the child is involved in, or likely to be aware of, the theft or could be 
influenced or distressed by it should the offence be seen as more serious.”30 None of the 
cases within the sample involved actively utilising a child in the commission of an offence. 
In two cases (155 and 249), a child was present during the offence but neither offender 
sought to blame the child in an attempt to avoid detection; both offenders had admitted the 
offences upon being detained. 
 
In case 155, the offender had stolen from a shop baby clothes and provisions worth £82. The 
offender had seven previous convictions, including three for theft. Her last court appearance 
was nine months earlier when she was sentenced to a 12-month conditional discharge for 






                                                          
28 SGC (2004a), at 7 
29 SAP (2008b), at 5 
30 Ibid, at 6. Also see Speed and Burrows (2006) which found that a discharge or fine (imposed in 67 per cent of cases) were 
the most likely disposal options where an offender was accompanied by a child; at page 38. 
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Table 5.7 Sentence Type and Presence of Children 
 
Children Present   








 Immediate custody N. 0 78 78 
%  .0% 26.9% 26.7% 
Suspended sentence N. 0 3 3 
%  .0% 1.0% 1.0% 
Detention Training Order N. 0 4 4 
%  .0% 1.4% 1.4% 
CRO N. 1 38 39 
%  50.0% 13.1% 13.4% 
CPO N. 0 4 4 
%  .0% 1.4% 1.4% 
CPRO N. 0 7 7 
%  .0% 2.4% 2.4% 
DTTO N. 0 35 35 
%  .0% 12.1% 12.0% 
Curfew N. 0 5 5 
%  .0% 1.7% 1.7% 
Attendance Centre N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .3% .3% 
Supervision Order N. 0 15 15 
%  .0% 5.2% 5.1% 
Fine N. 0 31 31 
%  .0% 10.7% 10.6% 
Discharge N. 1 40 41 
%  50.0% 13.8% 14.0% 
Referral Order N. 0 20 20 
%  .0% 6.9% 6.8% 
Reparation Order N. 0 2 2 
%  .0% .7% .7% 
CRASBO N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .3% .3% 
Costs N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .3% .3% 
Compensation N. 0 5 5 
%  .0% 1.7% 1.7% 
Total N. 2 290 292 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 






Case 249 involved a more serious form of shoplifting. With their eight and ten-year-old 
children present, two female offenders had stolen groceries valued £230 from a supermarket. 
Upon being detained, both fully admitted the offence and agreed that they had worked in 
partnership with each other. The co-offender had a clean prior record and was cautioned for 
the offence. Although the other offender had no previous convictions, she had received a 
caution for a similar offence four months’ earlier and was given a conditional discharge of 
unknown duration. 
 
In neither case was it clear how aware of the offending the children were, but the presence of 
the children does not appear to have had a marked impact on the sentencing decision, 
particularly in case 249 where the offence resulted in a discharge, and a caution for the co-
offender. The decision to impose a CRO on the offender in case 155 may have been 
influenced by her previous convictions and the fact that an earlier imposed discharge had 
not expired at the time of the offence. 
 
 
5.9 Offending By an Organised Group 
 
Offending by a group of two or more individuals who have orchestrated an offence is 
assumed by guidelines to aggravate the seriousness of the offence.31 The SGC states that 
offending by an organised group indicates a higher than usual degree of culpability.32 
Indeed, where retail theft is committed by an organised group and is combined with threats 
of violence, the offence is placed within the most serious band within the SGC’s guideline, 
attracting a prescribed sentence of between 36 weeks and four years’ imprisonment.33 
                                                          
31 Magistrates’ Association (2004), at 60 
32 SGC (2004), at 6 
33 SGC (2008), at 17 
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Furthermore, in cases where the offenders confront their victim face-to-face, the level of 
harm may also be increased through the incitement of greater fear.34 
 
42 cases in the sample involved offending by groups of two or more individuals. These 
offences were most likely to attract community-based sentences (in 40.5 percent of cases), 
although custody (14.3 percent), fines (14.3 percent) and discharges (9.5 percent) were also 
imposed. Nine offences (21.4 percent) committed by first-time young offenders resulted in 
the imposition of a referral order. 
 
Although the guidelines have traditionally identified group offending as an aggravating 
factor,35 the courts imposed a custodial sentence in only six cases. In two cases (i.e. one 
offence committed by two offenders) imprisonment was imposed for both parties. Cases 235 
and 236 involved two offenders who had jointly broken into a toolbox fixed to the rear of a 
vehicle and stolen tools valued £400 from within. Both offenders had lengthy criminal 
records (84 previous convictions including seven thefts, and 136 prior convictions including 
eleven thefts respectively), and both were sentenced to four months’ imprisonment 
following guilty pleas. The decision to imprison may have been influenced by the offenders’ 
previous criminal history or the perceived seriousness of the offence, owing to the fact that 
the offenders had used force to prise open the toolbox, causing damage in the process, and 
steal relatively high value goods. In one further case in which custody was imposed on an 
offender who acted as part of a group, the co-offenders were unknown and no criminal 
proceedings were brought against them. In the remaining three cases, custody was only 
imposed against one of the co-offenders notwithstanding the fact that the other co-offenders 
appeared to have played an equal role in the offence. This indicates that the offence in itself 
                                                          
34 Ashworth (2010), at 164 
35 Magistrates’ Association (2004), at 60; SGC (2004a), page 6 
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was not sufficiently serious to warrant imprisonment; custody was imposed on the basis of 
offender characteristics rather than offence gravity. 
 
The fact that an offence was committed by a group appeared to have little noticeable impact 
on the type of sentence imposed. Where the offender had a clean prior record, or had only a 
few previous convictions, the courts were likely to impose a conditional discharge or fine. 
These offences tended to be low-value shopliftings which did not include much apparent 
aggravation. The offences were insufficiently serious to justify the imposition of a 
community penalty. In those cases leading to a community penalty, the sentencing decision 
may have been based on factors other than offending by a group. The court may have been 
influenced either by the offender’s history of previous offending (case 252 in which the 
offender with 20 previous theft convictions had stolen cosmetics valued £23 and was placed 
on a 12-month CRO), the value of the property stolen (cases 225, 265, 276 concerning 
property valued £420, £210, and £15,000 respectively), or other factors relating to the 
seriousness of the offence (case 230 in which the offender and his unidentified co-offender 
siphoned fuel from a car, causing damage to the vehicle. The offender had also refused to 
name his co-offender, which may have denied him a source of mitigation at the time of 











Table 5.8 Sentence Type and Organised Groups 
 
Organised Group 








 Immediate custody N. 4 74 78 
%  9.5% 29.6% 26.7% 
Suspended sentence N. 0 3 3 
%  .0% 1.2% 1.0% 
Detention Training Order N. 2 2 4 
%  4.8% .8% 1.4% 
CRO N. 3 36 39 
%  7.1% 14.4% 13.4% 
CPO N. 0 4 4 
%  .0% 1.6% 1.4% 
CPRO N. 3 4 7 
%  7.1% 1.6% 2.4% 
DTTO N. 2 33 35 
%  4.8% 13.2% 12.0% 
Curfew N. 4 1 5 
%  9.5% .4% 1.7% 
Attendance Centre N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .4% .3% 
Supervision Order N. 5 10 15 
%  11.9% 4.0% 5.1% 
Fine N. 6 25 31 
%  14.3% 10.0% 10.6% 
Discharge N. 4 37 41 
%  9.5% 14.8% 14.0% 
Referral Order N. 9 11 20 
%  21.4% 4.4% 6.8% 
Reparation Order N. 0 2 2 
%  .0% .8% .7% 
CRASBO N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .4% .3% 
Costs N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .4% .3% 
Compensation N. 0 5 5 
%  .0% 2.0% 1.7% 
Total N. 42 250 292 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 







5.10 Related Damage 
 
In most theft cases, the harm caused to the victim may be measured principally by reference 
to the value of the property stolen, and whether that property is later recovered. In some 
cases however, the offender may cause damage to other property during the course of the 
theft. Under a proportionality-based sentencing system, this related damage ought to be 
construed as impacting upon the level of harm suffered and should consequently increase 
the seriousness of the offence. 28 cases within the sample involved related damage being 
caused. Some cases included substantial damage being caused, for example damaging a 
vehicle (perhaps by breaking a window) with a view to stealing property from within. In 
other cases, the extent of the damage was less significant, such as where the offender 
removes packaging or labels from goods. Of the 28 cases involving related damage, ten (35.7 
percent) resulted in a custodial sentence being imposed (compared with 28.4 percent of cases 
with no related damage), including two detention and training orders. 11 (39.3 percent) led 
to a community-based sentence and four (14.2 percent) resulted in either a fine or a 
discharge. The remaining three offences were committed by young offenders who received 












Table 5.9 Sentence Type and Related Damage 
 
Related Damage 








 Immediate custody N. 8 70 78 
%  28.6% 26.5% 26.7% 
Suspended sentence N. 0 3 3 
%  .0% 1.1% 1.0% 
Detention Training Order N. 2 2 4 
%  7.1% .8% 1.4% 
CRO N. 6 33 39 
%  21.4% 12.5% 13.4% 
CPO N. 0 4 4 
%  .0% 1.5% 1.4% 
CPRO N. 0 7 7 
%  .0% 2.7% 2.4% 
DTTO N. 2 33 35 
%  7.1% 12.5% 12.0% 
Curfew N. 0 5 5 
%  .0% 1.9% 1.7% 
Attendance Centre N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .4% .3% 
Supervision Order N. 3 12 15 
%  10.7% 4.5% 5.1% 
Fine N. 2 29 31 
%  7.1% 11.0% 10.6% 
Discharge N. 2 39 41 
%  7.1% 14.8% 14.0% 
Referral Order N. 2 18 20 
%  7.1% 6.8% 6.8% 
Reparation Order N. 1 1 2 
%  3.6% .4% .7% 
CRASBO N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .4% .3% 
Costs N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .4% .3% 
Compensation N. 0 5 5 
%  .0% 1.9% 1.7% 
Total N. 28 264 292 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 






The most common type of damage to be caused involved the offender removing security 
tags, labels or other packaging during the course of a shoplifting. This occurred in 12 of the 
28 cases and such damage may not have been significant enough to have factored greatly in 
the court’s sentencing decision. Three of these 12 cases resulted in a custodial sentence being 
imposed (cases 212, 272 and 287), but the decision to imprison the offender in each case was 
almost certainly due to the offender’s previous convictions (case 212) or multiple offending 
(272 and 287). For example, the offender in case 272 had pleaded guilty to the theft of spirits 
valued £50 from a supermarket. Having removed the security tags, he attempted to leave 
but was detained by security staff. The offender was placed on bail following this offence, 
but shortly after committed a further shoplifting (case 271). The magistrates’ court imposed 
sentences of 28 days’ imprisonment for each offence and ordered them to run concurrently. 
The damage caused to the security tags is unlikely to have impacted on the court’s 
sentencing decision. 
 
When sentencing a young offender, the court is under a statutory duty to impose a referral 
order, providing the offender has entered a guilty plea, does not have any previous 
convictions and either, the sentence for the offence is not fixed by law, or the court is not 
proposing to impose a custodial sentence, or the court is not proposing to impose an 
absolute discharge.36 In the two cases involving first-time young offenders committing thefts 
causing related damage (cases 108 and 195), the court imposed referral orders for eight 
months and six months respectively. The offences were insufficiently serious to justify a 
custodial sentence, but were too serious to warrant an absolute discharge. Five other cases 
involving damage were committed by young offenders with one or more previous 
convictions. None of these were dealt with by way of referral order. Custodial sentences 
were imposed in cases 212 and 251, although the damage caused may have had no impact 
                                                          
36 Sections 16 & 17 PCCSA 2000 
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on the decision to imprison. In 251, the 14-year-old offender had forced open a cashbox in a 
laundrette and stolen £2.50 contained within. The court imposed a four month detention and 
training order, to run concurrently to an order recently imposed for an unrelated robbery. 
His 15-year-old co-offender (case 250) had one previous conviction and was ordered to 
undertake supervision for six months. The offenders were treated as joint principal parties; 
the difference in sentence was due only to their previous criminality. A detention and 
training order was also imposed in case 212 in which the 15-year-old offender had stolen 
clothing accessories valued £50 from a shop. Having removed the security tags, he was 
detained and immediately admitted the offence. The offender had ten previous convictions 
and had appeared in court on five occasions within the last year. Supervision orders had 
previously been imposed but had failed to control the offender’s criminal behaviour; this 
may have been the primary influence in the decision to impose a custodial sentence.   
 
In five cases, substantial damage was caused by an offender forcing entry into a vehicle to 
steal property from within. A period of immediate imprisonment was imposed in three of 
these cases, and was therefore the most likely outcome. An absolute discharge was imposed 
in case 037 in which the offender had broken into a vehicle and stolen a stereo system 
valued £170, causing significant damage to the vehicle in the process. At the time of 
sentencing, the offender was serving a five-year term of imprisonment for burglary which 
may have heavily influenced the court’s sentencing decision. In the fifth case, 213, the 
offender was ordered to pay a £75 fine and £20 compensation, having broken a car window 
to steal a handbag from inside the vehicle. Even though significant damage was caused, it 
appears that the court did not view this as sufficient aggravation to cross the community-




In four cases involving related damage, the offender was ordered to pay compensation 
alongside the imposition of another sentence. In only one of these cases (247) was the 
compensation known to have been based on the damage caused. In two others (004 and 213) 
it was unclear whether the order for compensation was to cover the costs of the damage or 
the non-recovery of the stolen property. In all other cases involving related damage, no 
compensation was ordered to redress the costs incurred in repairing the damage caused.  
           
                                      
5.11 Motive 
 
The motivation behind the offender’s behaviour may be relevant to the assessment of his 
culpability. An offender who steals out of greed may be regarded as more blameworthy 
than an offender who steals out of need or desperation. That being said, there was no 
evidence in the CPS files to suggest that any of the sample’s cases involved an offender with 
a ‘good’ or excusable motive. Where the offender’s motive points to the existence of a 
criminogenic need which constitutes the root cause of the offending behaviour, the court 
may be inclined to impose a rehabilitative sentence aimed at treating the cause, thereby 
reducing the offender’s propensity to reoffend. Perhaps the most obvious example of this 
paradigm is the use of DTTOs for offences committed to fund a drug addiction.  
 
That said, there was at least one instance where the court still imposed a DTTO in a case 
which was quite (though not especially) serious. The offender in case 146 pleaded guilty to 
having stolen clothing valued £280 from a shop. He had 66 previous convictions, including 
17 for theft and was made subject to a 12-month DTTO. This may be contrasted with case 
140 in which the drug-dependent offender had stolen clothing valued £700 from a shop. The 
court imposed a four-month term of imprisonment. Arguably, the high value of the property 
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was enough in itself to justify a custodial sentence. The clear implication is that the offence 
in 140 was that bit more serious than in 146, so that a custodial sentence was (justifiably) 
imposed. 
 
There were 34 cases in which drug addicts were dealt with by means other than a DTTO. At 
the time of passing sentence in these cases, the court would have been required to have 
regard to section 52 of the PCCSA 2000, which gave the court a power to impose a DTTO on 
an offender who had a drug addiction that was susceptible to treatment. Accordingly, the 
court could only impose a DTTO if it was satisfied that the offender was dependent on or 
had a propensity to misuse drugs,37 that the dependency required and could be susceptible 
to treatment,38 and that the offender had expressed a willingness to comply with the order.39 
In one case (021), it was clear that the offender did not wish to comply with a drug-related 
order, having refused assistance from a member of the drug referral team at the police 
station following his arrest. In other cases, offenders may have been similarly unwilling, but 
this information was missing from the CPS file. The offender’s willingness may not be made 
apparent until after a PSR has been drafted. Consequently, the court would be aware of the 
offender’s unwillingness to comply leading it to impose an alternative sentence, but the 
reason for this decision would not be easily ascertainable from the CPS file. There are, 
therefore, a number of cases in which it is not clear why the offender’s drug dependency 





                                                          
37 Section 52(3)(a) 
38 Section 52(3)(b) 
39 Section 52(7) 
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N. 45 11 2 5 13 2 78 
%  31.5% 29.7% 25.0% 14.7% 22.4% 16.7% 26.7% 
Suspended 
sentence 
N. 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
%  1.4% .0% .0% 2.9% .0% .0% 1.0% 
Detention 
Training Order 
N. 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
%  2.8% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.4% 
CRO N. 18 4 3 6 5 3 39 
%  12.6% 10.8% 37.5% 17.6% 8.6% 25.0% 13.4% 
CPO N. 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
%  1.4% 5.4% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.4% 
CPRO N. 2 3 0 1 1 0 7 
%  1.4% 8.1% .0% 2.9% 1.7% .0% 2.4% 
DTTO N. 9 2 0 0 24 0 35 
%  6.3% 5.4% .0% .0% 41.4% .0% 12.0% 
Curfew N. 4 0 0 0 1 0 5 
%  2.8% .0% .0% .0% 1.7% .0% 1.7% 
Attendance 
Centre 
N. 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
%  .0% 2.7% .0% .0% .0% .0% .3% 
Supervision 
Order 
N. 11 2 1 1 0 0 15 
%  7.7% 5.4% 12.5% 2.9% .0% .0% 5.1% 
Fine N. 13 4 0 8 4 2 31 
%  9.1% 10.8% .0% 23.5% 6.9% 16.7% 10.6% 
Discharge N. 18 2 2 8 9 2 41 
%  12.6% 5.4% 25.0% 23.5% 15.5% 16.7% 14.0% 
Referral Order N. 12 3 0 2 0 3 20 
%  8.4% 8.1% .0% 5.9% .0% 25.0% 6.8% 
Reparation 
Order 
N. 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
%  .7% .0% .0% 2.9% .0% .0% .7% 
CRASBO N. 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
%  .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.7% .0% .3% 
Costs N. 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
%  .7% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .3% 
Compensation N. 1 3 0 1 0 0 5 
%  .7% 8.1% .0% 2.9% .0% .0% 1.7% 
Total N. 143 37 8 34 58 12 292 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 





In other cases, the court may have been discouraged from imposing a DTTO due to the 
seriousness of the offence warranting a custodial sentence or more punitive community 
sentence (cases 140, 179, 220 and 221 all involved relatively high-value goods or a breach of 
trust and resulted in the court imposing immediate imprisonment or a CPRO). 
Alternatively, the offender may have been the subject of a pre-existing DTTO, which the 
court ordered to continue to run (cases 121, 151 and 157) whilst imposing a discharge for the 
current offence. Thirdly, the court would not seem to impose a DTTO in cases where the 
offender was currently serving a custodial sentence for an unrelated offence (case 037) or 
had committed the present offence whilst on licence from prison release (cases 038 and 237). 
Finally, in case 134, the decision not to impose a DTTO may have been made on the basis 
that the offence was insufficiently serious to justify a community-based sentence. The 
offender had pleaded guilty to stealing groceries valued £2.50 from a supermarket leading 
the court to impose a £25 fine. 
 
Only two cases involving a female offender resulted in the imposition of a DTTO, reflecting 
the small number of females who were known to commit their crimes to fund a drug or 
alcohol dependency, a motive present in only six female cases (059, 127, 136, 156, 232, and 
237). Of the two cases where the court imposed a DTTO on a female offender, only one case 
(case 156) was known to have involved an offender stealing to fund her addiction. In case 
112, on the other hand, the offender was made subject of a DTTO but no apparent motive for 
the offending was given in the CPS file; a drug-related motive may however have been 
brought to the courts attention in a pre-sentence report. Since case 156 was the only instance 
in which the court imposed a DTTO upon a female who stole to fund a drug addiction, the 
other five female cases involving a drugs-related motive were either dealt with by way of 
custody, a CRO or discharge. All six offenders had pleaded guilty to shoplifting of property 




The offender in case 237 had very recently been released from prison, which may have 
influenced the court in its decision to impose upon her a further custodial sentence. The 
offender in case 232 had voluntarily sought help for her drug dependency, which may have 
led the court to feel that formal court intervention with the addiction would be unnecessary. 
Instead, the court imposed a two-year CRO, which may have been aimed at supporting the 
offender with her voluntary drug treatment. The final two cases (127 and 136) where a 
female offender was known to offend due to a drug addiction were both dealt with by way 
of a conditional discharge. Neither of the offenders had previously been subject to a DTTO, 
although both had a significant number of previous convictions: the offender in case 127 had 
33 previous convictions, including 11 for theft; the offender in case 136 also had 33 previous 
convictions, with 14 thefts. Both had a recent break in offending of eight months and one 
year respectively, which may have acted as a source of mitigation. Nonetheless, the reasons 
why a DTTO was not (or could not be) imposed are unknown, so too are the reasons why 
the court favoured a discharge. 
 
In 143 cases (49 percent of the sample), the CPS file did not point to any particular motive 
behind the offending. Such cases were categorised as having “no apparent” motive, 
although that is not to say that the offender lacked any motive behind the offending. Nine of 
these cases were dealt with by a DTTO, which should only be imposed by the court in cases 
where the offender is known to have a drug addiction which is susceptible to treatment.40 In 
some cases where no motive was made apparent in the case file, the true motive may not 
become known until the completion of a pre-sentence report.  
 
 
                                                          
40 Section 52(3) PCCSA 2000 
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5.12 Offending Whilst on Bail 
 
Fifteen cases within the sample involved offences being committed either whilst the 
offender was on bail, or whilst released on prison licence. Fourteen of these (93.3 percent) 
resulted in either a community or custodial sentence, with immediate imprisonment – 
including detention and training orders - being imposed in ten cases (66.7 percent). The only 
case not dealt with by way of a community or custodial sentence was 037 in which the 
offender had broken into a vehicle and stolen a stereo system valued £170, causing 
significant damage to the vehicle in the process. At the time of sentencing, the offender was 
serving a five-year term of imprisonment for burglary. The magistrates imposed an absolute 
discharge for the theft, effectively meaning there would be no punishment imposed for that 
offence. The court could have ordered a prison sentence to run concurrently to the sentence 
for burglary, which in real terms would have the same effect of not imposing any additional 
punishment. The court may have been of the opinion that the current offence was not 
sufficiently serious to warrant the imposition of a custodial sentence. The offence may have 
been serious enough to justify a community sentence, but that would not be available due to 
the offender’s incarceration for burglary. Alternatively, the court may have imposed an 
absolute discharge for expediency reasons. Doing so would not require the court to adjourn 
whilst a pre-sentence report was drafted. Martin Wasik’s review discussed three reasons for 
the grant of an absolute discharge: where the offence was trivial, where the offender had 
minimal culpability, and where the offender had suffered collateral losses which could be 
regarded as “unofficial or indirect punishment”.41 Perhaps more fundamentally, Wasik was 
of the opinion that an absolute discharge should not be granted in response to “an offence of 
any seriousness.”42 The fact that the offence resulted in significant damage and involved the 
                                                          
41 M. Wasik, (1985), at 229 
42 Ibid, at 237 
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theft of property of more than a nominal value calls into question the court’s decision to 
impose the least severe order available. 
 
Although the high incidence of community and custodial sentencing in cases involving 
offending on bail suggests that the court is of the opinion that the seriousness of the offence 
is such as to warrant such a penalty, theses cases often involved other aggravating factors 
which may have influenced the court’s decision. The high value goods stolen in case 069 
(£650) may have contributed to the court’s decision to impose a two month custodial 
sentence following the offender’s guilty plea for theft of jewellery by finding.  
 
On two occasions (cases 109 and 110, and 217 and 219), an offender was sentenced for 
multiple thefts committed on bail. The 17 year old offender in cases 109 and 110 was 
sentenced for two counts of retail theft, having stolen spirits valued £17 and cosmetics 
valued £35 respectively. In the former case, the offender had worked as part of an organised 
group with two unknown co-offenders, whom he refused to name. The offender had 62 
previous convictions, including 12 for theft, and was ordered to serve a four month 
detention and training order for each offence, to run concurrently. The decision to imprison 
the offender may have been based on a number of factors including multiple offending, 
working as an organised group, failing to cooperate with the police, entering a not guilty 
plea in case 109, and offending on bail. The offender in cases 217 and 219 was also sentenced 
for two typical thefts from a shop. The offender confessed to having a £50-per-day drug 
addiction which he could only fund through crime. The court imposed a 12 month DTTO in 
each; a sentence which would have been chiefly determined in reference to the offender’s 





Table 5.11 Sentence Type and Offending Whilst on Bail 
 
Committed On Bail 








 Immediate custody N. 8 70 78 
%  53.3% 25.3% 26.7% 
Suspended sentence N. 0 3 3 
%  .0% 1.1% 1.0% 
Detention Training Order N. 2 2 4 
%  13.7% .7% 1.4% 
CRO N. 2 37 39 
%  13.7% 13.4% 13.4% 
CPO N. 0 4 4 
%  .0% 1.4% 1.4% 
CPRO N. 0 7 7 
%  .0% 2.5% 2.4% 
DTTO N. 2 33 35 
%  13.3% 11.9% 12.0% 
Curfew N. 0 5 5 
%  .0% 1.8% 1.7% 
Attendance Centre N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .4% .3% 
Supervision Order N. 0 15 15 
%  .0% 5.4% 5.1% 
Fine N. 0 31 31 
%  .0% 11.2% 10.6% 
Discharge N. 1 40 41 
%  6.7% 14.4% 14.0% 
Referral Order N. 0 20 20 
%  .0% 7.2% 6.8% 
Reparation Order N. 0 2 2 
%  .0% .7% .7% 
CRASBO N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .4% .3% 
Costs N. 0 1 1 
%  .0% .4% .3% 
Compensation N. 0 5 5 
%  .0% 1.8% 1.7% 
Total N. 15 277 292 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 






In most cases where the offence is committed whilst the offender is on bail, the decision to 
impose a community or custodial sentence could have been based on other factors. Only one 
case does not appear to involve any other factors affecting the seriousness of the offence 
which would explain the sentencing decision. The offender in case 097 had stolen cosmetics 
valued £45 from a shop whilst on bail. He was detained at the scene and immediately 
admitted the offence. The court imposed an 18-month CRO, which does not appear to be 
explainable by reference to any other offence related factor. The offender did, however, have 
14 previous convictions, although only one of these was for a similar offence, which may 
have influenced the sentencing decision. 
  
Custodial sentences were imposed in all five cases where the offence was committed whilst 
the offender was on prison licence. The sentence would have been determined in reference 
to the terms of the prison licence, rather than the seriousness of the offence. Indeed, cases 
038 and 039 involved typical shopliftings, for which the offenders were each ordered to 
serve 14 days’ imprisonment notwithstanding the fact that the offences may not have been 
sufficiently serious to cross the custody threshold.  
 
 
5.13 Guilty Plea 
 
The sentence discount for a guilty plea has its roots in the common law,43 but was given 
legislative support in section 48 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which 
was re-enacted in section 152 of the PCCSA 2000: 
 
 
                                                          
43 See for example, de Haan [1968] 2 QB 108 
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“(1) In determining what sentence to pass on an offender who has pleaded guilty to an offence...a court 
shall take into account: 
(a) the stage in the proceedings for the offence at which the offender indicated his intention to 
plead guilty, and 
(b) the circumstances in which this indication was given.” 
 
The legislation failed to provide guidance as to how much of a discount should be properly 
awarded, but case law had suggested that, “something of the order of one-third would very 
often by an appropriate discount from the sentence which would otherwise be imposed on a 
contested trial.”44 Where the offender maintains a not guilty plea until later in the 
proceedings, the discount offered would be “substantially and visibly reduced from that 
which they would otherwise have earned.”45 The discount for a guilty plea is often justified 
for pragmatic purposes; that the offender should be rewarded (by way of a sentence 
discount) for contributing to the expedient and effective running of the criminal justice 
system through the avoidance of a costly and lengthy trial.46 
 
Only nine offenders within the sample pleaded not guilty. The offender in case 023 pleaded 
guilty to only part of the offence. This is the only case categorised as a ‘partial guilty plea’. 
He was charged with stealing two items from a hardware store. Whilst he admitted stealing 
one item (a roll of all-weather tape valued at £3), he maintained that the other item (a £40 
bicycle lock) was his own; a claim not accepted by the court. The 22-year-old offender had 57 
previous convictions, including 22 for theft. 32 convictions had led to a custodial sentence. 
16 convictions had been recorded in the past year on 11 different occasions, all of which 
resulted in either fines or custodial sentences. Most of his recent offending behaviour 
centred on shoplifting. His sentence of three months’ imprisonment seems punitive but 
might have been influenced by his partial denial of the offence; he had after all only 
admitted the very low value part of the offence. His recent spate of offending might also 
                                                          
44 Per Taylor LCJ in Buffrey (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 511, at 515, although see Henham (2001) who found that a large 
proportion of sentence discounts in the magistrates’ courts exceed one-third.  
45 Per Mellor J in Okee and West [1998] 2 Cr App R (S) 199, at 201 
46 A. Ashworth (2000), at 143 
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have led the court to conclude that a custodial sentence was appropriate, notwithstanding 
the fact that a number of such sentences had been tried in the recent past and each one had 
been followed shortly thereafter by a further conviction. 
 
Six of the nine not guilty pleas (66.7%) led to the imposition of an immediate term of 
imprisonment, including one detention and training order. The offender in case 171 had 
worked as a waitress and was charged with stealing items from a customer’s handbag. The 
victim had realised that her bag had been moved and that certain items were missing. The 
offender, who had 23 previous convictions including nine for theft, was convicted after a 
contested trial and was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment. This decision to imprison 
may well have been based on a number of factors: the offender’s not guilty plea, her list of 
recent convictions (for which she had received a number of fines and community penalties, 
the ineffectiveness of which may have led the magistrates to conclude that custody was now 
the only reasonable option), and the (albeit brief) professional relationship between the 
parties. 
 
Case 190 involved a 33-year-old male offender with 68 previous convictions, 20 of which 
were for theft, who received a four month prison sentence for stealing £2000 worth of mobile 
telephone top-up cards from a supermarket. The sentence imposed was held to run 
concurrently to a four month term of imprisonment imposed upon the offender on the same 








Table 5.12 Sentence Type and Guilty Plea 
 
Guilty Plea 








 Immediate custody N. 72 5 1 78 
%  25.5% 55.6% 100.0% 26.7% 
Suspended sentence N. 3 0 0 3 
%  1.1% .0% .0% 1.0% 
Detention Training Order N. 3 1 0 4 
%  1.1% 11.1% .0% 1.4% 
CRO N. 38 1 0 39 
%  13.5% 11.1% .0% 13.4% 
CPO N. 4 0 0 4 
%  1.4% .0% .0% 1.4% 
CPRO N. 7 0 0 7 
%  2.5% .0% .0% 2.4% 
DTTO N. 35 0 0 35 
%  12.4% .0% .0% 12.0% 
Curfew N. 5 0 0 5 
%  1.8% .0% .0% 1.7% 
Attendance Centre N. 1 0 0 1 
%  .4% .0% .0% .3% 
Supervision Order N. 15 0 0 15 
%  5.3% .0% .0% 5.1% 
Fine N. 30 1 0 31 
%  10.6% 11.1% .0% 10.6% 
Discharge N. 41 0 0 41 
%  14.5% .0% .0% 14.0% 
Referral Order N. 20 0 0 20 
%  7.1% .0% .0% 6.8% 
Reparation Order N. 2 0 0 2 
%  .7% .0% .0% .7% 
CRASBO N. 1 0 0 1 
%  .4% .0% .0% .3% 
Costs N. 1 0 0 1 
%  .4% .0% .0% .3% 
Compensation N. 4 1 0 5 
%  1.4% 11.1% .0% 1.7% 
Total N. 282 9 1 292 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 






A custodial sentence was also imposed in case 203 concerning a 24-year-old male who stole 
a mobile telephone to the value of £50. The offender was seen in a snooker hall asking the 
patrons for money. The victim, a customer of the snooker hall, noticed his mobile phone was 
missing and followed the offender outside. Initially the offender denied taking the phone, 
but subsequently admitted to taking the property, asserting that he intended to return it. 
The offender had 18 previous convictions for theft, although other details of his previous 
history were not available. He entered a plea of not guilty and was sentenced to six weeks’ 
imprisonment. 
 
The final two cases in which an immediate custodial term was imposed following a not 
guilty plea are cases 290 and 291. Both cases concerned the same offender, an 18-year-old 
Asian male, who stole two mobile telephones on the same day. In the first count, the 
offender had enticed the 16-year-old victim into parkland and asked if he could borrow the 
victim’s mobile phone. After the victim had agreed, the offender refused to return the phone 
to the owner and made threats that he was carrying a knife. On the same day, the offender 
had entered a take-away restaurant, the workplace of the second victim, noticed that the 
mobile telephone had been left unattended, took it and ran off making good his escape. He 
was subsequently arrested five days later and was sentenced by the Crown Court to a total 
of three months’ imprisonment. Separate sentences for each count were not indicated. 
 
A custodial sentence (in the guise of a detention and training order) was imposed on a 17-
year-old offender in case 109. The offender, along with two others, entered an off-licence and 
stole a bottle of spirits valued at £17. The two others kept the shop worker occupied whilst 
the offender took the bottle. The offender was later identified but refused to disclose the 
identities of his two co-offenders. He had 62 previous convictions, including 12 for theft, and 




In all of the cases where custody was imposed following a contested trial, there were other 
aggravating features that might explain the court’s decision to imprison; be it a breach of a 
position of trust (case 171), the offender’s prior criminal history (case 109, 171, 190 and 203), 
the value of the goods stolen (case 190), group offending (case 109), or the fact that the court 
was passing sentence for two or more offences at the same time (190, 290 and 291).  
 
In those cases where the offender contested the case and custody was not imposed, the court 
was not averse to imposing a penalty toward the lower end of the sentencing spectrum. 
Firstly, the offender in case 003 was convicted of theft from a dwelling, having stolen the 
victim’s mobile telephone. The victim was the offender’s childminder whose house the 
offender had visited to drop off her child. The victim noticed the item had gone missing and 
claimed that the offender was the only person who could have taken it. The offender had 
only one previous conviction dating back seven years for being carried in a motor vehicle 
taken without consent. The offender was ordered to pay £200 compensation (reflecting the 
value of the goods taken but not recovered) and £90 costs. It is unlikely that the court would 
have imposed a lesser compensation order had the offender entered a guilty plea because 
the level of compensation is primarily set to reflect the value of the property stolen. The 
court might however have reduced the value of the costs order to reflect the admission but 
this would have been because the true costs of the court hearing would be greater where the 
offender pleads not guilty as this results in a longer (and therefore more costly) hearing. 
Reducing the costs for a guilty plea would not therefore amount to a discount for a guilty 
plea: it would simply reflect the lower costs of the hearing. 
 
Similarly with case 213, the offender was convicted of one count of theft from a vehicle. 
Using force, he had smashed a car window to steal a handbag from the front passenger’s 
179 
 
seat. The offence caused significant damage, which was redressed through the victim’s 
insurance company. The offender had 58 previous convictions, 12 of which were for theft, 
but had only one conviction in the past year (that being shoplifting for which he received a 
conditional discharge). For the immediate offence, the court imposed a £75 fine and a costs 
order of £20. The fine may have been reduced to £50 had the offender entered a guilty plea, 
but either way this sentence could appear as particularly lenient considering the damage 
caused to the vehicle. 
 
The only case where the offender received a community-based sentence following a not 
guilty plea was 030 in which a 16-year-old convicted for theft from a vehicle (namely 
stealing an in-car stereo system from a vehicle) was sentenced to a 24-month CRO and 
ordered to pay £80 costs. Details of the offence contained in the CPS file were comparatively 
thin and no details of the number and nature of the offender’s previous convictions were 
available. Without knowing of any other aggravating factors it is difficult to make a 
judgement on the extent to which the not guilty plea might have impacted on sentence. 
 
 
5.13.1 Time of Guilty Plea 
 
It is a long standing principle that the extent of a sentencing discount attracted to a guilty 
plea is linked to the time the plea was entered.47 This has more recently been incorporated in 
the Sentencing Guidelines Council, which suggests that a discount of one-third should be 
applied for offenders who enter a plea at the first reasonable opportunity. This should be 
                                                          
47 See for example Rafferty [1998] 2 Cr App R (S) 449, although see Henham (2001) who found that no statistical 
relationship existed between the timing of the guilty plea and the size of the discount granted by the magistrates’ courts; 
at page 83. 
180 
 
reduced to one-quarter after a trial date has been set, and falls to one-tenth where the 
offender changes his plea after the trial has begun.48 
 
There appears to be a correlation between the time of confession and the imposition of an 
immediate custodial sentence, which becomes increasingly likely the later the plea is 
entered. Consequently, those offenders who entered a guilty plea immediately after the 
offence were the least likely group to receive an immediate custodial sentence with 18 
(14.3%) being made subject to that penalty. This proportion increases to 50% where the 





Most theft cases are not considered to be sufficiently serious to justify committing the case to 
the Crown Court for sentencing. However, in a small minority of cases, the magistrates 
appear to do so where they consider the seriousness of the offence to be such that their 
sentencing powers may be inadequate. That being said, the Crown Court may not ultimately 
impose a sentence outside of the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ court. The factors likely to 
lead the magistrates to decline jurisdiction are a serious breach of trust and the targeting of 
high value property.  
 
As the primary determinant in ascertaining harm, the monetary value of the property 
appears to have a bearing on the sentencing decision. In high value thefts, the courts are 
more likely to regard the seriousness of the offence as sufficient to cross the custody or 
community-sentence thresholds. Damage caused during the course of the theft can have an 
                                                          
48 SGC (2007), at 5 
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impact on the sentencing decision. Where significant damage is caused, the court is more 
likely to impose a custodial sentence. 
 
Offending by an organised group did not have such a marked impact on sentence as may 
have been expected. Generally, offences committed by groups were otherwise non-serious; 
therefore the courts may not regard the factor as sufficient aggravation to justify the 
imposition of a more punitive sentence type than would otherwise be appropriate. The 
impact of related damage was, as expected, dependent upon the extent of the damage 
caused. In cases involving significant damage, where the costs of repair or replacement 
extend to hundreds of pounds, the courts were likely to regard the seriousness of the offence 
as having crossed the custody threshold. 
 
Ultimately, in most cases resulting in a custodial or community-based sentence, there is no 
single offence-related factor which appears to adequately explain the courts’ decision. The 
imposition of these more punitive sentences, rather than a fine or discharge, may be based 
on the presence of a combination of offence-related factors and/or the offender’s character, 








IMPACT OF PARTICIPANTS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
ON THE SENTENCING DECISION 
 
 
The previous chapter examined offence-related factors which may have impacted on the 
sentencing decision in the study’s sample of cases. Here, the focus moves away from the 
offence and toward the parties to the crime in order to determine whether the offender’s 
characteristics and circumstances (such as gender, age, ethnicity, previous convictions and 
previous sentences served) may have affected the sentence outcome. Similarly, the 
characteristics of the victim are also explored. However, it should be noted that there was no 
apparent statistical significance between most offender and victim characteristics and the 
sentence imposed, although the offender’s previous convictions and prior sentences served 
nevertheless seemed to have some influence on the sentence.  
 
 
6.1 The Offender 
 
6.1.1 Offender Gender 
 
The overwhelming majority (76 percent) of thefts in the sample were committed against 
retailers. A higher proportion of the female offenders within the sample (83.6 percent) were 
convicted of these offences compared to the male offenders (73.5 percent), explainable in 
part by the fact that female offenders seem to have a narrower offending range than their 
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male counterparts. Whereas examples can be found of males offending in every category of 
theft (including abstraction of electricity), no females were convicted of theft from a vehicle, 
of a vehicle, abstraction, theft by finding, of a bicycle or mobile phone. 
 
Table 6.1 shows the relationship between sentence type and offender gender. Most sentence 
types were used equally against both male and female offenders. However, females were 
less likely to be issued with a DTTO (only two of the 35 DTTOs within the sample were 
imposed against female offenders), and fines were imposed relatively infrequently against 
female offenders, a finding consistent with other research.1 Conversely, females were more 
likely than male offenders to be made the subject of a CRO (24.7 percent compared with 9.6 
percent of male offenders).2 Referral and supervision orders were also more commonly 
imposed against female offenders (26 percent compared with 7.3 percent of male offenders), 
although this is explained by the over representation of young female offenders within the 
sample. 
 
Table 6.1 seemingly shows a significantly greater use of referral orders and supervision 
orders against female offenders, with 55 percent of referral orders and 53.3 percent of 
supervision orders being imposed against female offenders, despite the fact that females 
constituted only 25 percent of the sample. The study included a relatively high number of 
young female offenders who would often be sentenced to one of these two youth orders. 23 
of the 73 female offenders were aged under 18 at the time of the offence, constituting 31.5 
                                                          
1 Hedderman & Dowds (1997), at 2; Hedderman and Gelsthorpe (1997), at 21 where the authors suggest that the courts’ 
reluctance to fine female offenders may be based on a belief that to do so would be to penalise her children. More 
generally, Jacobson & Hough (2007), at 33 found that some sentencers were inclined to take into account the interests of 
any children, which was more likely to be an issue when dealing with female offenders. 
2 Whilst Speed and Burrows (2006) found that male offenders were twice as likely as females to receive a custodial 
sentence (30 per cent c.f. 15 per cent), females were more likely to be sentenced within the community (36 per cent c.f. 31 
per cent of males); at page 41.  
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percent of the female sample population, compared with only 12.8 percent of male offenders 
who were aged under 18.3 
Table 6.1 Sentence Type and Offender Gender 
 
Offender Gender 








 Immediate custody N 64 14 78 
% 82.1% 17.9% 100.0% 
Suspended sentence N 2 1 3 
% 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Detention Training Order N 4 0 4 
% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
CRO N 21 18 39 
% 53.8% 46.2% 100.0% 
CPO N 3 1 4 
% 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
CPRO N 7 0 7 
% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
DTTO N 33 2 35 
% 94.3% 5.7% 100.0% 
Curfew N 5 0 5 
% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
Attendance Centre N 1 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
Supervision Order N 7 8 15 
% 46.7% 53.3% 100.0% 
Fine N 26 5 31 
% 83.9% 16.1% 100.0% 
Discharge N 29 12 41 
% 70.7% 29.3% 100.0% 
Referral Order N 9 11 20 
% 45.0% 55.0% 100.0% 
Reparation Order N 2 0 2 
% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
CRASBO N 1 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
Costs N 1 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
Compensation N 4 1 5 
% 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Total N 219 73 292 
% 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square = 43.218 Df = 16 P = 0.000 
 
                                                          




6.1.2 Offender Age 
 
The penalties available for the courts’ utilisation vary depending on the age of the offender.4 
Simply put, the courts have at their disposal a different set of sentencing options when 
dealing with young offenders than those available for adult offenders, although there is 
some overlap. Fines and discharges are available for all offenders, regardless of age group. 
 
The purposes of sentencing are statutorily affected by offenders’ age. The Criminal Justice 
Act 1991 required sentences to be determined in reference to offence seriousness, thereby 
upholding principles of proportionality. For young offenders on the other hand, section 37 
of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 states that “the principal aim of the youth justice system 
[is] to prevent offending by children and young persons”, whilst section 44 of the Children 
and Young Persons Act 1933 provides that the court must “have regard to the welfare of the 
child or young person.” This could mean, therefore, that the courts may be less inclined to 
impose a custodial sentence upon a young offender, preferring instead to opt for a 
rehabilitative and supportive disposal option. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the relationship between offender age and sentence type imposed. As 
outlined above, some penalty types are only available for particular age groups, thereby 
accounting for the fact that all referral orders, supervision orders and detention and training 




                                                          
4 See section 2.5 above. 
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Table 6.2 Sentence Type and Offender Age 
 
Offender Age 








 Immediate custody N 0 14 40 24 0 0 78 
% .0% 17.9% 51.3% 30.8% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Suspended sentence N 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 
% .0% .0% 33.3% 66.7% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Detention Training Order N 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CRO N 2 11 11 13 2 0 39 
% 5.1% 28.2% 28.2% 33.3% 5.1% .0% 100.0% 
CPO N 0 0 1 2 1 0 4 
% .0% .0% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% .0% 100.0% 
CPRO N 0 6 0 1 0 0 7 
% .0% 85.7% .0% 14.3% .0% .0% 100.0% 
DTTO N 0 4 20 8 3 0 35 
% .0% 11.4% 57.1% 22.9% 8.6% .0% 100.0% 
Curfew N 0 2 1 2 0 0 5 
% .0% 40.0% 20.0% 40.0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Attendance Centre N 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Supervision Order N 15 0 0 0 0 0 15 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Fine N 2 8 10 8 3 0 31 
% 6.5% 25.8% 32.3% 25.8% 9.7% .0% 100.0% 
Discharge N 5 2 14 11 8 1 41 
% 12.2% 4.9% 34.1% 26.8% 19.5% 2.4% 100.0% 
Referral Order N 20 0 0 0 0 0 20 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Reparation Order N 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CRASBO N 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Costs N 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% .0% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Compensation N 0 1 1 1 2 0 5 
% .0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% .0% 100.0% 
Total N 51 49 99 73 19 1 292 
% 17.5% 16.8% 33.9% 25.0% 6.5% .3% 100.0% 






The study’s sample of cases includes offences committed by persons spanning a wide age 
range, the youngest offender being 12 years old (case 224) and the oldest 54 (case 176). 
Offending was relatively rare in those aged over 40,5 but was commonplace in all other age 
groups, as shown in Figure 6.1 below. Offending was most common amongst the 22-29 year 












6.1.2.1 Young Offenders 
 
Despite the statutory guidance to the contrary, on nine occasions the courts imposed a 
referral order on a young offender with one previous conviction.6 The referral order was 
imposed in all 11 cases involving first-time young offenders.  
 
 
                                                          
5 20 cases involved offenders aged 40 or over. In only one of these was the offender over the age of 50. 
6 When enacted, section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 will amend section 17 of the PCCSA 2000 
thereby providing the court with a discretion to impose a referral order on an offender who has been dealt with by the 
court on one previous occasion and, exceptionally, where he has been dealt with by a court on more than one previous 
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6.1.3 Offender Ethnicity 
 
Table 6.3 shows the relationship between offender ethnicity and sentence type imposed. 
Ethnicity was categorised in accordance with the categories given on the police charge sheet 
within the CPS file, thereby detailing the ethnicity as given in court. Of the 292 offenders 
within the sample, 254 (87.0 percent) were white and 36 (12.3 percent) were non-white. The 
36 non-white offenders were divided as followed: six (2.1 percent) dark European, 17 (5.8 
percent) Afro-Caribbean, 11 (3.8 percent) Asian and two (0.7 percent) Arabian. The 




















Table 6.3 Sentence Type and Offender Ethnicity 
 













 Immediate custody N 65 0 4 8 1 0 78 
% 83.3% .0% 5.1% 10.3% 1.3% .0% 100.0% 
Suspended sentence N 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Detention Training 
Order 
N 2 1 0 1 0 0 4 
% 50.0% 25.0% .0% 25.0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CRO N 35 1 2 0 0 1 39 
% 89.7% 2.6% 5.1% .0% .0% 2.6% 100.0% 
CPO N 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CPRO N 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
DTTO N 33 1 1 0 0 0 35 
% 94.3% 2.9% 2.9% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Curfew N 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Attendance Centre N 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Supervision Order N 12 1 2 0 0 0 15 
% 80.0% 6.7% 13.3% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Fine N 26 0 4 0 1 0 31 
% 83.9% .0% 12.9% .0% 3.2% .0% 100.0% 
Discharge N 34 0 4 2 0 1 41 
% 82.9% .0% 9.8% 4.9% .0% 2.4% 100.0% 
Referral Order N 18 2 0 0 0 0 20 
% 90.0% 10.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Reparation Order N 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CRASBO N 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Costs N 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Compensation N 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Total N 254 6 17 11 2 2 292 
% 87.0% 2.1% 5.8% 3.8% .7% .7% 100.0% 






6.1.4 Offender’s Employment 
 
Attention now turns to the offender’s employment status at the time of sentencing. The aim 
here is to discover whether there was any evidence that employment may dissuade the court 
from imposing an intrusive sentence, such as custody or a community punishment order, 
which might interfere with the offender’s job.7 The CPS files included information on the 
offender’s employment at the time of the offence but would occasionally include additional 
information regarding whether that employment had been terminated, as may very well be 
true in cases where the offender was convicted of theft by an employee. Unfortunately, it 
cannot be said with certainty that any changes in employment status were always noted on 
the CPS file. Where the offender has lost his employment as a consequence of the offence, 
the court may continue to sentence as an unemployed offender. Employment at the time of 
sentence is considered here to potentially play a greater role than employment status at the 
time of the offence since the court may be dissuaded from imposing a sanction which is 
likely to interfere with the offender’s employment. Where the offender has lost employment 
between offence and sentence, this would presumably no longer factor in the court’s mind. 
Conversely, where the offender was unemployed at the time of the offence but has 
subsequently found employment before being sentenced, the court may wish to take this 






                                                          
7 Jacobson & Hough (2007), at 37 found that a good work record can be very influential at the sentencing stage for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the courts would be wary of the risk of damaging an offender’s long-term economic prospects by 
imposing a custodial sentence. Secondly, an employed offender may be able to demonstrate himself as reasonably 



















































































 Immediate custody N 63 1 0 3 3 2 0 5 0 1 78 
%  80.8% 1.3% .0% 3.8% 3.8% 2.6% .0% 6.4% .0% 1.3% 100.0% 
Suspended sentence N 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
%  66.7% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 33.3% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Detention Training 
Order 
N 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 
%  50.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% 100.0% 
CRO N 28 0 4 2 0 1 0 1 2 1 39 
%  71.8% .0% 10.3% 5.1% .0% 2.6% .0% 2.6% 5.1% 2.6% 100.0% 
CPO N 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 
%  50.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CPRO N 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
%  100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
DTTO N 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 
%  100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Curfew N 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
%  80.0% .0% .0% 20.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Attendance Centre N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
%  .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
Supervision Order N 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 15 
%  13.3% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 86.7% .0% 100.0% 
Fine N 22 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 0 31 
%  71.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 6.5% 9.7% 12.9% .0% 100.0% 
Discharge N 35 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 2 41 
%  85.4% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 2.4% .0% 7.3% 4.9% 100.0% 
Referral Order N 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 15 2 20 
%  5.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 5.0% 5.0% 75.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Reparation Order N 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
%  50.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% 100.0% 
CRASBO N 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
%  100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Costs N 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
%  100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Compensation N 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
%  100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Total N 211 1 4 6 3 3 7 10 41 6 292 
%  72.3% .3% 1.4% 2.1% 1.0% 1.0% 2.4% 3.4% 14.0% 2.1% 100.0% 





Where an offender was employed at the time of the offence, his employment status was 
classified according to the Standard Occupational Classification.8 This scheme provides nine 
groups according to the type of work conducted or the offender’s level of authority in the 
workplace.9 It also lists many common occupations within each group. Additional 
classifications were added to incorporate the two largest offender groups in the sample: 
students and the unemployed. 
 
Table 6.4 shows the relationship between the offender’s employment at the time of the 
offence and the sentence type imposed. Where the offender was employed at the time of the 
offence, the employment was known to have been terminated following the offence in only 
three cases, all of which involved the offender stealing from his employer and resulted in the 
imposition of a custodial sentence. In all other cases in which the offender was employed at 
the time of the offence, it was not known whether that employment had ended before 
sentence was passed. Therefore it is difficult to state conclusively the extent to which the 




6.1.5 Previous Convictions 
 
Table 6.5 shows the relationship between the sentence type imposed and the number of 
previous convictions. Evidence suggests that criminality often begins during the formative 
                                                          
8 Office of National Statistics (2000) 
9 The nine classes are managers and senior officials, professions, associate professional and technical occupations, 
administrative and secretarial, skilled trades, personal service, sales and customer service, process plant and machine 
operatives, and elementary occupations.  
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years of youth,10 leading to many first offenders being young offenders. Indeed, many have 
claimed that youth is the most criminogenic age.11 40.7 percent of offenders with no 
previous convictions were under the age of 18. Young offenders also accounted for the 71 
percent of offenders with one to three convictions. Female offenders were more likely than 
their male counterparts to have fewer than four prior convictions, although this is explicable 
(at least in part) by the relatively large number of young female offenders in the sample. 
 
Although previous convictions were not statistically significant to the sentence imposed, the 
Table indicates a tendency for repeat offenders to receive custodial or community sentences. 
In most cases, this is explicable by reference to the greater seriousness of the offending, 
whilst other cases might offer some evidence of the courts sentencing on record. Case 023 
involved the theft of hardware valued £45. The offender had accumulated 57 previous 
convictions, 22 of which were for theft, with nine theft convictions in the last year. He was 
ordered to serve a three month prison term. In case 144, the offender had stolen perfume 
valued £66. The offender was detained at the scene, the property was recovered and a guilty 
plea was entered; there was no apparent offence aggravation present. The offender had 44 
previous convictions, 22 for thefts, with seven shopliftings being recorded in the past year. 
He was sentenced to 28 days’ imprisonment. Case 059 concerned a female offender who had 
stolen food valued £60. Similarly to case 144, there was no apparent offence aggravation. 
The offender had 19 previous convictions, 14 of which were for similar thefts, including 13 
theft convictions in the year preceding the immediate offence. He was sentenced to four 
months’ imprisonment. It appears that the only explanation for the decision to imprison her 
is based on her record and the frequency of recent theft offending in particular.  
 
                                                          
10 See for example, Lynch, Ogilvie & Chui (2003), at 45 
11 Farrington (2007); Muncie (2004), chapter 1; A. Rutherford (2002), at 35 
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That being said, a lengthy record need not necessitate a more punitive sentence. In seven 
cases, the offender had amassed 60 or more previous convictions for theft, all of which were 
dealt with by non-custodial measures. The seven cases involved offending against shops 
with no obvious offence aggravation. In each case, the offender’s significant criminal history 
was not enough to lead the court to impose a custodial sentence. Indeed in case 162 in which 
the offender had stolen from a shop alcohol valued £3.50, the court imposed a twelve month 
conditional discharge, notwithstanding the offender’s history of 119 previous convictions 
including 79 thefts.  
 
The Table shows that referral orders were imposed on nine offenders with one previous 
conviction, despite the fact that no such power existed at the time. Before the enactment of 
section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, the referral order could only be 
imposed on first-time young offenders who pleaded guilty to their offences and for whom 
the courts were not considering imposing a custodial sentence or absolute discharge.  
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Table 6.5 Sentence Type and Previous Convictions 
 
Previous Convictions 














N 4 0 0 5 17 22 17 9 4 0 78 
% 5.1% .0% .0% 6.4% 21.8% 28.2% 21.8% 11.5% 5.1% .0% 100.0% 
Suspended 
sentence 
N 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 
% .0% 33.3% .0% .0% .0% 33.3% .0% .0% .0% 33.3% 100.0% 
Detention 
Training Order 
N 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 4 
% .0% .0% .0% 25.0% 25.0% .0% 50.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CRO N 4 0 1 5 9 11 1 4 2 2 39 
% 10.3% .0% 2.6% 12.8% 23.1% 28.2% 2.6% 10.3% 5.1% 5.1% 100.0% 
CPO N 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 
% 50.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 25.0% .0% 25.0% .0% 100.0% 
CPRO N 0 0 1 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 7 
% .0% .0% 14.3% 42.9% 28.6% 14.3% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
DTTO N 0 0 0 8 10 3 7 4 2 1 35 
% .0% .0% .0% 22.9% 28.6% 8.6% 20.0% 11.4% 5.7% 2.9% 100.0% 
Curfew N 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 5 
% .0% .0% .0% 20.0% .0% 80.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Attendance 
Centre 
N 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
% .0% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Supervision 
Order 
N 0 3 2 2 6 1 0 0 1 0 15 
% .0% 20.0% 13.3% 13.3% 40.0% 6.7% .0% .0% 6.7% .0% 100.0% 
Fine N 3 2 3 3 8 6 2 2 2 0 31 
% 9.7% 6.5% 9.7% 9.7% 25.8% 19.4% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% .0% 100.0% 
Discharge N 3 3 2 5 12 6 6 3 0 1 41 
% 7.3% 7.3% 4.9% 12.2% 29.3% 14.6% 14.6% 7.3% .0% 2.4% 100.0% 
Referral Order N 11 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 
% 55.0% 45.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Reparation 
Order 
N 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
% .0% .0% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CRASBO N 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Costs N 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Compensation N 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 5 
% .0% 20.0% .0% .0% 60.0% .0% .0% .0% 20.0% .0% 100.0% 
Total N 27 20 11 33 69 56 36 22 13 5 292 
% 9.2% 6.8% 3.8% 11.3% 23.6% 19.2% 12.3% 7.5% 4.5% 1.7% 100.0% 






The Table also shows that offenders in four cases received an immediate custodial sentence 
for their first offence. Each of these was heard in the Crown Court and were all particularly 
serious examples of theft. The offender in cases 282-284 had stolen bank cards belonging to 
two elderly victims over whom the offender acted as a carer. She had used one card to 
withdraw cash from the victim’s bank account, and used the other to fraudulently purchase 
goods. She was sentenced to concurrent 18-month terms of imprisonment for each count. 
The offender in case 292 was a store manager who had appropriated £27,000 by authorising 
dishonest refunds. The Crown Court ordered that he serve 12 months in prison, no doubt 
due to the overwhelming presence of aggravating features: the high value of the property, 
breach of trust, and the sophisticated methods used to conceal  his actions. 
 
 
6.1.6 Previous Sentences 
 
This section will deal with offenders’ previously served sentences (if any). The issue for 
consideration here is whether the offender had previously received the same sentence type 
for one or more of his prior convictions as imposed for the current theft. This is particularly 
relevant to the consideration of discharges which do not, strictly speaking, constitute a 
punishment. There could be reason to claim that the leniency of a discharge should only be 
offered to an offender once. The question is also relevant to some community sentences, 
particularly those which seek to reduce the offender’s propensity to reoffend through 
rehabilitation (e.g. CRO and DTTO). The court may understandably feel that reoffending 
indicates that any previous sentence has not been effective and ought therefore not to be 
imposed on a subsequent conviction. Table 6.6 shows the number of cases in which 




In most instances the CPS case file included a list of previous convictions along with the 
sentence imposed for each and the date on which they were sentenced. Only in the Crown 
Court would there be a (albeit brief) précis of the offence facts. In 22 cases the list was either 
missing or incomplete to an extent that the question of whether the same sentence had been 
imposed of the offender in the past could not be addressed. 
 
Table 6.6 shows that the courts were not averse to imposing the same type of sentence on an 
offender as he had been subject to before. In many cases the offender may have received the 
same sentence type on two or more occasions. Not surprisingly, in the majority of cases (71.8 
percent) where a term of immediate custody was imposed, the same sentence type had been 


















Table 6.6 Sentence Type and Previously Received Same Sentence Type 
 
Previously Received Same Sentence Type 
Total No Yes - once 
Yes - more 
than once Unknown 
Sentence 
Type 
Immediate custody N 14 3 56 5 78 
% 17.9% 3.8% 71.8% 6.4% 100.0% 
Suspended sentence N 1 0 1 1 3 
% 33.3% .0% 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
Detention Training 
Order 
N 2 0 2 0 4 
% 50.0% .0% 50.0% .0% 100.0% 
CRO N 14 7 13 5 39 
% 35.9% 17.9% 33.3% 12.8% 100.0% 
CPO N 3 0 0 1 4 
% 75.0% .0% .0% 25.0% 100.0% 
CPRO N 4 1 2 0 7 
% 57.1% 14.3% 28.6% .0% 100.0% 
DTTO N 21 4 6 4 35 
% 60.0% 11.4% 17.1% 11.4% 100.0% 
Curfew N 5 0 0 0 5 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Attendance Centre N 1 0 0 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Supervision Order N 4 2 7 2 15 
% 26.7% 13.3% 46.7% 13.3% 100.0% 
Fine N 8 5 16 2 31 
% 25.8% 16.1% 51.6% 6.5% 100.0% 
Discharge N 15 2 23 1 41 
% 36.6% 4.9% 56.1% 2.4% 100.0% 
Referral Order N 15 5 0 0 20 
% 75.0% 25.0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Reparation Order N 2 0 0 0 2 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CRASBO N 1 0 0 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Costs N 0 0 1 0 1 
% .0% .0% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
Compensation N 2 1 1 1 5 
% 40.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Total N 112 30 128 22 292 
% 38.4% 10.3% 43.8% 7.5% 100.0% 









It is arguable that an offender should only be discharged once where they can legitimately 
claim that their offence was a lapse into criminality which was out of character. However, 
the courts appear willing to impose a number of discharges upon an offender. Of the 41 
cases where a discharge was imposed, the offender had previously received the same 
sentence type in 25 cases (61.0 percent), and had received a discharge in the past on more 
than one occasion in 23 of these (56.1 percent of the cases in which a discharge was 
imposed). In 18 cases the offender had previously received a discharge for theft. 
 
In some of those cases where an offender received a discharge and had been previously 
subject to a similar order on one or more occasions, the court may have been swayed by a 
significant break in the person’s offending behaviour. By way of example, in case 062 the 
offender received a 12 month conditional discharge for theft from a shop having received 
similar orders for assault occasioning actual bodily harm in 1994 and shoplifting in 1996. 
Her last recorded offence was for shoplifting in 1999, for which she received a £50 fine. 
Similarly, in case 088 the offender was made subject of a six-month conditional discharge 
following a guilty plea for shoplifting, having previously received four 12-month 
conditional discharges for shoplifting in 1988, 1994 and 1997. Her last offence recorded was 
for shoplifting in 1998 (six years before the current offence) for which she was handed a £200 
fine. Equally, case 207 involved an offender sentenced to a 12-month conditional discharge 
for a low-level theft from a shop. The courts had previously imposed discharges on him in 
1987 and 1998 for making a false statement to obtain benefits and criminal damage 
respectively. His last recorded offence was in 1999 for damaging property and breaching a 





6.1.6.2 Rehabilitative Community Sentences 
 
Where the court has previously imposed a sentence aimed at rehabilitating the offender, 
such as a DTTO or CRO, and where that order had failed to prevent subsequent criminality 
by the offender, it may be assumed that the court would be discouraged from imposing 
further similar orders. The court may believe that, as the orders had previously been 
ineffective, they may remain inappropriate for a particular offender unless a change in 
circumstances suggests otherwise. 
 
A DTTO was imposed in 35 cases, in 21 of which (60 percent) the offender had not 
previously been subject to a DTTO. In ten cases (28.5 percent) the offender was known to 
have previously received a DTTO, including six cases where the offender had received an 
order on more than one occasion. In some cases an earlier DTTO was still active and further 
DTTOs would be ordered to run concurrently to the earlier orders (for example, cases 172 
and 185 where the DTTOs were ordered to run concurrently to that imposed in cases 164-
167). Not only does it appear that the courts are willing to allow a DTTO to continue, despite 
reoffending, but the courts may not be discouraged from imposing a further DTTO once an 
earlier order has expired. For example, the offender in cases 253-255 (three counts of 
shoplifting all simultaneously sentenced for by way of a DTTO) had previously received 
similar orders four years and two years earlier, neither of which appear to have changed the 
offender’s criminal behaviour. The earlier orders’ failure to abate the offender’s criminal 




A CRO was imposed in 39 cases, 14 of which (35.9 percent) were imposed on an offender for 
the first time. In 20 cases (51.2 percent), the offender was known to have previously been 
made the subject of a CRO (or its predecessor, the probation order).12 These include 13 cases 
(33.3 percent) where the offender had previously received a CRO on more than one 
occasion.  These included instances where previous orders had failed to reduce reoffending 
but had been ordered to continue (for example case 173 in which the court imposed a nine 
month CRO concurrent to a similar order imposed three months earlier for shoplifting). 
 
 
6.2 The Victim 
 
This section will consider statistical analysis of the relationship between the victim’s 
characteristics and the sentence. Factors relating to the victim may be relevant to the 
determination of offence seriousness. Where an offender specifically targets a victim on the 
grounds of vulnerability or racial ethnicity, the seriousness of the offence may be affected. In 
its guideline on offence seriousness, the Sentencing Guidelines Council identifies the 
“deliberate targeting of vulnerable victims” and offences “motivated by hostility towards a 
minority group” as factors indicating higher culpability.13 Victim vulnerability is also named 






                                                          
12 In the remaining five cases the missing or incomplete data concerning previous sentences meant that it was unknown 
whether or not the offender had previously been subject to a CRO. 
13 Sentencing Guidelines Council (2004a), at 6 
14 Ibid, at 7 
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6.2.1 Nature of the Victim 
 
Figures relating to the distinction between individual and business victims is shown in Table 
6.8. This shows that offences committed against individuals were unlikely to receive either a 
fine or a discharge, with these penalties being imposed in only one and four cases 
respectively. A community sentence was imposed in 15 cases, immediate imprisonment in a 
further 15 cases and a suspended sentence of imprisonment in one case. The remaining cases 
were dealt with by way of either a referral order (six cases) or compensation (four cases). In 
31 cases against individual victims, the offence resulted in either a community or custodial 
sentence being imposed, suggesting that the courts often view this type of offending as 
sufficiently serious to cross either the community sentence or custody thresholds. 
 
Nevertheless, a consideration of some of the most prominent offence factors shows that the 
individual-victim offences more commonly include aggravating factors than the offences 
committed against companies. The stolen property was known to have been recovered in 
80.1 percent of the cases against companies, compared with only 28.3 percent of those 
against individuals. The value of the goods stolen in offences committed against individual 
victims was often greater than the values involved in most shopliftings, thereby affecting the 
seriousness of the offence through the harm caused. 78 percent of offences against 
companies involved property valued less than £100 compared with 34.8 percent of offences 
against individuals. Thefts against individuals were more likely to involve greater sums, 
between £100 and £500 (52.2%), and a smaller proportion (13.0 percent) involved values 






Table 6.7 Sentence Type and Nature of Victim 
 
Nature of Victim 








 Immediate custody N 15 63 78 
% 19.2% 80.8% 100.0% 
Suspended sentence N 1 2 3 
% 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
Detention Training Order N 0 4 4 
% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
CRO N 6 33 39 
% 15.4% 84.6% 100.0% 
CPO N 1 3 4 
% 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
CPRO N 4 3 7 
% 57.1% 42.9% 100.0% 
DTTO N 0 35 35 
% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Curfew N 0 5 5 
% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Attendance Centre N 1 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
Supervision Order N 3 12 15 
% 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Fine N 1 30 31 
% 3.2% 96.8% 100.0% 
Discharge N 4 37 41 
% 9.8% 90.2% 100.0% 
Referral Order N 6 14 20 
% 30.0% 70.0% 100.0% 
Reparation Order N 0 2 2 
% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
CRASBO N 0 1 1 
% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Costs N 0 1 1 
% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Compensation N 4 1 5 
% 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Total N 46 246 292 
% 15.8% 84.2% 100.0% 






Occasionally the offences against individuals involved significant property damage being 
caused, particularly where the offender had broken a window during the course of stealing 
from a vehicle (as occurred in eight cases). Damage to property was known to have been 
caused in 21.7 percent of offences against individuals, compared with 6.9 percent of cases 
involving corporate victims. Group offending was slightly more prominent against 
individual victims (19.6 percent) than companies (13.8 percent). 
 
 
6.2.2 Individual Victims: Victim gender 
 
The issue here is whether the victims’ gender appears to affect the sentence outcome. 
Obviously, comparisons can only be drawn between cases involving individual victims. 
















Table 6.8 Sentence Type and Victim Gender 
 
Victim Gender 








 Immediate custody N 63 8 7 0 78 
% 80.8% 10.3% 9.0% .0% 100.0% 
Suspended sentence N 2 0 1 0 3 
% 66.7% .0% 33.3% .0% 100.0% 
Detention Training Order N 4 0 0 0 4 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CRO N 33 2 4 0 39 
% 84.6% 5.1% 10.3% .0% 100.0% 
CPO N 3 0 1 0 4 
% 75.0% .0% 25.0% .0% 100.0% 
CPRO N 3 2 1 1 7 
% 42.9% 28.6% 14.3% 14.3% 100.0% 
DTTO N 35 0 0 0 35 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Curfew N 5 0 0 0 5 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Attendance Centre N 0 1 0 0 1 
% .0% 100.0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Supervision Order N 12 2 1 0 15 
% 80.0% 13.3% 6.7% .0% 100.0% 
Fine N 30 0 1 0 31 
% 96.8% .0% 3.2% .0% 100.0% 
Discharge N 37 3 0 1 41 
% 90.2% 7.3% .0% 2.4% 100.0% 
Referral Order N 14 2 4 0 20 
% 70.0% 10.0% 20.0% .0% 100.0% 
Reparation Order N 2 0 0 0 2 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CRASBO N 1 0 0 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Costs N 1 0 0 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Compensation N 1 2 2 0 5 
% 20.0% 40.0% 40.0% .0% 100.0% 
Total N 246 22 22 2 292 
% 84.2% 7.5% 7.5% .7% 100.0% 







6.2.3 Individual Victims: Victim Age 
 
Where the offender targets a vulnerable victim, proportionalists would claim that his 
culpability is increased, enhancing the seriousness of the offence thereby justifying greater 
punishment. A victim may be particularly vulnerable by reason of disability or age. Young 
or elderly victims may be less able to defend themselves or their property against others. To 
determine the impact of victim vulnerability on sentencing, discussion here focuses on those 
age groups most likely to be vulnerable, namely the elderly and the young. Six cases 
involved victims aged under 18 and four victims were over the age of 60. 
 
Of the four cases committed against victims aged over 60, two (006 and 013) involved 
stealing items belonging to relatives. Were the court to consider vulnerability in these cases, 
it may have concluded that the victims were vulnerable due to the relationship shared with 
the offender which may provide an ease of offending, rather than on the basis of age.15 In 
case 006, the offender had stolen electronics valued £350 from his mother’s house. The court 
imposed a 12-month CRO to run concurrently to a similar order recently imposed for 
assaulting a police officer. In case 013, the 16-year-old offender stole her grandmother’s 
credit card and used it to withdraw £300 from the victim’s bank account. The offender had 
one previous conviction, thereby preventing the court from imposing a referral order. The 
offender was placed under supervision for 18 months. The other two cases committed 
against victims over the age of 60 (cases 091 and 093) concerned two co-offenders sentenced 
for stealing a vehicle belonging to a 67 year old male. The offenders had not previously 
come into contact with the victim and would not have known of the victim’s age. 
Consequently, the offence did not concern a specific targeting of a vulnerable victim. 
 
                                                          
15 Cases involving a relationship between the parties are dealt with further in section 6.2.5. 
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Where the victim was under the age of 18, four cases were committed by a young offender, 
against whom the victim may not have been considered to be particularly vulnerable since 
the parties were of a similar age. Elsewhere case 175 was an opportunistic theft of a bicycle 
belonging to a 16 year old victim. The 28 year old offender did not appear to know of the 
victim’s age at the time of the offence, and so had not specifically targeted the victim on the 
basis of his age and perceived vulnerability. The court imposed a 12-month conditional 
discharge. Case 290 is the only case involving a suggestion that the young victim may have 
been specifically targeted on the basis of his vulnerability. The 18-year-old offender had 
enticed the 16-year-old victim into some parkland, asked to borrow the victim’s mobile 
telephone and then refused to return it, making threats toward the victim that he was 
carrying a knife (thereby making the offence akin to robbery). The offender was sentenced to 
serve three months’ imprisonment concurrent to term imposed in case 290. The victim’s 
vulnerable age may have been considered by the court as a source of aggravation, but the 
custody threshold may already have been passed due to the value of the goods, the totality 
of the offending, and the offender’s not guilty plea. 
 
 
6.2.4 Individual Victims: Victim Ethnicity 
 
The victims’ ethnicity was known in 40 of the 46 cases involving offending against an 
individual. 35 of the victims were White European (87.5 percent) and five were Asian (12.5 
percent). The incidence of imprisonment in those cases committed against Asian victims was 
particularly high, with four of the five cases (80 percent) resulting in immediate 
imprisonment. These four cases comprised of two pairs of offences. Cases 180 and 181 
involved an offender who stole car stereos valued £470 from two vehicles, causing 
significant damage in the process. The offender was sentenced to serve two concurrent three 
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month terms of imprisonment. There was no evidence to suggest that the offender had 
specifically targeted the victims due to their ethnicity, nor that he was aware of the car 
owners’ ethnicity at the time of committing the offences. The victims’ ethnicity was unlikely 
to have influenced the sentence outcome, no doubt the court being of the opinion that the 
seriousness of the offences justified an immediate term of imprisonment.  
 
Cases 290 and 291 involved an Asian offender convicted for two counts of thefts of mobile 
telephones, both belonging to Asian male victims. The offences themselves were relatively 
serious, involving goods worth £400, threats of violence being made to one of the victims, 
and multiple offending. The offender had also entered pleas of not guilty for both counts 
which would deprive him of a sentence discount. As with cases 180 and 181 above, the 
victims’ ethnicity was unlikely to be cause to impose a custodial term, particularly since the 
offender in cases 290 and 291 was also Asian, thereby countering any suggestion of racial 
aggravation. The offences themselves may have warranted a punitive sentence, but it was 
the offender’s recent release on prison licence that was most likely to lead the Crown Court 
to impose a custodial term here. In the final case involving an Asian victim, case 128, the 
offender had snatched the victim’s purse as she walked along the street. The offender 
pleaded guilty to theft, although this may have been a plea bargain against a charge of 
robbery, which may have more suitably reflected the offence. The offender was ordered to 
undertake a 40 hour CPO. As with the other cases above, the seriousness of the offence itself 
justifies the imposition of a community sentence without concern that the victim’s ethnicity 







6.2.5 Relationship between the offender and the victim? 
 
A domestic or familial relationship may give rise to a breach of trust. A breach of trust may 
also arise where the offender steals from his or her employer. The statistics set out in Table 
6.9 show the cross tabulation between sentence and the relationship between the parties. Of 
the 46 cases where the victim was an individual, there was some form of relationship 
between the offender and victim in 15 cases. In the other 31 cases involving individual 
victims, the parties were strangers and no such relationship existed. 
 
Table 6.9 shows that where the offender and victim shared a relationship, a community-
based sentence was the most likely outcome, being imposed in eight of the 15 cases. In three 
cases, a term of immediate imprisonment was imposed. None resulted in a fine or discharge, 
suggesting that those offences involving an interrelationship between the parties were 
considered by the courts to be sufficiently serious to place within the higher sentencing 
options. 
 
However, the number of offences committed against a member of the offender’s family or a 
friend or neighbour is so small that it is inappropriate to suggest even tentative conclusions 










Table 6.9 Sentence Type and Victim/Offender Relationship 
 
Victim Relationship With Offender 
Total 
Not 












 Immediate custody N 63 12 0 2 1 78 
% 80.8% 15.4% .0% 2.6% 1.3% 100.0% 
Suspended sentence N 2 1 0 0 0 3 
% 66.7% 33.3% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Detention Training Order N 4 0 0 0 0 4 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CRO N 33 3 2 1 0 39 
% 84.6% 7.7% 5.1% 2.6% .0% 100.0% 
CPO N 3 1 0 0 0 4 
% 75.0% 25.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CPRO N 3 3 1 0 0 7 
% 42.9% 42.9% 14.3% .0% .0% 100.0% 
DTTO N 35 0 0 0 0 35 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Curfew N 5 0 0 0 0 5 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Attendance Centre N 0 0 0 0 1 1 
% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Supervision Order N 12 1 1 0 1 15 
% 80.0% 6.7% 6.7% .0% 6.7% 100.0% 
Fine N 30 1 0 0 0 31 
% 96.8% 3.2% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Discharge N 37 4 0 0 0 41 
% 90.2% 9.8% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Referral Order N 14 2 1 0 3 20 
% 70.0% 10.0% 5.0% .0% 15.0% 100.0% 
Reparation Order N 2 0 0 0 0 2 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
CRASBO N 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Costs N 1 0 0 0 0 1 
% 100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Compensation N 1 3 0 0 1 5 
% 20.0% 60.0% .0% .0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Total N 246 31 5 3 7 292 
% 84.2% 10.6% 1.7% 1.0% 2.4% 100.0% 






It is, however, worth noting that three cases involved the theft of property belonging to the 
offender’s parent or grandparent, all of which resulted in a sentence based in the 
community. Two of these (cases 013 and 170) were thefts committed by young offenders, for 
whom the courts have somewhat restricted sentencing options. Even if the existence of a 
relationship between the parties does not have a bearing on the type of sentence imposed, it 
might affect the quantum of the penalty. In case 013, the 16 year old offender was made 
subject to an 18 month supervision order having used a stolen credit card belonging to her 
grandmother to withdraw £300 from an automatic teller machine. She had only one 
previous conviction, a similar theft from a dwelling some six months earlier, for which she 
was handed a six month supervision order. The length of the order in the immediate case is 
among the longest of its type seen within this study’s sample.16 
 
Although the existence of a relationship between the parties might be treated by the courts 
as a source of aggravation, it is not usually sufficiently aggravating to require a custodial 
sentence. As mentioned above, only three cases including a relationship led to a term of 
immediate imprisonment, all three of which contained other factors that may have 
contributed to the decision to imprison. A breach of trust was common in all three cases. The 
offender in case 171 had worked as a waitress and was charged with stealing items, 
including bank cards, from a patron’s handbag. The victim had realised that her bag had 
been moved and that certain items were missing. The offender, who had 23 previous 
convictions including nine for theft, was convicted after a contested trial and was sentenced 
to two months’ imprisonment. This decision to imprison may well have been based on a 
number of factors: the nature of the property, the offender’s not guilty plea, her list of recent 
convictions (for which she had received a number of fines and community based penalties, 
the ineffectiveness of which may have led the magistrates to conclude that custody was now 
                                                          
16 Cases 078 and 079 were also met with 18 month supervision orders, and the length of the order in 224 was unknown. 
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the only reasonable option), and the (albeit ephemeral) professional relationship between 
the parties. Secondly, case 196 concerned the theft of electronics from the victim’s house 
whilst the offender was staying there as a guest. The offender had been recently released on 
licence, and was returned to custody for four weeks under the terms of his licence. The fact 
that the offender had breached his early release conditions was presumably the main 
determinant in recalling him to the young offenders’ institution, effectively resulting in a 
custodial sentence for this offence. The third and final case involving an intra-party 
relationship that resulted in custody was case 290 where the offender enticed a neighbour 
into an area of parkland and asked to borrow the victim’s mobile telephone. Once the victim 
had agreed, the offender refused to return the property, making threats to the victim 
intimating that he was carrying a knife. The case resulted in a three month custodial term, 
although the offender was also sentenced for a second count of theft.17 Separate penalties 
were not given, meaning that the term of imprisonment was measured against the totality of 
the offending. As with case 171 above, the decision to imprison may have been affected by a 
number of contributing factors, only one of which was the relationship between the victim 
and offender. It thereby appears that the fact that the parties shared a relationship of one 
form or another was not in itself reason for the courts to impose a custodial sentence, 
although it might have contributed towards that decision when other aggravating factors 
are also present. 
 
One case in which the relationship between the parties might have impacted on the 
sentencing decision is case 014, although of greater significance may have been the position 
entrusted upon the offender, rather than the relationship between the parties per se. There 
was no evidence that the offender and victim knew each other, only that they worked for the 
same company. The offender, a 16 year old white male, was employed as a part-time cleaner 
                                                          
17 Case 291, which also was a charge of theft of a mobile telephone. 
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of an office, wherefrom he stole £3 from an employee’s desk drawer. The seriousness of the 
offence may have been aggravated by the trust placed in the offender to undertake his work 
without supervision, and the fact that the offender appeared to have no justifiable reason for 
opening the desk drawer. He had one previous conviction for criminal damage three months 
earlier, for which he received a four month referral order; thus, at the time of the offence the 
order still had one month left to run. Following his guilty plea for the current offence, the 
offender was handed a 15 hour attendance centre order and was ordered to pay £3 
compensation to the victim . Where an attendance centre order is imposed on an offender 
over the age of 14 (as in this case), the minimum duration was 12 hours18 and, more 
importantly, a period of over 12 hours could not be imposed unless the court was of the 
opinion that 12 hours would be inadequate, in which case a term of up to 36 hours can be 
imposed where the offender is aged 16-20.19 When applied to this case the implication 
becomes clear: for the youth court to impose a 15 hour order on the offender, it must have 
been of the opinion that a standard 12 hour period would be inadequate for the offence. This 
case appeared to include three sources of aggravation: the relationship between the parties 
as a possible breach of the position entrusted upon the offender, the fact that the offender 
opened the employee’s desk drawer without having justifiable reason for doing so, and the 
operation of a previous court order at the time of the offence, although this had expired by 







                                                          
18 Section 60(3) PCCSA 2000 
19 Section 60(4) PCCSA 2000 
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6.3 Conclusions  
 
The present chapter has considered a variety of offender and victim characteristics to 
ascertain the extent to which the presence of these appear to impact on the courts’ 
sentencing decision.  
 
Although the analysis showed no statistical significance between previous sentences and the 
sentence for the latest theft conviction, it was interesting to find instances where offenders 
were given more than one discharge and more than one rehabilitative sentence following 
further offending.  
 
Most offences included in the sample were committed against companies. Although 
individual victims might be expected to suffer more harm than their corporate counterparts, 
there was no apparent evidence that offences against individual victims resulted in tougher 
sentences. Although the existence of a relationship between the parties might be treated by 
the courts as a source of aggravation, it is not usually sufficiently aggravating to require a 
custodial sentence, despite the fact that such offences will often involve an element of breach 
of trust.   
 
Overall, the offender’s physical characteristics (gender, age, and ethnicity) appear to have 
little impact on the sentencing decision. In line with youth justice policy, which aims to 
safeguard the welfare of children, young offenders were unlikely to receive custodial 
sentences. Specialist youth disposal options, referral orders and supervision orders, were the 
most likely sentence outcomes in cases concerning young offenders. Elsewhere, age appears 




It is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions on the apparent effect of previous 
convictions on sentencing. Whilst it appeared that more punitive penalties were dealt to 
some offenders on the basis of prior convictions, others escaped severe penalties despite 
their lengthy records. In a significant proportion of cases, the offender’s previous 
convictions seemed to have no significant relationship with sentence, which may be 
expected if courts are utilising the principle of progressive loss of mitigation, which affords 
only a limited role to prior offences in determining sentence.  
 
The offenders’ gender and ethnicity had no effect on sentence, although offences committed 
against Asian victims were more frequently dealt with by way of custodial sentences. These 
offences were more likely to involve aggravating factors such as high value goods and 
multiple offending. The sample included an insufficient number of cases to determine the 
effect that victim vulnerability (on the basis of age) has on the sentencing decision. The 
targeting of vulnerable victims would be expected to have some impact on the sentence 
under a proportionality-based system, affecting as it does the seriousness of the offence on 













The interviews undertaken for this study were conducted between October 2008 and 
September 2009, and comprised of interviews with sentencers (magistrates and Crown 
Court judges), and probation officers, the latter were included because of their role in 
writing pre-sentence reports. The interviews were semi-structured in nature. 
 
 
7.2 Interviews with Sentencers 
 
Interviews with magistrates and judges took place between October 2008 and February 2009 
and were conducted in the respective court buildings. In total, two Crown Court Judges and 







                                                          
1 For information surrounding the interview format, see section 4.6 
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7.2.1 Purposes of sentencing 
 
All interviews with sentencers began with the same opening question concerning the 
purposes of sentencing in theft cases. Most responded to say that the purpose(s) most 
appropriate in a particular case vary depending on the circumstances of the offence and the 
offender’s characteristics; the purpose(s) to be employed in each case are chosen by the 
bench on this basis. The approach employed for determining the purposes of sentencing was 
best summed up by the sole District Judge (Magistrates’ Court): 
 
M4: [the purpose of sentencing differs] depending on the offender, on the offender’s circumstances 
and of course the nature of the offence of theft… It also depends on the nature of the offender, 
whether it is a young or older person, previous convictions for an offender who has a whole 
host of convictions for offences of a similar nature. 
 
The same magistrate did however note that, generally, the purpose of sentencing is to 
punish rather than to rehabilitate: 
 
M4: The purpose of sentencing is generally punishment rather than rehabilitation, not always but 
sometimes it is inevitable that there has to be punishment. 
 
Both Magistrates Two and Three, who were interviewed jointly for logistical reasons,2 
claimed that punishment and rehabilitation were the two purposes of sentencing for which 
they have regard, particularly in theft cases, with rehabilitation playing a particularly 
important role in cases where the offending is caused by an underlying drug addiction. A 
similar approach was taken by Magistrate Six: 
 
M6: For me, it is about rehabilitating the offender; finding out why he has done it. Ninety percent of 
the thefts you get are either drug or alcohol related. So it is dealing with those first and then 
the punishment element as well.3 
                                                          
2 Interviews with magistrates took place during the recess period between the morning and afternoon court sessions. On 
this occasion, the morning session had overran, leaving insufficient time to interview both magistrates individually. They 
could only be accommodated by conducting a joint interview. 




Magistrates Two, Three, Four and Six therefore demonstrate a bifurcated approach to 
sentencing for theft. Where the offence occurs due to a criminogenic need (such as a drug or 
alcohol dependency) the court will seek to rehabilitate the offender. In other cases, the 
purpose of sentencing is simply punishment. 
 
The approach of Magistrate Seven appeared to view the purposes differently depending on 
the offender’s prior offending history. According to Magistrate Seven, the primary purposes 
of sentencing are deterrence and punishment. But where the offender has a record of 
previous criminality, it may become necessary for the court to invoke a rehabilitative 
approach to sentencing. 
 
Magistrates One, Five and Eight, who had not shown an attraction to a particular purpose, 
were asked specifically about the five sentencing aims laid out in s.142(1) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003. All respondents claimed to use their own judgement as to which purpose to 
apply in any given case, there being no specific guidance to follow in relation to this. This 
raises concerns of inconsistent approaches at sentencing. Where some magistrates may 
impose a punitive rehabilitative or deterrent sentence, others may favour a less punitive 
punishment which is proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and does not principally 
aim to break the offending behaviour. 
 
All that being said, Magistrate Eight acknowledged that the decision regarding which 
sentencing aim to apply in any particular case is not an entirely free choice for the 
sentencing bench, who may have to work within confines set by the previous bench (where 
applicable). Where a case has been adjourned before sentencing, the previous bench will 
have completed a sentencing reasons form. This form includes the sentencing purposes 
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being considered by the bench, along with a prescribed sentence range. If a pre-sentence 
report is required, the sentencing reasons form is forwarded to the Probation Service to 
enable the drafting of a pre-sentence report. The sentencing purposes prescribed by the trial 
bench are likely to shape the recommended sentence contained within the report, it being 
considered by Probation to be a parameter for them to work within.4 The ultimate 
sentencing purpose applied will have been informed by the pre-sentence report and also the 
sentencing reasons form: 
 
M8: …so you take into consideration the sentencing reasons from the other bench, the previous 
bench, and you also take into consideration what Probation is saying [in the pre-sentence 
report]. 
 
Where offending is known to be caused by an underlying drug or alcohol dependency, the 
courts show more consistency in the sentencing purposes employed. All magistrates and 
judges had identified rehabilitation as the primary purpose of sentencing persistent 
offenders whose criminality is due to a drug or alcohol addiction. In such instances, the 
courts will carefully consider the merits (and likely success) of a drug rehabilitation 
requirement.5 
 
Overall, when considering which sentencing purpose to apply the courts appear not to take 
too formulaic an approach preferring instead to use their own judgement when deciding 
which aim to follow, this decision being made on a case by case basis by taking into 
consideration the nature of the offence and the offender’s character. Where sentencers follow 
their own sentencing purposes agenda, there is always the risk of inconsistencies between 
individuals, even where it appears that their practices are similar. However, where the 
                                                          
4 See discussion of sentencing purposes within probation officer interviews at section 7.3.4 
5 The drug rehabilitation requirement has effectively replaced the drug treatment and testing order under the 1991 
Criminal Justice Act framework. 
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offending behaviour is due to a drug or alcohol dependency, the sentencers demonstrate a 
more consistent approach, favouring rehabilitative sentencing. 
 
The judges and those magistrates who had experience of working on the Youth Bench were 
also asked about the purposes of sentencing young offenders.6 Both Crown Court Judges 
were of the opinion that custody should be avoided as far as is possible in cases involving 
young offenders, although a similar point had also been raised in relation to adult offenders: 
 
J2: …if it is a youth then the Children and Young Persons Act [1933] applies in the sense that the 
court must act to do what is right to achieve the welfare of the child. 
 
Crown Court Judge One, was in agreement with Judge Two on the above point, but further 
noted that different principles would apply in cases with “persistent young offenders”,7 
where it seems the court will endeavour to deter the offender and protect the public from 
further offending behaviour. Consequently, the welfare of the young offender is relegated 
from its position as the primary sentencing purpose. When the young offender is labelled as 
being “persistent”, the court’s approach changes from being based principally on the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933, to one in which crime reduction takes a central role: 
  
J1: [In cases of young offenders, the court must] effectively avoid custody… So rehabilitation and 
support I think is another way of putting it [the purposes of sentencing young offenders]… 
Personally I strive as hard as I can to avoid putting a youngster away. [But] there are persistent 
young offenders for whom, even for comparatively minor crimes, they are so repeated that you 
have got to make an example of them; you have got to give society a break from their 
behaviour.  
 
Many of the magistrates were in agreement with the judges that young offenders should be 
offered support and, ultimately, the courts should aim to dissuade such offenders from 
                                                          
6 A young offender is any offender aged 10-17 years, see s.68 Criminal Justice Act 1991 
7 Although there is no statutory definition of a persistent young offender, the Sentencing Guidelines Council has suggested 
that the court should regard as a persistent young offender, a young person aged 10-17 years who has “been convicted of, 
or made subject to a pre-court disposal that involves an admission or finding of guilt in relation to imprisonable offences on 
at least three occasions in the past 12 months.” SGC (2009) at page 11. 
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reoffending. This might mean that the courts believe that young offenders should be spared 
the negative effects that custody might have upon them: 
 
M4: With a young offender we try to find a way to…try to keep them out of the courts, try 
to…dissuade them from continuing to offend. Youth courts, of course, with referral orders and 
a whole raft of community orders that are available to us after that, are all designed to prevent 
them from getting into the mainstream punishment system. 
 
 
7.2.2 Pre-sentence reports 
 
Magistrates and judges were asked about the weight they attribute to the recommended 
sentence provided within a pre-sentence report,8 an instrument drafted by the Probation 
Service under the request of the trial bench. The report includes information concerning the 
offence, the offender, previous criminality and his attitude to the offending, in addition to an 
assessment of the offender’s risks of reoffending and reconviction. The report concludes 
with a recommendation as to how best to deal with the offender in the eyes of the report 
writer, which the court may take into account when sentencing, although there is no duty 
for the court to follow it.9 
 
Almost all magistrates and both judges recognised that the pre-sentence reports worked as a 
valuable source of information, providing details surrounding the offender which might not 
otherwise be made known to the court. The consensus view was that this was due to the 
probation officer being afforded more time with the offender than is available in court to 
discuss his background in a less formal setting, during which time the offender is less likely 
                                                          
8 The term pre-sentence report is used as an umbrella term to include both Standard Delivery Report and Fast Delivery 
Report, the purposes of which are the same although a Standard Delivery Report provides more detail. A Fast Delivery 
Report is not considered appropriate in cases where the offender poses a risk to others or has complex needs such as a 
drug or alcohol dependency. 
9 Section 156 Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires the court to obtain and consider a pre-sentence report before imposing a 
community or custodial sentence, unless the court is of the opinion that a report would be unnecessary. Similar provisions 
existed under s.36 Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. 
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to be so taciturn. Certainly, none of the interviewees felt a compulsion toward following the 
recommendation as a matter of course, with a small number of magistrates insisting that the 
sentencing decision is ultimately one to be made by the magistrates in line with the 
appropriate guidelines, although the reports were considered to be useful instruments in 
enabling the bench to come to a decision. A number of magistrates also made reference to 
the experience and expertise of the probation officers, a fact that influences the court to pay 
greater attention to what is recommended in the report: 
 
M7: I tend to apply quite a lot of weight to [the recommendations]. We turn to [the probation 
officers] as being the experts in this field. The officer is there in court and we make full use of 
them; they have a knowledge of all the details of the offence, the offender and previous 
convictions, his lifestyle, his family, everything about him. And that is important information 
we might not be able to get. We can ask for it. We can ask searching questions but…the 
Probation Service, on a one-to-one over a desk, will get more information from [the offender]. 
 
 
 That being said, some magistrates seem to largely disregard the recommendation made, 
although greater attention is given to the background information set out in the report. One 
magistrate explained that the sentencing decision is ultimately one to be made by the 
court:10 
 
M2: It might mention the [risk] of the offender to the public…The reports include graphs and so 
forth on that sort of thing, and we might go by some of those, but definitely not the 
recommendation: that is our decision as to sentence within the guidelines. 
 
 Conversely, one Crown Court Judge stated that the recommendation is often read first, and 
appeared to suggest that only if that recommendation is realistic would the remainder of the 
report be considered: 
 
J1: I think that most of us read the recommendation first… If you can see that it is a sensible 
recommendation then you want to pay particular care to what is being said.  
 
                                                          
10 This view is consistent with a number of Scottish sentencers interviewed by Tata, et al (2008), at 845 
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The judges and longer-serving magistrates had also recognised a noticeable improvement in 
the quality of the reports over recent years, with more realistic recommendations now being 
made. Gelsthorpe and Raynor’s study on the quality and effectiveness of Reports found a 
suggestion that reports perceived by the sentencers as ‘higher quality’ were more likely to 
result in the imposition of a community sentence rather than imprisonment.11 No doubt the 
courts are more welcoming of the reports if the recommendations prescribed are perceived 
as being realistic: 
 
J2: There has been, I think, an improvement over the quality of the recommendations over the 
last three or four years; they are more informed than they used to be and I think the 
current sentencing guidelines have helped because they are available to [the probation 
officers].  And I think that the shift in the culture within the probation service has likewise 
assisted.  So it is now closer to the American approach to probation than it is the social 
work approach to probation.  Sometimes some reports, in my experience, get information 
out of the defendant that there is no way an advocate could get from the client.  I find 
them more often to be helpful than not helpful. 
 
 
 That being said, three magistrates and one Crown Court judge indicated that the reports 
still rarely suggest the imposition of a custodial sentence, continuing with a heavy reliance 
on community-based sentences. This may not be surprising when one remembers that the 
reports are written by probation officers who would work with the offender in a supervisory 
role under a community sentence. 
 
M1: I might say it is fairly rare for the Probation Service to suggest a custodial sentence, although it 
does happen occasionally, not very often…and so we might not go along with the route they 
suggest. 
 
Although the majority of interviewees were complimentary of the pre-sentence report, most 
were quick not to overstate its usefulness as a sentencing tool. Claims were made that the 
reports were unnecessarily long,12 that custody was very rarely recommended13 and that 
ultimately the sentencing decision is one to be made by the sentencing bench whilst having 
                                                          
11 Gelsthorpe & Raynor (1995), at 197. See also Creamer (2000), page 8 
12 Per Judge One 
13 Per Magistrates One and Two 
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regard to guidelines, the comments made by the previous bench, and the pre-sentence 
report. The report is only one instrument to be taken into consideration when passing 
sentence: 
 
M8: Quite often [the pre-sentence report] does give a basis [for sentencing], but it all depends on the 
sentencing bench… The pre-sentence report is a guideline, so you look at all the mitigating and 
aggravating features, you listen to the facts of the case. It is up to the sentencing bench to put 
everything into the equation and to come up with the right answer. 
 
 
7.2.3 Mode of Trial 
 
As an either-way offence, theft may be tried and sentenced in either the magistrates’ court or 
the Crown Court, with the latter enjoying greater sentencing powers. Theft is not commonly 
committed to the Crown Court for sentencing, although Magistrate One highlighted that 
there may be occasions where the aggravating factors call for a sentence outside of the 
magistrates’ powers. It appears as though a theft case would only be committed to the 
Crown Court if the offence had involved a cocktail of significant aggravation. It does not 
appear that a single aggravating feature would in itself be sufficient to justify committing 
the case to the Crown Court:  
 
M1: [In cases of breach of trust,] if it is a very high value, and I mean into the thousands [of pounds], 
then we almost certainly think that our powers of punishment…would not be sufficient and 
we would probably send it up to the Crown Court for a greater sentence than we can impose. 
 
Prima facie, it could be claimed that, if the powers of the magistrates to refer a trial to the 
Crown Court or to commit the case for sentence are used appropriately, the Crown Court 
should rarely impose a sentence within the lower courts’ powers. However, where a 
defendant elects trial by jury within the higher court, the sentence imposed upon conviction 
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could be expected to still fall within the lower courts’ powers as offence seriousness is not 
acting as a reason for the case moving up to the Crown Court: 
     
J2:  There are two types of circumstance [where cases are arguably committed to the Crown Court 
wrongly]. One is that defendants still have the right to elect on section one theft. I had one 
where a man had stolen two chocolate bars and he elected to trial. The other situation, which to 
be fair in theft cases one sees rarely, where the magistrates have committed it for sentence and 
the judge takes a different view to that on the magistrates. That is not to say that they got it 
wrong: you may have more information than the justices had. Sometimes they may get it 
wrong… Those are the two circumstances where we see theft, I think. 
 
The Judges were of the opinion that cases sent to the Crown Court are rightly committed, 
even where the sentence ultimately imposed is within the magistrates’ powers. There 
appears to be no criticism by the Judges when the magistrates commit to the higher court, 
what is later deemed by the Crown Court to be, a relatively minor offence. 
 
 
7.2.4 Use of custodial sentencing 
 
Sentencers were asked whether theft would ever cross the custody threshold, and if so, 
under what circumstances. Respondents unanimously agreed that theft may, in some cases, 
warrant a custodial sentence. Theft in breach of trust was the most commonly cited factor 
which might attract a period of imprisonment, although this is only likely to be true where 
the breach of trust is in company with other aggravation (such as high value goods stolen).14 
 
M8:  Certainly theft in breach of trust [will almost inevitably cross the custody threshold]. If you 
have not crossed the threshold, you are certainly close to crossing the threshold.   
 
                                                          
14 Such a practice would reflect guidance emanating from both the Court of Appeal (Barrick (1985) 7 Cr App R (S) 142; Clark 
[1998] 2 Cr App R (S) 95) and Sentencing Guidelines Council (SGC (2008)), with the latter stating that the seriousness of the 
offence increases in line with the level of trust breached, and the value of the theft also determines the seriousness of the 
offence. For thefts of less than £2,000 the starting point is a non-custodial sentence (at pages 10-11). 
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However, the consensus view was that custody is not axiomatic in breach of trust cases. The 
court will take into account all relevant factors and may decide that the mitigation is 
sufficiently strong to bring the offence to rest below the custody threshold: 
 
M1: [For] theft in breach of trust, the custody threshold would be the starting point… You could bring 
it down [below the custody threshold]… It may be that it is a low value theft. It may be that it 
has been done on impulse, rather than planned. It may be a single item. So all of those things 
would mitigate the offence and it might bring it down, in the magistrates view, from a 




Offender characteristics may also be associated with crossing the custody threshold. Two 
magistrates also highlighted repeat offending as potentially crossing the custody 
threshold.15 Rather than custody being warranted on the basis of offence seriousness, the 
decision to imprison is based on the offenders’ prior criminality and, moreover, his failure to 
comply with previous court orders. In this sense the courts appear to use custody as a last 
resort where all other options have been tried but proved ineffective against the offender: 
 
M7: If someone is a persistent offender for shoplifting, the time comes where enough is enough. They 
have probably had probation orders in the past and, for whatever reason, they have probably 




Imposing custody for a first theft offence appears to occur only under exceptional 
circumstances: 
 
M3: As a general rule we would never send someone into custody unless everything else has been 
tried. It is very rare that someone commits a first offence and you send them into custody. You 
normally try a lot of other ways before. So if it is that they have got to go to prison then I think 
prison they should go because normally everything else has been tried.  
 
                                                          
15 The role of previous convictions and previous sentences are considered further in sections 7.2.8 and 7.2.9 respectively. 
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The District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) appeared to suggest that custody may be imposed in 
cases where there is a series of aggravating factors and a distinct lack of mitigation, 
indicating that the use of custody is restricted to the more serious forms of offending. It is 
interesting to note that the District Judge made no reference to the offender’s characteristics 
giving rise to the need to imprison. Rather, the approach taken by the District Judge seems 
to be that custody is justified only where the offence is sufficiently serious: 
 
M4:  …of course it is our own judgement that determines whether or not in that particular case [the 
custody threshold has been passed]. So you look at the circumstances of the case, and there is 
no hard and fast rule. It is just an accumulation of aggravating factors and perhaps a lack of 
mitigating factors to reduce the level below the custody threshold. 
 
 
7.2.5 Non-custodial sentencing 
 
7.2.5.1 Community-based penalties 
 
Community penalties encompass a wide range of sentencing options, not all of which are 
available to the courts in all circumstances. Some community sentences may only be 
imposed against certain age groups, or where the offender has a recognised, particular need: 
a drug rehabilitation requirement can only be imposed if the offender is dependant on, or 
has a propensity to misuse, drugs and where that dependency is susceptible to treatment.16 
The interviewed magistrates explained that the community band of disposals constitutes an 
important range of options which the court will use in a significant proportion of theft cases: 
 
M7: Yes, quite a high proportion of [theft] cases would attract a community sentence. If it is a 
persistent offender and the reason they are offending is- we try to deal with it and sort it out. 
Yes [the community band is where the bulk of theft offences would lie. In most cases] we would 
be looking at community sentences. 
                                                          
16 S. 209(2)(a) Criminal Justice Act 2003. Similar provisions existed under the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) 





The decision to impose a community-based sentence may be based on the offender’s 
previous convictions, or where the immediate offence is sufficiently serious to warrant such 
a penalty in accordance with s. 148(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003:17 
 
M4: A community penalty would be considered after the first few offences, depending on the nature 
and gravity of those offences.  It may be a community order is imposed for a first offence 




Some community sentences, such as drug treatment and testing orders,18 are imposed to 
address the cause of the criminality, but they are only justified where they have a chance of 
success.19 The court appears to take the pragmatic view that it is undesirable to impose a 
drug rehabilitation requirement on an offender who shows no signs of wanting to accept 
treatment for his addiction. To do otherwise would be ‘setting the offender up to fail’ and, 
quite probably, he would breach the order shortly after, whereupon the court would have to 
deal with him again: 
 
M1: If it is a drug-related [offence]…which seems to be the most prevalent, then we would look 
very seriously at getting him onto a drug course, the drug rehabilitation programme in 
conjunction with the Community Drugs Team.  And if we felt that he could be helped in that 
way, then we would certainly try to impose that and we do feel that we have duty to try to 
reform these people, particularly in cases like shoplifting, because if they are only doing it to 
support their drug habit, if we don’t have the drug habit we will not have the shoplifting.   
 
 
That being said, even in cases where the court is aware of an underlying drug (or alcohol) 
problem, one interviewee suggested that it would be rare for an offender to receive a 
community-based sentence for a first offence: 
                                                          
17 A similar provision existed under s. 6(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, which applied in the cases within this study’s 
sample. 
18 And its successor, the drug rehabilitation requirement. 
19 In accordance with s.209(2)(a)(ii) CJA 2003: the court may only impose a drug rehabilitation requirement if it is satisfied 
that the offender’s dependency is susceptible to treatment. Prior to the enactment of the 2003 Act, an identically worded 




M4: Certainly one would look at it very carefully as soon as one became aware of a drug problem.  
One may even consider imposing a community order with a drug rehabilitation requirement if 
it were recommended by the Probation Service for a first offence; it is unusual for a first offence, 
I have to say, but it depends on the seriousness of that offence and the history of the addiction 
which has been established by the Probation Service. 
 
The above comment seems to claim that, where the offence is not particularly serious, a non-
community (and non-custodial) sentence would be imposed for a first-time offender, even 
where a drug or alcohol dependency was the cause (or probable cause) of his offending and 
may be susceptible to treatment. If the courts aim to reduce the offender’s propensity to 
offend, it seems sensible to impose an order aimed at treating the criminogenic addiction at 
an early stage, when it may be more susceptible to treatment.  
 
That being said, for a first offence, the courts may prefer to impose a conditional discharge 
(as a cheaper disposal option and one that is less burdensome on the offender), which may 
be sufficient to dissuade the offender from further offending behaviour committed to fund a 
drug or alcohol addiction. But where the drug addiction is well established and offending 
has only recently began in a need to fund the dependency, the offender may require a more 
pro-active and supportive disposal than a conditional discharge. Furthermore, if the court is 
not considering imposing a community sentence on a first-time offender with a drug 
dependency, the law does not require it request a pre-sentence report.20 Consequently, the 






                                                          





7.2.5.2 Fines and discharges 
 
Although fines are a relatively commonly invoked penalty,21 they are perhaps unlikely to be 
used in more serious cases lying as they do toward the lower end of the sentencing 
hierarchy. Most interviewees were of the opinion that fines were most likely to be used 
where the offender does not have a string of previous convictions to his name, or where 
there is an apparent recent break in offending. When discussing custodial and community 
penalties, often interviewees discounted these for first time offenders, leading to the 
conclusion that most would receive a fine or discharge for a first offence. Fines, and indeed 
discharges, may also be imposed in so called “petty offences” involving little or no 
aggravation and perhaps some mitigation: 
 
M4: The offender who is fairly new to the criminal justice system, does not have a substantial 
record- Or perhaps one might consider a financial penalty for someone who has not offended 
for some time; has a dreadful record but has kept out of trouble for some time. One might 
consider a conditional discharge or a fine in that situation. Or somebody who has been in 
prison and has- Let us say you are starting the whole system again but if it is a very petty 
offence you might consider a financial penalty for that.  
 
 The question arises as to whether the imposition of a fine relies on the offender being in a 
financial position to make payment. If so, the related question is how are those offenders 
who cannot pay a fine to be sentenced? Magistrates were asked for their views and practices 
on imposing fines upon offenders with limited financial means. For the most part, 
magistrates stated that an offender’s low income would not lead them to rule out imposing a 
fine if the offence warranted such a penalty.22 However, the income is relevant to fixing the 
                                                          
21 Of this studies sample, 31 cases (10.6%) resulted in a fine being imposed as the primary sentence. According to Ministry 
of Justice statistics, a fine was imposed in 13.1% of theft cases sentenced in all courts in England and Wales in 2008: 
Ministry of Justice (2010b), Supplementary Tables volume 5.1. 
22 Although note the quote from Magistrate Seven, above: “If they are in a position to pay a fine, we have got to be fair, 




level of the fine to be paid, the amount of the fine being determined in line with the 
offender’s financial position: 
 
M4: Well everybody has the means to pay it because everybody has an income of sorts, or is 
entitled to an income of sorts whether it is income from earnings or benefits. So one can impose 
a fine even if it is with a first payment date of so much per week which is set for six weeks 
ahead to enable that person to start to claim benefits or find work. 
 
 
Ultimately, although the offender’s means is relevant to the amount of fine imposed, it is not 
used as a determinant of whether a fine can be imposed.23 If a financial penalty is deemed to 
be appropriate for the seriousness of the offence, the magistrates would impose a fine, 
irrespective of the offender’s financial means. Consequently, the court would not consider 
imposing a more severe penalty type (notably a community sentence) where the offender is 
not financially stable: 
 
M1: If we felt that the fine was the right bracket, the right banding, then we must be in the fine 
banding or below. If it is serious enough for a community penalty, it must be a community 
penalty. So you cannot say they cannot afford to pay the fine so we will give them a 
community penalty. That is not the way it works.  
 
Although most magistrates were of the opinion that a fine could be imposed on an offender, 
regardless of income, this view was not supported by all: “If they are in a position to pay a 
fine, we have got to be fair, then we would look at fines.”24 This suggests that the opposite is 
true: where an offender is not in a position to pay the fine, this magistrate at least, would not 




                                                          
23 Although note the dissenting opinion of Magistrate Seven. 
24 Magistrate Seven 
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7.2.5.3 Custody in lieu of fine payment 
 
In cases where the offender has little or no disposable income, the magistrates do have a 
method of circumventing the imposition of a fine. A small number of magistrates spoke 
about the practice of offering the offender a choice to either pay a small fine or spend one 
day in prison in lieu of the fine payment: 
 
M1: It is a practice which is considered and it is usually with people who have basically no money at 
all, and if they have been arrested and their freedom has been denied them for a day, because 
they have spent the night in prison and then in the cells down in the court, then come up 
before the court. We might consider, where the fine is small, that they pay it immediately or 
they serve one day in prison, and we deem that to have been served by the period that they 
[have already] served in custody. And that is a way, if you like, of allowing the person to 
resume his life without a huge penalty hanging over him which we are probably convinced he 
will never get paid because he has not got any money to pay. If someone is on job seekers’ 
allowance or some other sort [of income] from the State then we can do what is called an 
attachment of benefits… But on occasions where people come before us who already have two 
attachments to their benefits, and if they are only given £94 a fortnight, two attachments to 
their benefits will probably take five, eight, ten pounds out. You have got to leave them with 
something to live on, otherwise they will go out and shoplift again.  
 
The practice of imposing a nominal custodial sentence in lieu of the payment of a fine 
appears to be limited to cases where (i) the magistrates deem a fine to be an appropriate 
sanction for the offence; (ii) the offender could not be expected to pay the fine due to his 
very limited financial means, and (iii) the offender had spent the previous night in custody. 
The practice may be used in cases where an offender is making payments for earlier fines 
and the imposition of an additional fine would be beyond what he could be expected to pay. 
Consequently, the court does not expect the offender to pay the fine; the sentence is passed 
with full expectation of the offender accepting the short custodial term since this has already 
been served and payment of the fine is not required.  Ultimately, it is a custodial sentence 
rather than a financial penalty since the fine is not paid nor, perhaps more importantly, does 
the court expect it to be paid. The punishment imposed on the offender is the previous night 
spent in incarceration. Again, it should be reiterated that when adopting this practice, the 




M1: It may be something that magistrates use to sort of help them in some ways so that you are not 
burdening them with a financial penalty which they cannot afford to pay, and may lead to 
further crime. It is the business of not setting somebody up to fail; there is no point in that 




7.2.6 Offence specific aggravation and mitigation 
 
Sentencers were asked how they address cases involving both aggravating and mitigating 
features. For the most part, the approach taken is based on experience. Most interviewees 
were not able to articulate precisely how various factors sit together, although some factors 
were clearly considered to be more serious than others.25 When taking into consideration all 
of the present factors, there are no cast-iron rules to attach. The factors are dealt with 
intuitively: 
 
M4: It is not an exact science, I am afraid. It is just something that with experience you hope to get 
right. But there is not an exact science, or at least I have not discovered it. You just have to 
[think] how serious are these aggravating factors and how persuasive are the mitigating 
factors; mitigation for the offence and mitigation for the offender. And certainly mitigation for 
the offence, if there is any mitigation for the offence, can be quite a powerful weapon in the 
hands of the defence in reducing the level of gravity. Mitigation for the offender of course is 
also very important but not so important if there is a dreadful list of convictions. 
 
The minority view, held only by one interviewee, was that each aggravating and mitigating 
factor is weighted equally. Consequently, one aggravating feature acts to cancel out one 
mitigating feature: 
 
M8: [An equal number of aggravating and mitigating features] balance each other out, yes. That is 
the way I view things I am pretty sure others are of the same opinion. 
 
                                                          
25 See discussion on factors which act to push the offence over the custody threshold, section 7.2.4 
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The value and type of property was considered important by some principally where the 
offender has targeted particular goods for the ease with which they can be sold on, thereby 
making the offence more serious: 
 
M1: There is property which has a ready market, which can be sold off. So I think that would have 
an impact, making it more serious or less serious as the case may be.  
 
Magistrate One also held that the sentimental value of the property should not be 
overlooked: 
 
M1: If someone has stolen a wedding ring or something of great sentimental value which cannot be 
replaced, it then does not matter what the value of it is in monetary terms because the value of 
it to [the victim] is above money. So that will be taken into account as well. 
 
Other magistrates appeared to view the value of the property with less importance, claiming 
instead that where the property is not recovered, the court will try to order compensation to 
the value of the stolen goods, where the offender is in a position to make the payment. 
Although this practice seeks to minimise the harm caused to victims by effectively returning 
them to their position before the offence occurred, it does not reflect the increased 
culpability of the offender where high priced goods have been targeted. 
 
 
7.2.7 Guilty plea 
 
It is a long-standing common law principle that a sentence discount is awarded to an 
offender who enters an early guilty plea.26 This discount is reduced for the person who 
pleads guilty on the day of the hearing. On the whole, interviewees demonstrated a 
                                                          
26 For example, see De Haan (1968) 52 Cr App R 25. In 2004, the Sentencing Guidelines Council published its guideline, 
Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea (SGC, 2004). This was subsequently revised by the Council’s, Reduction in Sentence 
for a Guilty Plea: Definitive Guideline Revised 2007 (SGC, 2007). 
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consistency in approach concerning guilty plea, a uniformity no doubt aided by the clear 
and definitive guidance available which leaves little judicial discretion. 
 
In cases where the evidence against the defendant is so overwhelming that the defence 
could not credibly enter a not guilty plea, there were varied approaches as to whether a full 
discount of one-third would still be applied. Judge One was of the opinion that any 
defendant, regardless of the strength of his case, should be given full credit for entering an 
early plea: 
 
J1: I will give a third off to anyone who pleads. I have not yet got to be in the position where I have 
said “you were so banged to rights you had no alternative” because they do have an 
alternative. They can string the court along if they want to. 
 
Judge Two was of the opinion that an offender with a weak case would still be given credit 
for a guilty plea, but a reduced discount may be applied. However, the interviewee 
continued shortly after to explain that appeals are likely to be successful where full credit is 
not given for a guilty plea, although it was accepted that the likelihood of an offender 
successfully appealing on the basis of insufficient mitigation for a guilty plea may have 
changed since the Sentencing Guidelines Council’s guidance was published, clarifying the 
position: 
 
J2: Effectively, it comes down to, was he caught red handed? Would there have been a defence? But 
even where they are caught red handed you still give them credit [albeit a reduced level]… I 
have only had one [case where I did not award the full discount for a guilty plea] and they 
were successful in the Court of Appeal. 
 
Similarly, to Judge One above, Magistrate Four, the District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) 
claimed that a full discount would be applied equally in all cases where an early plea is 
entered, regardless of the strength of the prosecutions’ case, but a reduced discount (or 
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indeed no discount at all) would be offered where the offenders enters a guilty plea 
immediately before the trial is due to commence: 
 
M4: I would still give them a discount of a third, around about a third if they have actually pleaded 
guilty. I think the person who is in that position and changes his plea of the day of the trial and 
the witnesses are all there, probably in that situation I would not give any discount. 
 
During the course of the interviews it became apparent that an early guilty plea can act to 
bring an offence below either the custody or community threshold. Not only does a guilty 
plea affect the quantum of sentence, it may also change the sentence type imposed: 
 
M4: One might be thinking in terms of a short custodial sentence, but because of an early guilty 
plea it comes down to a high community order.  
 
Such a comment leads to one of two possible conclusions. Either the approach for dealing 
with a guilty plea is less arithmetic than the guidelines suggest, or the courts have fashioned 
a model of substitutability amongst different sentence types allowing them to move from 
one sentence band to another whilst imposing sentences of equal punitive measure. In other 
words, were the court considering a period of imprisonment, rather than imposing a shorter 
custodial sentence in light of the offender’s guilty plea, the court can impose a community 
sentence which is equally as punitive as a reduced term of imprisonment. In light of the 
sentencers’ comments that they do provide a discount of one-third for an early guilty, the 
conclusion appears to be that the courts have formed a model of substitutability amongst 








7.2.8 Previous convictions 
 
All interviewees expressed a view that previous convictions can be an important part of the 
sentencing process, although they were careful not to overstate the role played by the 
offender’s prior criminality. Interviewees tended to note an important, but limited, role 
afforded to previous convictions: 
 
M3: I think [previous convictions] are important but on the other hand…they have actually served the 
sentence for what they have done before. You take them into account but not wholly 
depending on that. Some magistrates look at it differently. I look at it that they have already 
been punished for that already (sic), but you do take it into account, but not too highly. 
 
Not only are previous convictions given a limited role through the argument that to give 
them a more central role would lead to an offender being sentenced twice for the same 
crime, but furthermore only relevant (similar) convictions are taken into account. In a case of 
theft, prior thefts and other property and dishonesty offences would, no doubt, be 
considered. Offences of a wholly dissimilar nature would not be considered and would not 
affect the sentencing decision: 
  
M5: [Previous convictions] would play a role if they are relevant… If they are similar offences then 
they are relevant. If they are not, or are over ten years, then remove them from the situation. If 
they are then they become part of the structure of the decision and the guidelines take care of 
that.  
 
Previous convictions were viewed as most important where they indicate a pattern of 
offending, thereby explaining the consensus view that only relevant (similar) convictions are 
taken into consideration at the sentencing stage.  
 
M4:  [The offender’s prior record is] significant if it shows a pattern of offending… You have to look 
at [similar] previous convictions when determining the penalty.  I know they are a penalty 
served, and some people might say they are gone, been done and dusted and you should not 
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pay any attention to them, but you have to because it shows a pattern of offending and it assists 
the way in which that punishment has to be imposed.   
 
Guidance has long been available to the sentencing court, detailing the importance of 
similarity in previous convictions. The Magistrates Association Sentencing Guidelines 
instruct magistrates to: 
 
“Consider previous convictions, or any failure to respond to previous sentences, in assessing 
seriousness. Courts should identify any convictions relevant for this purpose and then consider to 
what extent they affect the seriousness of the present offence.”27 
 
In spite of the changed statutory role of previous convictions, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
retains reference to the similarity of offending. Section 143(2)(a) of the Act requires the court 
to: 
 
“treat each previous conviction as an aggravating factor if… the court considers that it can reasonably 
be so treated having regard… to the nature of the offence to which the conviction relates and its 
relevance to the current offence.” 
 
Case law dating back further is indicative of a similar approach towards the relevance of 
certain types of previous convictions. The offender in Williams28 had pleaded guilty to four 
counts of obtaining by deception. His record of dishonest convictions was taken into 
consideration, but a previous conviction for rape was not relevant. 
 
The question of how much impact previous convictions can have on sentencing was not one 
with a seemingly easy answer: 
 
M1: You will find some people who have been shoplifting their whole lives and they have got dozens 
and dozens of [previous convictions]. They are almost hopeless cases in some ways. There is a 
core reason: it is usually drugs. When you have got someone who has been on drugs for 10, 15, 
                                                          
27 Magistrates’ Association(2004), at 9. An identically worded passage was also included in the 2000 edition of the 
Guidelines. 
28 (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 244 
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20 years, then they will have racked up quite a lot of similar offences. So that is taken into 
account. You have to put a weighting on it obviously. You would not think that just because 
someone has done eight or ten previous shoplifting offences, you would not then lift up the 
penalty to any particular level because of that, but you would want to take that into account. 




It became apparent during the course of the interviews that the offender’s prior record does 
not play a central role in sentencing; the seriousness of the immediate offence remains the 
chief determinant of the penalty: 
 
M8: I do not think the sentence is ever driven by the record. I always guide people to think of the 
record as the last thing. I would say that the antecedents is the last thing to look at and should 
not drive the sentence. 
 
On the effect that previous convictions might have on the sentence imposed, some 
interviewees were clear that the type of penalty could be increased (from a fine to 
community, or from community to custody) as a result of the presence of previous 
convictions, although as mentioned above, it is not easy to say by how much the sentence 
should be raised: 
 
M5: [Where the offender has previous convictions for similar offences,] you would look at a heavier 
penalty, yes.  
 
Other interviewees appeared to suggest that, rather than merely inflating the sentence to 
take into account previous convictions, the prior criminality may lead the court to take a 
different approach to sentencing, perhaps with a greater emphasis being placed on 
rehabilitation. This may not mean that the offender is necessarily made subject to a more 
punitive order per se, but rather a different type of sentence is chosen by the court by the fact 




J2: If it is a minor offence of theft, the previous convictions may well be pushing you towards 
rehabilitation because it is recognising a pattern under which lies a drug problem. 
 
That being said, Magistrate Two suggested that where the offender has a number of 
previous convictions and has failed to comply with previous court orders, custody may be 
inevitable as the only option remaining: 
 
M2: If they are habitual and they have had warnings and they have had a community order to help 
with their thieving or drugs, and its just not working and they have not attended or whatever, 
it will affect me because then I will just say ‘custody’. I would announce that ‘you have ignored 
the help we have given you [under] previous court orders’. 
 
Similarly, Magistrate Seven suggested that the custody threshold could be crossed where a 
persistent offender has failed to comply with previous court orders, and where the court has 
no faith that any available non-custodial order would be effective: 
 
M7: If someone is a persistent offender for shoplifting, the time comes where enough is enough. 
They have probably had probation orders in the past and, for whatever reason, they have 




The responses to questions concerning previous convictions showed the courts were only too 
aware of the complexities involved in taking prior offences into account at sentencing. A 
Crown Court Judge believed it to be a difficult balancing exercise: 
 
J2: But the thing you have got to be very, very careful of about previous convictions is that you are 
not punishing someone yet again for what they have done before. Yes, it is an aggravating 
feature but it does not assume such proportions as to mean in effect they are being sentenced 
twice. 
 
A small number of interviewees also spoke of the importance of a lack of previous 
convictions. Whereas a pattern of offending can be an aggravating feature, a clean prior 
record can act as significant mitigation. This seems to leave no neutral ground; either the 
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offender will receive a discount for his clean record or any previous convictions will be used 
as a source of aggravation: 
 
J1: What is very important, and I pay great regard to this, is the absence of previous convictions. I 
think we all do. It is a hugely mitigating feature that someone is doing this for the first time. I 
am not particularly persuaded by the fact that he has not got any convictions for stealing from a 
shop but he has got 1,001 previous convictions for burglary, or vice versa. I am impressed by the 
fact that he has never been in trouble before.29  
 
The above quote by Judge One claims that a lack of any previous convictions, whether of a 
similar nature to the current offence or not, is a significant source of mitigation. Previous 
responses by other interviewees had demonstrated that relevant (similar) previous 
convictions are aggravating, but the existence of dissimilar previous offences are not an 
aggravating source. Together this leads to the conclusion that the only middle-ground 
(where prior record is neither mitigating nor aggravating) occurs where an offender has only 
previous convictions of a dissimilar nature. He would not be entitled to mitigation for a clean 
prior record, but his record would not be aggravating since the convictions are of a dissimilar 
nature to the current offence.  
 
Where the offender has previous convictions but there has been a break in offending, the 
court may also award him credit for this: 
 
M7: If they have been of good character for five years, we would probably give them credit for that 
and take no action against offences before then because we consider those to be spent. 
 
The practice of affording a role to previous convictions at the sentencing stage was lauded by 
one Crown Court Judge as representing a “sensible” change in policy from the previous 
position under the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (as relevant to this study’s sample) where prior 
offending played no aggravating role in the sentencing decision: 
                                                          




J1: Historically, if you go back to 1991 and the Criminal Justice Act, we were not allowed to take 
account of previous convictions. They did not aggravate, it did not make it more serious if you 
committed another offence because the argument was you had had your medicine for that one, 
it either worked or it did not, and now you ignore it. We have turned from that position and 
sensibly recognised that people who repeatedly offend have more sentencing problems to be 
addressed, or create more sentencing problems, with more concerns to be addressed.  
 
 
7.2.9 Previous sentences 
 
Once it had been established that (some) previous convictions are relevant at the sentencing 
stage, the interviews proceeded to consider whether the sentencing decision may be affected 
by prior sentences imposed on the offender. It was apparent that the courts pay more 
attention to whether the offender had complied with previous orders, rather than the mere 
fact that the offender had previously been made the subject of a particular type of sentence 
before: 
 
J1: [Previous sentences] can demonstrate whether the offender has responded to supervision and 
community sentences. If you see that community sentences have been imposed in the past and 
you see breach after breach after breach, then you know it is going to be a complete waste of 
time in taking the risk now to impose a community order. So the type of sentence, yes, but more 
importantly whether that sentence has been complied with is also a feature which will appear 
on the antecedents as a conviction for breach. 
 
It became clear that the courts do not merely ratchet up the sentences previously imposed. 
Rather, the main determinant of sentencing continues to be the seriousness of the current 
offence: 
 
J2: But [the] length of a sentence of imprisonment probably will not have an impact upon you 
approving a sentence of imprisonment because you have to sentence according to the 
culpability of this particular matter. Therefore the fact that it was nine months last time does not 




A similar point was also made by the District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) in stating that the 
decision to imprison is formed chiefly in reference to the seriousness of the current offence. 
Where an offender has previously been imprisoned, subsequent custodial sentences do not 
necessarily automatically follow: 
 
M4: You are still judging the new offence with his current circumstances and the mere fact that he has 
been in prison six months before or six years before does not necessarily mean that you are 
going to stick him back in prison. 
 
 
Interviewees were also asked whether a custodial sentence was more likely to be imposed in 
cases where the offender had previous experiences of incarceration. The Crown Court 
Judges gave the impression that earlier custodial sentences could have an effect on 
sentencing, albeit only a slight impact: 
 
J1: I am slightly more hesitant of [imposing a custodial sentence for a first time] because quite often 
the point made in mitigation is that this would be the first prison sentence and that, as you can 
appreciate, is going to be tough in itself. 
 
Judge Two agreed with this point and elaborated further, stating that the absence of a prior 
prison sentence has greater effect than the fact that an offender has previously been 
incarcerated. It therefore appears that the absence of a prior prison sentence may play a role 
in mitigation: 
 
J2: It is more a question of the absence of a prison sentence and the impact on your sentence, rather 
than the presence of a previous prison sentence meaning custody is inevitable. Custody, from 
my perspective at least, is only inevitable where the gravity of the offence or the culpability of 
the offender require it, or the law requires it. 
 
Magistrates, on the other hand tended to disregard the offender’s previous custodial 





M1: If the offence passes the custody threshold then the custodial sentence would be passed… There 
are times I think when we pass custodial sentences because we think that the offence is so 
serious and it is the only sentence that could be passed. Perhaps we do it sometimes with a 
little bit of reluctance, but if that is the sentence that is what needs to be passed.  
 
That being said, Magistrate Seven offered a different attitude by claiming that the bench 
would look at the reasons why the offender had previously been imprisoned, alluding to the 
court’s interest in factors other than the immediate offence and the offender’s current 
circumstances: 
 
M7: If he has had a previous offence, for whatever, and he has served time in prison for that, then we 
would certainly take that into account, with the reasons why he was sentenced to 




The perceptible difference in approach between the two courts may be explained by the 
magistrates’ reliance on sentencing guidelines, which do not make reference to previous 
sentences as being either mitigating or aggravating. If the guidelines do not draw the 
magistrates’ attention to a particular issue (such as prior sentences) it may be disregarded. 
Judges, on the other hand, are not constrained by the same guidelines and may be more 
willing to consider factors beyond those mentioned within guidelines. 
 
The sentencing procedure can be affected by the fact that an offender has previously served 
a custodial sentence. The court is not necessarily obliged to request a pre-sentence report in 
such cases, and can proceed straight to sentencing:30 
  
                                                          
30 Section 156(4) Criminal Justice Act 2003 (and previously section 36(5) Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 
2000) provides the court with a power to pass sentence without first obtaining a pre-sentence report if “the court is of the 
opinion that it is unnecessary to obtain a pre-sentence report.” Where an earlier report exists in relation to the offender, 




M4: [If an offender has previously served a custodial sentence, it makes it more likely that another 




7.2.10 Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 
The judges along with those magistrates who had a number of years’ experience sitting on 
the bench, were asked how sentencing policy and practice had been affected by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003. This was an important inclusion for the interviews as the data collected 
from the sample of CPS files predated the enactment of the 2003 Act. Responses to this 
question were generally answered in the negative: that the Act had made little or no 
difference to sentencing practice, although the suspended sentence was noted as having 
been made “much more realistic by the imposition of…community requirements.”31 The 
courts may thereby make greater use of the suspended sentence order than under the 
previous sentencing regime. As a custodial sentence, a suspended sentence order is subject 
to the same custody threshold as immediate imprisonment: a custodial sentence, whether 
suspended or not, can only be imposed where the offence is so serious that a fine or 
community penalty cannot be justified.32 If suspended sentences are to be used more 
frequently, they should be used solely as an alternative to a period of immediate 
imprisonment. That being the case, a rise in the use of the power to suspend a custodial 
sentence should result in a reduction in the use of immediate imprisonment.  
 
One Crown Court Judge noted that the community sentence may be more widely invoked 
following the restructuring under the Act. However, similarly to other comments made by 
                                                          
31 Per Judge Two 
32 Section 152(2) Criminal Justice Act 2003 
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the Crown Court Judges regarding practices within the magistrates’ court, this is based on a 
perception of the magistrates’ court practices and does not necessarily reflect true practices: 
 
J1: No… [although] the Criminal Justice Act 2003 [extended] the powers to impose requirements 
under a community order, about eight or nine of them (sic)…[which] has had greater sanction 
made available to the court to deal with offences which are lesser offences, offences of the 
nature of theft. So I think the answer is [the Act] may [have had an impact on sentencing 
practice] because of the extended powers to impose requirements on community orders; it may 
well be the case that less (sic) cases have gone to prison. 
 
The District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) was of the opinion that the 2003 Act has had very 
little impact on sentencing practice. The Act has changed the names of various penalties, 
such as the rebranding of various community-based sanctions, but the nature of the 
penalties and the cases in which each are imposed have not been subject to change. This can 
be directly contrasted with the comment made by Judge One, above: 
 
M4: I do not think [that the 2003 Act has affected sentencing practice].  I do not think it has had very 
much impact at all.  It basically takes us through different hoops that we have to consider 
before sentencing that we went through anyway.  The government tinkers around with the law 
and basically it all boils down to things we have been doing for centuries.  We go through all 
the hoops, it is just that they put them in different orders or they call them by different names, 
they keep changing the community orders that we have; you have to try to remember those for 
a few months until the government decides to have another tool around.  They are always 
tinkering.  I am sick and tired of them.  Whichever government it is, whether it is Labour, Tory, 
they all like to tinker around just to show they are doing something.  It has in the Crown Court, 
in terms of dangerousness and extended sentences and so forth, but at this level, no. 
 
The lay magistrates tended to be of the opinion that sentencing practice has changed over 
recent years, but this is the result of changes to the sentencing guidelines rather than any 
noticeable effects of the 2003 Act: 
 
M1: I have been on the bench [for] eight years and there have been quite a lot of changes… so 
people who have been on the bench for 20 years will probably tell you that there is a leaning 
towards community style punishment as opposed to custodial sentences, but very much 
magistrates and judges are to a great degree bound by the guidelines: we have to bear in mind 





7.2.11 Multiple Offending 
 
Chapter 5 illustrated the relatively common practice of theft offenders being charged (and 
subsequently sentenced) for more than one offence at the same hearing. This may be because 
a number of offences had arisen from a single transaction,33 he had offended whilst subject to 
a court order for which he is now held to have breached,34 or had been on a “spree”.35 
Magistrates were asked how such circumstances were dealt with at sentencing; whether a 
single sentence is imposed, reflecting the totality of the offending, or separate sentences are 
provided for each offence, determined solely on the basis of that offence, which in turn may 
be imposed consecutively or concurrently to one another. The purpose of this question was 
to aid an understanding of how other offences may affect the sentence imposed for a theft 
conviction. 
 
The interviewees’ responses indicate divergent practices being employed when dealing with 
multiple offending. One the one hand, the court may impose a sentence for the most serious 
offence, which is deemed appropriate for that offence, whilst imposing no separate penalty 
for the other offences. In effect, only the most serious offence is dealt with; the other offences 
may not influence the sentence for the more serious offence, nor do they receive their own 
sentences. Alternatively, the court may impose the same sentence for each offence to run 
concurrently and, if necessary, amend the quantum of the penalty to account for the other 
offences. Both of these approaches were outlined by Magistrate One: 
 
 
                                                          
33 For example, cases 114 and 115: the offender had closed a company bank account after he had, on at least two 
occasions, extracted funds from the account which he placed into his own. 
34 For example, case 142: the offender had committed theft in breach of a conditional discharge. She was also convicted for 
two counts of failing to surrender to bail. 
35 For example, cases 104-107: the offender committed four counts of theft from a shop on a single afternoon. 
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M1: It depends on the circumstances. Totality is important. If he gets a community punishment 
then he gets the same community punishment for all three…so you just have the one 
punishment, which is a community punishment. And we may perhaps up the term of the 
community punishment, or the length of unpaid work, if that is what he is getting, because 
there is more than one offence so they would be taken into consideration. In the circumstances, 
we might give a penalty which we thought was appropriate on the more serious offences and 
then we may impose no separate penalty on the others. But it is a case of totality I think. You 
have got to have a sentence which is proportionate to the offence. 
 
A third approach was detailed by Magistrate Eight, whose own practice involved sentencing 
for each offence separately, before ensuring that the overall package is appropriate for the 
totality of offending: 
 
M8: When someone is up for multiple charges, you always look at the most serious first and then you 
look at all the others.  Then I guide the bench if I am chairing, and we go through the exercise 
and sentence each one as separate offences, and then you look at the total package.  And if the 
total package looks excessive, you can start amending the sentences for each one.  But each one 
should be recorded. 
 
Furthermore, Magistrate Seven suggested a practice more in line with what Magistrate One 
detailed above, where only the most serious offence is sentenced for. However, unlike 
Magistrate One, Magistrate Seven claimed that other offences are treated as aggravating 
factors to the more serious offence. Although no separate penalty is given for the other 
offences, they are accounted for within the sentence for the more serious offence: 
 
M7: I would look at the seriousness of all the offences.  If they have all been picked up on one 
offence, been stopped on one occasion, [I would] look at the most serious one and then deal 
with the others in totality.  So that one offence we are dealing with, we would add to that as 
aggravation the fact they have committed all the other offences within it; so we would deal 
with it on a totality situation.     
 
It also became apparent that in some circumstances, such as where an offender commits a 
number of thefts and is placed on bail for each offence before committing the next offence, 
the court may impose a custodial sentence based on the totality of offending, even where 
each individual offence does not in itself warrant more than a community-based penalty, 
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seeming to suggest that the multiple offender is treated more punitively than an offender 
who appears in court for one offence on a number of occasions: 
  
M4: [Multiple offending] might [lead to a custodial sentence where each individual offence is not 
serious enough to warrant custody]. It depends… Having committed four offences, perhaps 
offending on bail which is an aggravating factor, it certainly could result in a prison sentence if 
the person commits an offence, is bailed, commits another offence, is bailed and appears in 
court with four or five offences, then the aggravating factor could take it over the custody 
threshold even though, individually with one offence, [it] might have resulted in a community 
order…[That being said] it would not necessarily result in it being taken from one band to 
another. 
 
Conversely, if the offender has offended on a ‘spree’ and is only apprehended after 
committing a number of offences, Magistrate Seven had claimed that such an offender would 
be sentenced more leniently than one who appears before the court charged with one offence 
on a number of occasions:36 
 
M7: I think the person who comes to us with three or four offences will get off lighter; it will be a 
more lenient sentence than it would be for three separate ones. 
 
It thereby appears that the courts take a stronger view of an offender who is placed on bail 
and subsequently defies that privilege by committing further offences, leading to potentially 
more severe sentencing, than an offender who is apprehended once having committed of a 
number of offences. 
 
 
7.2.12 Concluding Remarks 
 
The foregoing discussion has indicated some inconsistent practices amongst individual 
sentencers, not least in terms of the sentencing purposes employed. In cases concerning 
                                                          
36 Similarly, Albrecht (1994) (cited in Jareborg (1998)) provides an understanding of how German courts impose bulk 
discounts for multiple offenders. The discount increases progressively with each additional charge. Thus, the more serious 
the overall criminality, the greater is the bulk discount imposed.  
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young offenders, interviewees claimed that crime reduction and the welfare of the child 
become main priorities. Interviewees demonstrated a similarly unified approach in cases 
where the offender is known to suffer from a drug addiction, where the courts had indicated 
the appeal of rehabilitation. In cases neither concerning young offenders nor substance 
misusers, sentencers are less likely to agree as to the appropriate sentencing purposes.  
 
Overall, both the magistrates’ court and Crown Court appear to uphold the seriousness of 
the offence as the primary sentence determinant. However, an offender’s previous 
convictions can have a significant impact on the sentence imposed. Magistrates had claimed 
that a first theft offence would usually warrant a fine or discharge, it being unusual for a 
community order to be imposed for a first offence. Rarer still would it be for the court to 
impose custody for a first offence, although doubtless there are occasions where the 
seriousness of the offence warrants imprisonment, regardless of the offender’s prior history. 
Community penalties were viewed as an important sentencing band for acquisitive crime 
since many offences are committed to satisfy a drug or alcohol dependency. 
 
The imposition of a fine in the magistrates’ court did not rely on the offender being in a 
stable financial position. The decision to impose a fine is based on the seriousness of the 
offence; the offender’s financial means appears to have no bearing on this decision. 
However, the level of the fine is determined in line with the offenders’ means. That being 
said, the magistrates commented that where the offender has extremely limited financial 
means, the court may waive a fine and provide the offender with an opportunity to serve 
one day in custody, the time being taken as served where the offender was kept in custody 
on the night before the court hearing. Such a practice could be said to cause confusion 
within the sentencing hierarchy under both Criminal Justice Acts of 1991 and 2003 where 
251 
 
custodial sentences are considered to be more punitive than any other penalty.37 The 
interviews made it apparent that the offender is not expected to pay the fine; the offer of 
custody in lieu is made because of the offender’s perceived lack of finances to make the 
payment. The sentence in effect is a custodial sentence masked behind a financial penalty 
since the offence seriousness does not warrant a custodial penalty. If the sentence of 
imprisonment in lieu of payment of a fine is deemed to be a custodial sentence, it would 
contravene the minimum custodial term of five days under section 132 of the Magistrates’ 
Court Act 1980. 
 
The Crown Court judges viewed custodial penalties as unlikely outcomes for thefts tried in 
the magistrates’ court. Collectively, magistrates listed a number of occasions when custody 
would be considered, the most likely of which is thefts committed in breach of trust. 
Magistrates also claimed that custody could be imposed on the basis of repeat offending, 
particularly where the offender had breached previous court orders. In such instances, 
custody is not warranted on account of the seriousness of the offence, rather it is viewed as 
the only meaningful option. 
 
Although the seriousness of the offence was held as the chief sentence determinant by both 
judges and magistrates, there appeared to be no definable method of dealing with offence 
aggravation and mitigation. Almost all sentencers interviewed had suggested that some 
factors are more important than others, although they were unable to explain how the 
weightings of each varied. The only exception to this was Magistrate Eight who asserted that 
all factors are equally weighted and, consequently, one mitigating feature would cancel out 
the effect of an aggravating feature. This approach was not expressed by any other 
                                                          
37 According to s.1(2)(a) of the CJA 1991, the court could only impose a custodial sentence where the offence, or 
combination of the offence and one other offence associated with it, was so serious that only a custodial sentence can be 
justified. This was subsequently amended by s.152(2) of the CJA 2003 to state that the offence must be so serious that 
neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified. 
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interviewee. On the contrary, some responded to questioning by stating that the approach in 
dealing with aggravation and mitigation is based on experience and is not mathematical or 
other ways calculable.  
 
Previous convictions were clearly important in determining sentence, although most 
sentencers were only too aware of the dangers of double-punishment if prior record was 
granted too central a role in sentencing. Only recent and relevant convictions were deemed 
to have any noticeable impact on the sentencing decision, although that is not to say that the 
sentence would be increased by any particular amount in light of the prior history. Prior 
sentences would be considered by the sentencing court, though only in respect of 
determining the offender’s propensity to comply with court orders. A sentence would not be 
inflated to reflect prior sentences as part of a ‘ratcheting up’ exercise. 
 
Pre-sentence reports drafted by the Probation Service were, on the whole, viewed positively 
by interviewees, being considered as a useful tool in uncovering the offender’s 
circumstances. The recommended sentence was considered by most to be merely advisory; 
none of the sentencers interviewed felt compelled to follow the proposal given. The 
perceived expertise of the Service encouraged the sentences to give thought to the contents of 
the report. Judges tended to hold pre-sentence reports in less high regard, claiming to read 
the recommendation first and disregard the remainder of the report if the proposed sentence 
was not deemed realistic. In theft cases, judges in the Crown Court would usually hear the 
most serious forms of the offence, where custody may be being seriously considered. 
Keeping in mind the reports’ perceived disregard for custodial sentences,38 judges may be 
less inclined to follow the reports’ recommendations, believing them to be unrealistic. 
 
                                                          




7.3 Interviews with Probation Officers 
 
Toward the closing stages of the interviews with sentencers, it had become apparent that the 
courts regarded pre-sentence reports as an important source of information and, therefore, 
acclaimed them as a useful tool to be used during sentencing. Views concerning the 
influence of the recommended sentence contained within the report differed between those 
who would consider following the recommendation provided it was viewed as being 
realistic, and those who largely disregarded the recommendation as encroaching on the 
sentencers’ jurisdiction. This being the case, it became desirable to examine the contents of 
the reports and the philosophies and practices of the reports’ authors. The request to access 
court files and the pre-sentence reports contained within was denied. As an alternative 
means of accessing comparably similar information, seven interviews with probation 
officers were organised and took place between July and October 2009.  
 
 
7.3.1 Roles of the probation officer and report 
 
The officers were unanimously of the opinion that their role was primarily to assist the court 
by presenting information relating to the offence and the offender which may aid the court 
in its sentencing decision.  
 
P1: Our role, from my point of view, is to provide the court with information on the offender’s 
current circumstances, some of the history of the offender, and not just in terms of the 




A secondary role of the probation officer in their capacity as authors of the reports is to 
inform the court of what she perceives to be the most suitable disposal option for the 
offender: 
 
P2: I see the role as a provider of information first of all. So I am giving [the court] a snapshot of 
that person’s life. Obviously I am only interviewing for an hour and a half, so it is only a 
snapshot, and it relies on what they tell me… And also I am telling the courts what I think 
would be the best resources available to manage that person’s risk and their offending 
behaviour. 
 
P6: Primarily we are officers of the court. We are there to advise the court, in a sense… Looking at 
the facts of a theft, I can probably advise the magistrates as to the best way to go, should they 
have any uncertainties.  
 
A number of officers expressed that the reports should be objective: 
 
P1: My opinion is a report is bias free, it is opinion free. You look at what the situation is. If the 
court is looking at custody because they have indicated that at the first appearance, [then we 
look at] what the impact of custody is going to have on them… If it is going to impact on work, 
accommodation, the offender themselves.  
 
Interviews with magistrates and judges showed a firm belief amongst the sentencers that the 
pre-sentence reports offered the courts a valuable source of information regarding the 
offender’s character and his risk of reoffending. Similar sentiments were voiced by the 
probation officers. Owing to the Service’s work with other agencies, the report is able to 
include information from a number of sources which would not be readily available to the 
courts: 
 
P1: It would be difficult for the court to get the information because we, as appropriate, get in 
contact with the other agencies. So it could be that we are in touch with the police, social 
services, child risk, housing… It all ties up the other areas. Otherwise you would be waiting for 
reports from here, there and everywhere. 
 
Other officers believed that the offender may be more receptive to questioning during the 
interview either because the interview takes place in a less formal setting that the courtroom, 
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or because the offender views the officer as an associate of the defence team. There remains, 
however, the unresponsive offender who refuses to engage with the officer during 
interview: 
 
P3:  I suppose because you interview them [after conviction or their guilty plea], it is just you and 
the offender. It is more informal than, say, in court. So I think that they would be more likely to 
open up. 
 
P2: We will get people who say “can you tell [the court] this, and can you tell [the court] that”. I 
explain that that is not what I am here to do… I will base [the report] on what I think and the 
resources. I think they see us as a connection with their solicitor… So in some ways they are 
quite receptive…[but] sometimes you will get someone who sits there and says “I am not 
prepared to talk to you at all.” They are usually quite difficult, obviously. 
  
 
7.3.2 The focus of the report 
 
Magistrates and judges had demonstrated a central role in sentencing being afforded to the 
seriousness of the offence. Since the enactment of the 1991 Act, report writers have been 
required to consider and evaluate offence seriousness and to ensure that their 
recommendation reflects this.39 Nonetheless, in a study of the legislative impact on pre-
sentence reports, Cavadino found that a significant minority of reports (27 percent) 
contained no explicit or implicit reference to offence seriousness.40 In such cases, the reports 
tended to justify the recommendation on the basis of the “sentence’s likely effectiveness in 
producing a positive response from the offender.”41 Probation officers were asked whether 
their reports focus principally on the offence or the offender. If the latter, the courts could in 
fact surreptitiously be sentencing primarily for the offender rather than for the offence 
where the reports’ recommendations are followed. All officers confirmed that the reports 
consider issues relating to both the offence and the offender, with some claiming that the 
                                                          
39 Home Office (1992), at 13-14 
40 Cavadino (1997), at 535 
41 Ibid, page 536 
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two are inextricably linked. Some explained that the offence is the starting point, but the 
focus then moves on to the offender, in particular whether the offender is able to comply 
with a community order, or similarly, how the offender’s life can be transformed away from 
criminal behaviour: 
 
P1: I am focusing on whether they are going to be able to comply with a community-based 
sentence. Obviously you take the offence as a starting point, but my main concern is, if we are 
looking at a community sentence, (i) are they going to comply with it, and (ii) is it going to 
benefit them? It is pointless putting someone on an order that they are either not going to 
bother to turn op to, or turn up just to tick a box. 
 
P5: In the report the main thing you are thinking about is how can we work with this person to 
make their life a pro-social, non-offending life.  
 
Officer Six explained that the focus of the report may move from the offence to the offender 
(or vice versa), depending on the particulars of the case. The nature of the offence will take 
precedence where the crime is especially serious, particularly where the custody threshold 
has been crossed; the offender’s characteristics are not going to be sufficient to tempt the 
court away from a custodial penalty. Where the offence is less serious and the offender has 
certain issues to be addressed, the focus lies on the offender: 
 
P6: If you have got someone with no previous convictions but it is a £100,000 theft, you know you 
are going to be in difficulty because it is a serious amount of money… You might say it is a theft 
of £10 but it is someone who is a heroin addict who is shoplifting to get their next fix, so that 
sends you in a different direction. So it is a combination of the two factors together that you 
have to balance… To get the full picture you have to combine them both. 
 
A similar opinion was given by Officer Four, who claimed that the offender of a minor theft 
is the focal point of the report, suggesting that the same is not true for more serious offences: 
 
P4: Some reports focus more on the offender, depending on the offender’s issues. Some reports 
might focus more on the offence depending on the seriousness of that offence [and the] impact 
of that offending. I would say that for general small theft offences, you are looking at the 




Were the court to follow the report’s recommendation, the report’s focus on the offender 
does not necessarily mean that the seriousness of the offence (which was heralded by the 
sentencers in interview) is overlooked. The court will often provide a sentencing bracket to 
the probation officer to indicate where on the sentencing hierarchy the court is looking. 
Probation will then make a recommendation usually within this prescribed range. The 
seriousness of the offence is taken into consideration within the bracket stipulated by the 
court. The offender’s characteristics and needs are then accounted for by the report author in 
determining the most appropriate disposal option available within this range: 
 
P2: The court is supposed to put in a sheet where they tell us whether they are considering 
anything from a fine right up to custody, but…we do not always get that. So a lot of reports 
come through [as] an all-options report, so that says we need to cover anything that could be 
given to them, which makes the report quite longwinded because you are going “well they are 
not suitable for that programme, they might be suitable for a curfew, they might be suitable for 
unpaid work”, and you are grasping at everything to try to make sure that when they give them 
a sentence, they don’t give them something that we cannot work with… But we are supposed to 
get a sheet that says “we are looking at 16 weeks’ custody”, and you need to think on that lines 
of what would be manageable or acceptable within that range. So they are more precise [than all 
option reports], because you know that they are looking for a programme, something quite 
substantial. 
 
Following the interview between officer and offender, new issues may become apparent 
which were not known to the court at the time of determining the prescribed range. Where 
this occurs, the officer may report the issues and propose a sentence outside of the range: 
 
P2: Yes [the proposal may fall outside of the prescribed range]… Sometimes the information that 
comes forward, you start seeing something they have not mentioned to anyone and they start to 
reveal that, and you realise that the custodial sentence [prescribed by the court] is going to be a 
really bad move, and that they really need to go in [a different] direction. Particularly if they are 
suicidal or need mental health, which sometimes does not get picked up until you start 








7.3.3 The recommended sentence 
 
The probation officers were asked for their views on the role of the recommended sentence 
within the report. The responses were unanimous in saying that the proposal should evince 
what is perceived by the report writer to be the most ‘appropriate’ disposal option. The 
determination of the most appropriate option should be made in reference to what is 
appropriate for the offence and the offender, whilst also being mindful of what the court 
would accept as a realistic recommendation: 
 
P3: [The recommendation is] just the conclusion as to the best and most appropriate sentence, not 
just for the offence that has been committed but also for the offender as well. So it has to be 
appropriate not just to the offence, the magistrates’ or judges’ wishes, but also for that 
offender. There is no point giving them an order which will just set them up to fail, which 
happens sometimes. 
 
None of the probation officers expressly mentioned that the offence’s impact on the victim, 
or the interests of society in general would be taken into consideration within the 
recommendation, notwithstanding the fact that one section of the pre-sentence report 
focuses on victim impact. 
 
With this in mind, officers were also asked whether they believed the recommendation acts 
to merely inform the court of an appropriate sentence, or whether it goes further toward 
influencing the court’s decision. Once again, the responses were consistent with one another. 
By detailing what is considered by the author to be the most appropriate disposal option, 
the officers thought that the courts would (or at least should) be influenced by the 
recommendation. Moreover, the proposal is not divorced from the rest of the report; rather it 
is a conclusion based on the aforesaid details on the offence and offender. Consequently the 




P2: I think that if the report is structured then the proposal at the end should make sense… To me it 
is a commonsense line of thinking that I am putting together. I would hope that when [the 
court] reads that, they would see that and they make the decision based on the best resources 
available. 
 
One probation officer maintained that the role of the recommendation is threefold: to 
inform, to guide and to instruct the court: 
 
P3: [The recommendation] does inform [the court], it guides them, and in a way it can instruct them 
as well. 
 
The recommended sentence constitutes the most appropriate option in the eyes of the 
report’s author. The officers are eager to stipulate in the report any penalties for which the 
offender is deemed unsuitable, whilst providing reasons for this conclusion. The officers 
were aware that where a disposal is not expressly rejected and goes unmentioned in the 
report, the court may assume that the order was overlooked and may impose it regardless. 
The eliminated disposals are thus equally as important as the final recommendation: 
 
P4: For me, it is more powerful to say “they are not suitable for unpaid work programme, drug 
rehabilitation requirements, mental health” than it is for me to say “this person is suitable for 
supervision”. If I do not state that they are not suitable, the court feels that we have not dealt 
with them; they assume we have not dealt with them and will therefore give it to them anyway 
because they do not feel that they have been given a harsh enough sentence, when actually that 
is not the case: we have looked at all of the options, we have come to the best conclusion and 
we have given it to the court. What [the courts] want is to know what they can and cannot give. 
As long as you state they cannot give something, if they then give it and it all goes wrong or 
they fail, then that is the courts’ responsibility.  
 
 
Ultimately, the sentencing decision was acknowledged by the probation officers to be a 
decision for the court, with the recommendation simply stating which non-custodial options 
may be suitable (if any): 
 
P6: You see the bottom line is that [sentencing] is not your decision; it is a decision for the court. 
What you can say is “we are available” but in a sense, how they sentence is a matter for them 
and depends on their view of the offence. And if they determine that, for one reason or another, 




Officers appeared to be aware of a high take-up rate of the recommended sentences by the 
courts, with all officers interviewed acknowledging that the courts will typically adopt the 
recommendation supplied within the report. However, previous research has warned 
against an assumption that any concordance between sentences imposed and report 
recommendations is necessarily evidence of the latter’s influence on the sentencing 
decision.42 Rather, report writers try to foretell what sentencers may regard as realistic 
sentences.43 Three officers thought that the courts would follow the recommended sentence 
in 80 to 90 percent of all cases, suggesting that the proposal would be followed by the court 
if it is “sensible” and comprehensive in discounting certain unsuitable orders: 
 
P1: If you have got a well written and well structured report, and you can justify everything you 
have put in there…if you can say why you have not gone for something [then the courts will 
tend to follow the recommendation made].  
 
 
Two officers did sense, however, that the Crown Court is less likely to adopt the 
recommendation made, possibly because it has already made its decision before the report is 
delivered: 
 
P1: It seems as though over here [in Coventry], especially with the Crown Court, the report can 
sometimes be – let us not say disregarded, not taken into account. Or they will take it into 
account but they have already decided what they are going to do, which can happen at any 
court, but my experience is it is more likely to happen [in the Crown Court].  
 
Perhaps the real reason why the Crown Court is less likely to implement the 
recommendation is due to the reports’ loyalty toward non-custodial sentences, which may 
be viewed by the Court as unrealistic in those cases where the Court is likely to be 
considering custody. This would be particularly true for indictable offences and either-way 
offences which have been committed to the Crown Court for sentencing, but less so where 
the defendant in an either-way offence has elected trial. 
                                                          
42 Carter & Wilkins (1967); Morgan & Haines (2007). 




7.3.4 Sentencing purposes 
 
Magistrates and judges had, during interviews, indicated that the sentencing purposes 
employed depend on the nature of the offence and the offender’s characteristics. Some had 
also stated that the purpose is determined by the sentencing bench in light of the sentencing 
reasons stipulated by the previous bench and the contents of a pre-sentence report, where 
such a report is available.44 In drafting the reports, the probation officers noted that, often, 
the court will indicate which purposes are to be considered: 
 
P1: The court indicates what [purposes] they are looking at, there are five different boxes for them 
to choose from, whether it be punishment, rehabilitation, reparation, reduction of crime or 
[protecting the public]. 
 
P4: We are given the guidance of five different areas for the purposes. I think that even if the court 
states what purposes they are looking for, by the time we have done our assessment, 
sometimes they might just be asking for unpaid work to be looked at. Once we have done the 
interview and the assessment, we might feel that unpaid work is not the best thing; that there 
are some underlying issues that have not been brought up, so supervision would be more 
[appropriate]. You then move from a punishment sentencing purpose to a more reforming and 
rehabilitative purpose. If the court was to request public protection for a £15 theft then I would 
say “no”, these are not public protection cases. They are punishment or reform and 
rehabilitation.  
  
Although the probation officer will usually apply the purposes highlighted by the court, 
they do not feel compelled to do so in all circumstances. Where the probation officer believes 
that, in light of information garnered during the interview with the offender, the purposes 
stipulated by the court appear now to be inappropriate (perhaps because of the uncovering 
of a particular need of the offender which was unknown by the court), they are not opposed 
to disregarding this and following what they consider to be a more suitable path: 
 
                                                          
44 See comments by Magistrate Eight, section 7.2.1 
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P5: It depends what [purposes the court has asked for], but essentially you will go for exactly what 
you feel at the end of the report, and it will not really matter what they have asked for… But at 
the end of the day you make your own mind up; you make your own decision. 
 
The report writer may feel that a purpose other than that prescribed by the court would be 
more appropriate in the circumstances. If, for example, the offender’s drug dependency only 
becomes known during interview, this may lead the report writer to suggest a rehabilitative 
approach, which the court had not prescribed as it was unaware of the offenders’ addiction 
(or extent thereof) at the time of submitting the sentencing reasons form. 
 
On the other hand, Probation Officer Seven appeared to be against the practice of departing 
from the courts’ sentencing reasons: 
 
P7: Normally the courts will say what the purposes of sentencing are, whether it is to rehabilitate or 
to punish.  There are quite a few different ones. [You would usually follow this purpose]. You 





Magistrates had some misgivings concerning the probation services’ antipathy toward 
proposing custodial sentences, which may lead the courts to regard some recommendations 
as unrealistic. Five officers were candid about their reliance on non-custodial 
recommendations, often viewing imprisonment as an inappropriate disposal option in theft 
cases. Probation Officer Five was of the opinion that the court could be dissuaded from 
imposing short custodial sentences: 
 
P5: I will write a report to try and keep [the offender] out of jail because I only agree with it for 
violent people, not for people who just commit theft… If [the court is considering a custodial 





Officer Six exhibited a reluctance towards custodial sentences based on his belief that an 
offender should be dealt with by way of the lowest possible tariff, although concerns for 
public protection can necessitate a custodial term when facing dangerous offenders. 
Probation Officer One explained that the role of Probation in general explicates the Service’s 
inclination towards community sentences: 
  
P1: I think, as it stands, because of the role the probation has got, we are obviously looking for as 
many people in the community as possible. But if someone should not be in the community 
[because he poses a danger to the public], that needs to be reflected in the report. 
 
Nonetheless, officers were asked whether they would ever consider recommending custody 
for theft. Five Officers had misgivings about the value of custody in such cases, in part due 
to the perceived worthlessness of short custodial terms and because custody fails to offer the 
support needed by so many convicted of minor acquisitive crimes: 
 
P4: The thing with custody for theft is that, if they get short custodial sentences it is no good to 
anybody. They do not come out on licence. They do not get supervision. They do not get any 
kind of support. And I think they are pointless in that respect. If it is a short sharp punishment, 
then [ok], but if someone has got a history then it is not going to change anything. 
 
 
Officer Six commented that custody is not recommended, per se, rather the court would be 
advised that the offender was not deemed suitable for a community order: 
 
P6: You don’t, as such, recommend custody. What you do is say “regrettably, I cannot help the 
court on this occasion.” That might be where it is a massive amount of money, as I have 
illustrated, or the [previous convictions] are so hopeless, they are on a suspended sentence and 
this is their fifth theft in six months and it is all linked to drugs, and you have tried to get them 
on to a drug related order but they have not cooperated. The cards you are holding in your 
hand are completely hopeless… You usually know when you have run out of options and when 






The most commonly cited factor which would lead to a recommendation for custody, or at 
least no recommendation for a community order, was where the offender had demonstrated 
to the officer an unwillingness to comply with a community-based sentence. Where this 
occurred, the officers felt compelled to make this fact known to the court in full knowledge 
that a custodial sentence may be imposed: 
 
P2: I have had a couple of cases where the people have used theft as a means of feeding their drug 
habit, and they basically turn around and say “I am not interested in doing any work at all in 
the community. I am not interested in attending supervision. I want a custodial sentence”. And 
I have argued that that is not their best option, but without their say so, there is nothing that we 
can do. And the courts then have no option but to give a custodial sentence… I am saying that I 
cannot work with them unless they agree to it.  
 
 
7.3.6 Fines and discharges 
 
Officers were asked if a fine or discharge would ever be proposed in a report. Concerning 
fines, responses were unanimous: a fine would not be recommended within a report. 
However, the reasons for this practice varied somewhat. Some officers suggested that a fine 
would be inappropriate for theft as it poses the question of how the offender will raise the 
funds to pay. This suggests that the officers consider fines as a sanction to be inappropriate 
in cases of acquisitive crime, rather than it merely being inappropriate to propose a financial 
penalty: 
 
P1: I have never [recommended a fine] for theft. I would question where the money was coming 
from to pay the fine. People who shoplift have got issues with their finances anyway. 
 
Other officers claimed that, where a fine is considered by the court to be an appropriate 
disposal, a report would not be requested. For Probation to be asked to produce a report, the 





P5: I am assuming that if it was a minor theft, if the goods were not that high [in value], if they were 
recovered, if it was just literally a theft, then it would not usually go to a report. If the court 
deemed a fine to be okay, then it would not go to a report. I think that if they were looking at 
that, they would deal with it before it got to report. [If] it is not serious and they can deal with 
it by just imposing a fine, then it is a waste of resources [for Probation to get involved by 
issuing a report]. 
 
Finally, the remaining officer claimed that her preference away from fines is due to a 
perceived legal incapacity to propose them, rather than a discretionary avoidance of 
financial penalties: she did not believe that a fine could (rather than should) be 
recommended within a report. 
 
Officers were more likely to recommend a conditional discharge over a fine, although a 
discharge would only be appropriate in cases where the offender was suffering from no 
underlying dependency or wellbeing issues and the offender did not have a long list of prior 
convictions, either of which would lead the officer to recommend a community order: 
 
P4: If there are no big issues, no alcohol, drug issues, emotional wellbeing, depression, if none of 
those are evident, then I would quite happily ask for a conditional discharge if they haven’t had 
one before; if it is their first or second offence.  
 
Officer Six appeared to uphold the value of the conditional discharge more than any of his 
colleagues, asserting that a discharge can be the most suitable outcome for relatively minor 
offences where the offender is new to offending and presents a low risk of reoffending. The 
Officer appeared to claim that the conditional discharge may also be the least damaging 
disposal for such an offender, where placing him on unpaid work may be harmful by close 
association with others placed on the order: 
 
P6: The interesting thing to do is try and present the court with a conditional discharge where you 
have got unpaid work, and you know that unpaid work is the obvious outcome, but for one 
reason or another you think it is better for the Service and better for the offender to go for a 
conditional discharge… You do not get many, but as long as you are convinced it is the right 
thing to do. It is usually on people with no or few recent previous convictions on less serious 
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offences. I get a lot of satisfaction out of getting conditional discharges for good reasons… But 
as I say it is in circumstances where they do not need supervision and where unpaid work is a 
natural outcome, but sometimes you do not want people mixing with the kind of guys we have 
got [on unpaid work], just like we do not want guys mixing with the people we have got in 
prison; that is quite a powerful argument. You do not necessarily want people mixing with the 
people on unpaid work, and it makes more sense to say to the court “he is a very low risk of 
reoffending, why do you not try a conditional discharge?” So, that is what we do.  
  
 
7.3.7 Community-based sentences 
 
The officers had demonstrated a negligible reliance on custodial recommendations and a 
complete lack of utilising fines within the proposals, leading to the conclusion that the officer 
would commonly recommend that the offender serve his sentence in the community; an 
assertion that was supported by all officers during interview. The reliance on community 
based penalties is perhaps unsurprising considering the nature of the Probation Service’s 
work. Even where a custodial sentence could be justified for the offence, non-custodial 
alternatives are still assessed for suitability. There appear to be occasions when custody is 
justified but the report writer will remain hopeful that a community sentence can be 
recommended: 
 
P6: I guess our role is partly to be optimistic, despite the evidence. So sometimes we are dealing 
with people who perhaps ought to go to jail but realistically deserve another chance. 
 
The willingness of the Service to propose community penalties was perhaps best 
summarised by Officer Six. Where the seriousness of the offence does not render custody 
imminent, and assuming the offender seems prepared to comply with the order, the report 
will recommend a disposal within the community: 
 
P6: When [offenders] go to custody, we have usually ended up with circumstances where the 
machinery is completely sanded up by the offender’s response and/or the seriousness of what 
they have actually done, rather than our willingness or otherwise to take them on. If they 




According to Officer Seven, the community order proposed is selected on the basis of what 
is the most appropriate option for the offender, rather than being determined with reference 
to the seriousness of the offence. Although the sentence type recommended (be it custody, 
community-based, or a discharge), at least in part, is decided upon in reference to the 
seriousness of the offence, where a community sentence is selected, the precise order is 
determined in light to the offender’s particular needs.45 Where the offender has a propensity 
for drug misuse, this may form the focus of the reports’ recommendation, providing that the 
offender has demonstrated to the interviewing officer an inclination to quash the drug 
dependency: 
 
P7: If there are drugs involved then you are looking at a drug rehabilitation requirement… If they 
are not in good physical health, you do not want to put them up for unpaid work because they 
probably will not go and they probably would not be able to do it. 
 
Similarly to Judge Two, Officer Six also noted that a suspended sentence order may now 
warrant careful consideration as it allows for the court to warn the offender against 
reoffending by way of an impending custodial term for subsequent breach, whilst also 
allowing the individual to undergo work or supervision within the community: 
 
P6: The extra dimension that has crept into things is the suspended sentence order, which actually 
gives the magistrates the opportunity to try out somebody and say “we will give you 16 weeks 
suspended for 12 months, and at the same time we want you to be supervised and/or do some 
unpaid work.” That option actually gives the magistrates a new opportunity where they are 
actually sentencing somebody to custody, but they are saying they will suspend it. And, I 
suppose, rather than giving a community order, they are actually deferring – it is not deferring, 
it is actually a suspended sentence. So that is an interesting new development which gives the 






                                                          
45 Armitage found that probation officers were more likely to recommend a probation order (subsequently CRO) where 
personal or social problems had been identified that could be addressed through probationary supervision. See Armitage 
(2001), chapter 8. 
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7.3.8 Offence aggravation and mitigation 
 
The pre-sentence reports, and recommendations contained within, are not shaped by 
offence-specific aggravation and mitigation. The officers stated that such factors are taken 
into consideration by the court when determining the sentence range which is provided to 
Probation in the Sentencing Reasons Form. To consider them further within the report as 
determinants of the recommendation would be to count them twice: 
 
P1: The court will take the aggravating and mitigating circumstances into account. They start with 
“we are looking between here and here in terms of sentence”. Then you go down and take into 
account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Then they do a revision of where they 
are looking at. So they have already indicated that, so we do not really get involved… You 
could say that it is clear that the offending is linked to the long standing drug habit, but you 
would not use that as an aggravating or mitigating factor. As far as I am concerned, you would 
not because the court has already said “these are the aggravating, these are the mitigating, this 
is where we are now looking at”.  
 
  
7.3.9 Personal mitigation 
 
On the matter of personal mitigation, all officers commented on the effects of remorse 
shown by the offender. Two officers commented that the offender’s demonstration of 
remorse would not have a noticeable impact on the recommendation made within the 
report, but a lack of remorse tends to be frowned upon by the court and may lead to more 
punitive sanctioning: 
 
P5: If they stand there saying they absolutely do not care, then [the court] will be much harsher on 
them. If you are completely remorseful [and] ashamed, that will hold some weight with the 
court… Just because they are really remorseful and really understand it, they may still need the 
same amount of work through the Probation Service that I thought they did anyway [so the 
recommendation would be the same regardless of remorse]. They might have areas in their life 
like coming off drugs, looking for work, and those things will be the same whether [or not] 




Other officers maintained that remorse is an important factor for inclusion in the report and 
that it may affect the recommendation; it can strengthen the proposal for sentencing within 
the community. Where the offender demonstrates genuine remorse, he may be more 
susceptible to treatment within the community because he has recognised his wrongdoing, 
suggesting that he is willing to move away from a life of crime: 
 
P2: If [the offender] is remorseful, then it might save them from custody because it given you 
something to work with. 
 
 
7.3.10 Previous convictions 
 
Most officers commented that previous convictions are an important feature to consider 
within the report, although they do not necessarily affect the sentence type prescribed in the 
recommendation: 
 
P3: [Previous convictions are] taken into consideration but not to the extent that it would 
completely jump from being high community to custody. 
 
However, previous convictions can shape the report’s proposal where the offender shows a 
history of failing to comply with court orders. Where this is the case, the officer may be 
discouraged from recommending a similar order: 
 
P1: [Previous convictions are] a good indication of how they are going to comply with sentence. So 
if someone has got three or four convictions within the same 12 months, and they are quite 
recent, you can say the likelihood is that they are not going to comply with [a similar order 
now].  
 
Rather than influencing the author’s proposal within the report, previous convictions were 
noted for their ability to offer an insight into the offender’s life at the time, and to illustrate 
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patterns in offending behaviour. Where an offender does show a pattern of criminality, this 
may strengthen the report’s proposal for a rehabilitative approach to sentencing: 
 
P3: Theft, normally, is a pattern of offending. That strengthens your proposal for a drug 
rehabilitation requirement then because you have a cycle of offending, the drug addiction, and 
to try and break that cycle, you need treatment. 
 
Officers also highlighted the importance of looking toward previous convictions to identify 
an escalation in offending. Moreover, where the offender has downgraded the seriousness of 
his offending (from, say, robbery to theft), this can act as significant mitigation for the 
offender by revealing that something is working, although this is not necessarily recognised 
by the courts: 
 
P4: If [the current offending] is less serious [than previous offending] then I think that is some 
success on some level, if the offending has gone from wounding to jumping a train. I do not 
necessarily think that offenders get mitigation enough for less serious offending. It is an 
obvious sign that something is working but it has not quite got to the stage of having finished 
working. And I do not think that is taken into consideration by the courts. Having dealings 
with offenders who fine that quite irritating, I can understand their point of view; they are 
trying and it is not getting recognised. 
 
 
7.3.11 Previous sentences 
 
On the question of previous sentences, officers felt these were considerably less important 
than previous convictions. One officer expressly stated that drawing up a proposed sentence 
is not a ‘ratcheting up’ exercise: 
 
P2: I do not look at [previous sentences] and think “he had a community order last time, perhaps 
he needs a suspended sentence this time.” It does not really cross my mind. 
 
As with previous convictions, most officers use previous sentences to foretell the offender’s 




P4: I would not say that [previous sentences] make a huge difference unless you have got someone 
who has had a lot of previous community sentences and has constantly breached their orders, 
then it would be an issue. If someone has had four community orders before…and they have 
breached every single one of them…I would not recommend [a similar order] unless specific 
circumstances have changed for that offender.  
 
Similarly, Officer Three had emphasised the need to consider the offender’s current 
circumstances. The fact that an individual has breached orders in the past does not 
necessarily require all community orders to be discounted; a change in offender 
circumstances may suggest a newfound willingness to comply: 
 
P3: Theft offences are normally committed by drug addicts, and often have a history of breaching 
orders. If they have had a drug rehabilitation requirement before and have not complied, we 
do look at whether they are motivated enough to comply. To be fair, I like to give people a 
chance… You have got to think about resources [but] I would never disregard an offender. You 
look at their current circumstances. 
 
 
7.3.12 Concluding remarks 
 
For the most part, the interviews with probation officers depicted a general consistency 
between responses, demonstrating coherent practices and application of principles. The 
interviews led to two manifest primary conclusions, the first being the Probation Service’s 
evident reliance on community sentences in their recommendations. It appears that custody 
is not expressly recommended within the report; rather the author would conclude that the 
offender could not be managed within the community, effectively rendering custody as the 
only available option. The officers demonstrated an attraction toward dealing with the 
offender in the least severe manner, thereby avoiding custody as much as possible. One 
officer explicitly claimed that the courts can be dissuaded from imposing short custodial 
terms by recommending a non-custodial alternative. This would be the case in all 
magistrates’ cases where custody was being considered, and consequently would hold true 
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in most theft cases. Probation officers had noted that imprisonment would only be 
recommended where the offender has clearly demonstrated an unwillingness to comply 
with any community order offered. Consequently, the decision to recommend 
imprisonment is based squarely on whether or not the offender would be likely to breach an 
order. In theft cases at least, the seriousness of the offence alone would not lead the reports’ 
author to conclude that custody was necessary. 
 
Below the community sentence band, fines were never proposed in the reports. However a 
conditional discharge could be recommended where the offender had no specific needs or 
wellbeing issues and had not amassed a lengthy prior record. Most recommendations would 
consequently fall within the community sentence band, a fact which is explained in part by 
the Probation Service’s positioning within the criminal justice system. Effectively, the task of 
the author in writing a report and recommending a sentence is to determine whether the 
Service can offer a programme within the community. 
 
Community sentences have an added benefit of being tailored to suit the individual 
offender. The officers hold them in high regard as being useful and more positive sentencing 
options in trying to help the offender and reduce the incidence of crime. This leads to the 
second conclusion to be drawn from the interviews: the reports’ focus on the offender. 
 
Although a pre-sentence report includes information on both the offence and offender, the 
officers’ responses show an overwhelming concentration on matters relating to the offender. 
The officers had claimed that the role of the recommendation was to provide the court with 
the most suitable disposal option for the offender. Officers also expressed the clear need to 
give reasons for discounting any unsuitable options. Failure to alert the court as to which 
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penalties are not appropriate (along with reasons why) could lead the court to impose it 
regardless.  
 
Offence specific aggravation and mitigation is not taken into consideration to any noticeable 
extent as these factors are reflected in the court’s prescribed sentence range, which is 
provided to the probation officer before the offender interview takes place. Any penalty 
within the range supplied would be appropriate for the offence. The probation officer then 
decides on the best sentencing option for the offender. It was noted, however, that the officer 
may depart from the prescribed range if previously unknown issues come to light which 
require a different response to those being considered by the court within its range. 
 
Personal mitigation, and other matters specific to the offender, make up a considerable 
portion of the reports, with issues relating to substance misuse, accommodation, education, 
employment, finances, relationships and general lifestyle all being reviewed. Issues such as 
victim awareness and substance misuse can provide a focus for the offender to work on 
under a community order. 
 
Previous convictions and previous sentences were viewed by the officers as important tools 
in gauging the offender’s issues and providing an insight into his life. Previous convictions 
were not viewed as aggravating and would not, in themselves, result in a more punitive 
sentence being recommended unless the individual has demonstrated a repeated non-
compliance to previous orders. Recommendations could be affected where the offender was 
known to breach community penalties by concluding that he may remain unlikely to 
comply still. Consequently a community order may not be proposed. However, some 
officers indicated that previous breaches may not stand in the way of recommending a 
community programme if the offender’s circumstances have changed and he now shows a 
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readiness to comply with an order. Once again, in such cases the recommendation for a 
community order is based on the offender and his attitude rather than the offence.  
 
Officers noted that their role was to assist the court by presenting information gleaned from 
the interview with the offender, and to make a recommendation for sentence based on what 
is considered to be the most appropriate option for the offender in light of the available 
resources. Perhaps it is more accurate to define the role of the recommendation as advising 
the court whether or not the offender is suitable for punishment within the community, 
owing to the fact that the report does not expressly recommend custody or propose the 




7.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Probation officers had estimated that the majority (80 – 90 percent) of recommendations 
provided within pre-sentence reports were likely to be followed by the sentencing court, 
with the Crown Court being less likely that the magistrates’ court to implement the 
recommendation. The proposed sentences for minor acquisitive crime, such as theft, are 
likely to be followed where the seriousness of the offence does not warrant a custodial 
sentence; at least some of the 10-20 percent of recommendations not followed by the courts 
would be likely to warrant custody, perhaps on the basis of offence seriousness, which the 
report may not have recommended where the offender has demonstrated a willingness to 




With the courts’ focus drawn to offence seriousness, and the reports concentrating on the 
offender, the overall sentence imposed is likely to reflect the seriousness of the offence 
whilst also being the most appropriate disposal option for the offender. This however is 
subject to two caveats. Firstly, that the sentencing court implements the recommended 
sentence proposed within the pre-sentence report, and secondly, in determining the 
recommended sentence, the reports’ author does not depart from the confines of the 














The purpose of this chapter is to try to make sense of the courts’ sentencing practice in theft 
cases, and to identify the apparent justifications and purposes which lay behind the 
sentences. During the study, there was no opportunity to interview the magistrates and 
judges responsible for determining the sentence in each case in the sample, which would 
have provided a more certain explanation of the sentencing decision. Nevertheless, the 
chapter will try to suggest explanations based on the information available.  
 
The chapter begins by considering those cases in which the sentence appears to have been 
determined by reference to the seriousness of the offence, and thus where the sentence could 
be said to represent a proportionate response to the seriousness of the offence. The chapter 
then identifies a number of cases in which the sentence may initially appear either 
disproportionately severe or disproportionately lenient, but the offender’s previous criminal 
record and/or circumstances seem to have been influential. At the same time, it may be that 
some of these seemingly severe or lenient sentences can be (better) understood on the basis 
of some other justification or purpose (such as rehabilitation, deterrence or incapacitation). 
Some sentences nevertheless do appear to be disproportionate to the seriousness of the 
offence. Finally, the chapter explores the apparent sentencing practice relating to young 
offenders in the sample, for whom proportionality plays a less central role but rather the aim 




8.1 Adult Offenders 
 
8.1.1 Proportionate Sentences  
 
There was some evidence in the sample that the sentencing decision is based on the 
seriousness of the offence, across a variety of theft offences and the whole range of disposal 
options. Subsequent interviews with sentencers indicated the importance for courts to 
impose proportionate sentences, with some magistrates explaining that custodial sentences 
would be imposed where an offence involves a series of aggravating features and, perhaps, 
a lack of mitigation. However, in only a minority of custody cases did the decision to 
imprison appear to have been justified by reference to the seriousness of the theft itself. An 
example of this is case 292 in which a store manager had appropriated £27,000 by 
authorising dishonest refunds. The Crown Court ordered that he serve 12 months in prison, 
no doubt due to the overwhelming presence of aggravating features: the high value of the 
property, breach of trust, the sophisticated methods used to conceal  his actions, and the 
extended period of the offending.  
 
During interviews with sentencers, theft in breach of trust was the most commonly cited 
factor likely to attract a custodial sentence, although magistrates indicated that the custody 
threshold is most likely to be crossed where a breach of trust is present alongside other 
aggravating features (such as high value of goods stolen),1 as occurred in case 292 above. 
Similarly, the analysis in Chapter Five found breach of trust and high value to be significant 
in determining sentence, seemingly being significant enough to push an offence over the 
custody threshold.   
                                                          




In other cases, the court seems to have imposed a period of immediate imprisonment based 
on the seriousness of an associated (non-theft) offence. In case 220, the offender had head-
butted a security guard having been detained following a £30 shoplifting. The court 
imposed a three month prison term for common assault with one month imposed 
consecutively for the theft.2 The three month sentence for the assault was almost certainly a 
proportionate sentence and one which provided an element of public protection.3 With a 
longer sentence imposed for assault than that imposed for the theft, the court viewed the 
violent conduct as more serious than the associated theft. The sentence may have been 
determined principally in relation to the assault, with the theft being dealt with as a ‘bolt-on’ 
offence. One month imprisonment for theft seems disproportionately severe, but since the 
court clearly believed that the assault justified a custodial sentence, this restricted the 
options available in dealing with the theft. The offender’s incarceration for assault would 
prevent the court from imposing a community sentence or a fine;4 the offender would not be 
available to undertake work or supervision in the community whilst presently incarcerated. 
Therefore, unless willing to impose a discharge for the theft, which would have been too 
lenient, the court had little choice but to pass a custodial sentence.  
 
The custody threshold also applies to suspended sentences of imprisonment. Consequently, 
a suspended sentence should only be imposed where the offence is so serious that a non-
custodial sentence cannot be justified. Of the three cases resulting in a suspended sentence, 
case 281, which was heard in the Crown Court, was the only case where the offence could be 
                                                          
2 Consecutive sentences are rightfully imposed where the offences are of a dissimilar nature and are committed against 
different victims. See Ashworth (2005), page 46 
3 Section 79(2)(b) of the PCCSA 2000 provided the courts with a power to imprison offenders for violent or sexual conduct 
from which the public needed protecting. 
4 A fine should not be imposed in conjunction with a custodial sentence where the offender is unable to pay the fine 
(Maund (1980) 2 Cr App (S) R289), or where it would place the offender under a financial burden upon release (McCormack 
Unreported, 16th January 1976). 
279 
 
said to have crossed the custody threshold.5 The offender had stolen jewellery worth £10,000 
whilst delivering furniture to the victim’s house. He eventually pleaded guilty to the 
offence, but had taken steps to avoid detection (namely by swallowing the ring before being 
searched at the police station). The offender had only one previous conviction, which was 
‘spent’.6 His previous good character seemed to have induced the court to suspend the 
period of imprisonment which was otherwise justified by reference to the seriousness of the 
offence, based on the value of the property stolen and the breach of trust.  
 
Before imposing a community-based sentence, the court must be satisfied that the offence 
committed is serious enough to warrant such a penalty.7 Although some community 
sentences have crime-reduction aims (most notably the community rehabilitation order 
(CRO) and drug treatment and testing order (DTTO) which are both based primarily on 
notions of rehabilitation), according to the 1991 Act, these should still only be imposed 
where justified by the gravity of the offence. A number of cases demonstrate the courts’ 
desire to impose proportionate community sentences. On occasion, the community-sentence 
threshold may have been crossed by reason of the totality of the offending. Offenders 
sentenced for multiple counts were significantly more likely to receive a community (or 
indeed a custodial) sentence than a fine or discharge. Only 9.7 percent of fines and 12.2 
percent of discharges were imposed of multiple-count offenders, compared with 50 percent 
of community orders and 65.9 percent of custodial sentences.  
 
Four offenders convicted of either theft from a vehicle or from a dwelling were placed under 
a CRO. The aggravating factors present in these cases (related damage to property in the 
                                                          
5 The other two cases are discussed below in section 8.1.2 as apparently disproportionate sentences imposed on the basis 
of the offenders’ record. 
6 In accordance with the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
7 See sections 6(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, as replicated in section 35(1) of the PCCSA 2000, and subsequently 
section 148(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
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case of a theft from a vehicle, or an element of breach of trust where the offender stole from a 
dwelling) rendered the offences sufficiently serious to justify a community sentence. 
However, quite rightly they were not viewed by the court as sufficiently serious to cross the 
custody threshold or to warrant the imposition of a more punitive community order. For 
example, the offender in case 225 had stolen an alloy wheel valued £240 from a vehicle. He 
was arrested three months’ later, having been identified by a fingerprint found on the 
vehicle. He initially denied having committed the offence, but eventually entered a guilty 
plea. He had ten previous convictions, only one of which was for theft, and was ordered to 
undertake an 18-month CRO. It seems that the penalty was chosen to reflect the seriousness 
of the offence rather than the offender’s prior convictions, most of which were of a dissimilar 
nature. Had the offender’s previous history been influential, the sentence would probably 
have been a community punishment order (CPO) or community punishment and 
rehabilitation order CPRO. 
 
The community punishment and rehabilitation order (CPRO) is one of the most punitive 
community sentences and may be expected to be imposed in some of the more serious 
thefts, perhaps where the offence lies on the cusp of the custody threshold. In genuine 
borderline cases, it seems that non-offence characteristics may influence the sentence. But 
strictly, if the offence crosses the custody threshold, non-offence characteristics should not 
be used to reduce it to a community sentence. Nevertheless, five offenders in the sample 
were ordered to undertake a CPRO, including three whose offences were sufficiently serious 
to justify the imposition of the penalty. For example, in case 230, the offender had siphoned 
fuel from a car by cutting the fuel line, thereby causing damage to the vehicle, and had 
attempted a similar offence against a second car. The offender had 14 previous convictions, 
including five thefts, and was ordered to undertake a 50-hour, one-year CPRO. This 
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sentence seems justifiable on the basis of offence seriousness, rather than the offender’s 
relatively short prior history.  
 
At first glance, two cases resulting in the imposition of a CPRO do not appear to be 
sufficiently serious to cross the community-sentence threshold. For example, the offender in 
case 280 was made the subject of a two year CPRO following a typical shoplifting involving 
confectionary valued £20. The offender had 14 previous convictions, including six thefts. The 
offender had been made the subject of a similar order five months earlier, which had been 
imposed by the Crown Court. By imposing a CPRO in this case, the Court effectively 
extended the previously imposed order. Although the offender was not formally charged for 
breach of the earlier CPRO, the latest offence effectively meant that he was de facto in breach 
of it. The court may have been influenced by this in deciding to impose a CPRO for the latest 
offence. If so, it is arguable that although in one sense the CPRO was a response to the 
offender’s previous record, in another sense, the breach of the earlier CPRO is a 
characteristic of the latest theft so that the CPRO is not a disproportionate sentence.  
 
Community sentences may also have been justified by reference to the seriousness of the 
offending on totality. Five offenders who were made the subject of a DTTO accounted for 21 
offences. For example, one offender was sentenced for six typical shopliftings of a total value 
of £390. He had seven previous convictions, only one of which was for theft. Individually, 
the offences would almost certainly not have been sufficiently serious to justify the 
imposition of a DTTO, but when considered together, the court seems to have concluded 
that the community-sentence threshold had been crossed. The sentence satisfies 




Fines were imposed in 31 cases committed by 30 offenders. The fine was most commonly 
imposed for low-value and typical shopliftings (22 cases) in which the low-value of the 
property, early admission of guilt and general lack of aggravating features no doubt led the 
court to conclude that a fine represented a proportionate response to the crime. Fines were 
also imposed in other (not retail) low value thefts, including case 158 in which the offender 
was ordered to tow away a vehicle impounded by the police. Whilst doing so, he removed a 
pair of driving gloves valued £6 from the vehicle. The offender was of previous good 
character, having no previous convictions, and was ordered to pay a £100 fine. Given the 
particularly low value of the property, a more punitive sentence (such as a community 
order) would almost certainly have been a disproportionately severe response to the 
offending. Furthermore, the fact that the offender was employed may have led the court to 
perceive him as able to pay a fine. His previous good character meant that he had not 
accumulated a pattern of offending for which he would require rehabilitation. Overall, a fine 
seems to be a proportionate response to the offence.  
 
Fines might still have been imposed for non-serious offences even where the offender had a 
lengthy criminal history, implying that prior record in itself would not necessarily lead to 
the imposition of a penalty disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence. This practice 
would comply with the 1991 Act which required the sentencing decision to be based on the 
seriousness of the offence and not in reference to the offender’s prior history. As an example, 
the offender in case 123 had 109 previous convictions including 65 for theft, and was fined 
£50 for a typical shoplifting involving the theft of property valued £20. Unlike other cases 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter,8 the sentence seems to have been based solely on the 
seriousness of the offence.  
 
                                                          
8 See sections 8.1.2 – 8.1.5 below 
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In a further group of cases, proportionality appears to dominate rehabilitative concerns. 
Firstly, it appears that the court will not be dissuaded from imposing a custodial sentence 
where the offence, which crosses the custody threshold, is committed due to the offender’s 
drug addiction, despite the fact that a drug treatment and testing order (DTTO) could enable 
rehabilitation. In case 140, the offender had stolen clothing valued £700 from a shop. The 
court imposed a four-month term of imprisonment. Arguably, the high value of the property 
was enough in itself to justify a custodial sentence. There did not appear to be any 
suggestion that the offender would not comply with a DTTO if imposed (although a pre-
sentence report may have highlighted something to the contrary), thereby suggesting that 
the sentencing decision was based more on the seriousness of the offending than on 
rehabilitating the offender.  
 
Similarly, case 134 suggests that where an offender commits a particularly trivial offence 
due to his drug addiction, the court will not necessarily impose a DTTO if the offence is 
insufficiently serious to cross the community-sentence threshold. The offender had stolen 
goods valued £2.50 from a shop, and was detained at the scene whereupon he admitted the 
offence. Although the offender had a known drug addiction and had 22 previous 
convictions for similar offending, the court imposed a £25 fine, no doubt a reflection of the 
seriousness of the offence.  
 
Likewise, in case 161, a conditional discharge was imposed on the offender who had 
committed a typical shoplifting, known to have been motivated by his drug addiction. He 
had 76 previous convictions, including 25 thefts, and was conditionally discharged for 12 
months. The offender had not been made the subject of a DTTO in the past. It is not 
understood why the court decided not to address the underlying cause of the offending 
through a rehabilitative disposal option. But, given the non-serious nature of the offence, the 
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sentence is not disproportionate. In accordance with the legislation, the court was right to 
ignore the offender’s long prior record.  
 
 
8.1.2 The Apparent Influence of the Offender’s Criminal Record 
 
The offender’s prior record was given only a limited role in the sentencing decision under 
the 1991 Act by the adoption of the principle of progressive loss of mitigation.9 However, 
according to interviews with magistrates, judges and probation officers, prior record can be 
a significant consideration at the sentencing stage, having the effect of moving the sentence 
across thresholds. The analysis of the sample of cases supported this claim. To understand 
the significance of record, it is helpful to consider four different situations. Firstly, where the 
offender has no prior record, secondly where the offender does have a prior record, thirdly 
where the offender has a recent break in offending, and finally where there is a reduction in 
the seriousness of the offending. 
 
 
8.1.2.1 No Previous Record 
 
Where an offence is on the cusp of the custody threshold, a clean record can keep the 
sentence below custody.10 For example, the offender in cases 114 and 115 had appropriated 
£1,800 from a company bank account and proceeded to close the account in an attempt to 
conceal his actions. The court imposed a 150-hour CPO. The offence, involving high value, 
breach of trust and sophisticated means, undoubtedly crossed the community-sentence 
                                                          
9 See section 2.4.1 above. 
10 M. Hough, J. Jacobson & A. Millie (2003), at 36-38. Additionally see Jacobson & Hough (2007) at 31, who concluded that 
the sentence severity tends to be reduced for an offender who has no prior criminal record. 
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threshold and may indeed have been on the cusp of the custody threshold. The court may 
have been discouraged from imposing a custodial sentence (or a more punitive community 
sentence such as a CPRO) due to the offender’s clean prior record.  
 
Having no prior record can influence the court to be apparently lenient. Three first-time 
offenders had committed some of the more serious offences resulting in a conditional 
discharge. The offender in case 066 had committed a £170 shoplifting along with a co-
offender (case 065, who herself was ordered to undertake a 12 month CRO concurrent to a 
similar order that she was already subject to); the offender in 179 had stolen goods valued 
£200 from a shop, although the offence involved no other obvious aggravation; and the 
offender in 249 had committed a £235 retail theft along with a co-offender (who herself was 
cautioned for the offence). Ultimately, the decision to discharge each offender appears to 
have been based on the offenders’ clean prior record, rather than the seriousness of the 
offence which would otherwise have justified a more punitive sentence, perhaps falling on 
the cusp of the community threshold. 
 
Having noted that community sentences would usually be considered only after the first 
few convictions,11 magistrates believed that a fine or discharge would be an adequate 
response to many first-time offences,12 which may be sufficient to deter the offender from 
further crime whilst also conforming with proportionality where the offences are not 
particularly serious. First-time offenders, having no pattern of offending, may not represent 
a risk of reoffending that would warrant the imposition of a rehabilitative sentence. A CRO 
was only imposed on one first-time offender, who was sentenced for four shopliftings 
committed during a spree (cases 104-107). The offences were individually relatively non-
                                                          
11 See section 8.1.2.2 below 
12 See section 7.2.5.1 
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serious, involving property with a total value of £80. The court imposed a six-month CRO.13 
The fact that the offender had committed the offences on a spree appears to have been taken 
as equivalent to a prior record, suggesting to the court a need to rehabilitate whilst the 
sentence also offered a proportionate response to the offence. 
 
During interviews, magistrates had cited conditional discharges as useful disposal options 
when dealing with first-time offenders for non-serious offences. It was claimed that 
discharges are cheap and less burdensome than a community sentence, but may nonetheless 
provide a sufficient deterrence against further offending by the individual. The element of 
deterrence in these conditional discharge cases is more in the nature of giving the person of 
generally good character a chance to show that the offence was a lapse, rather than a threat 
of real punishment. Interviews also pointed to a commonly held view amongst sentencers 
that a clean prior record is a significant source of mitigation, which may explain the 
imposition of conditional discharges for first-time offenders. 
 
 
8.1.2.2 Existence of a Prior Record 
 
Where an offender’s prior record demonstrates a pattern of offending, it will often inform 
the approach taken by the court in sentencing. All judges and magistrates had identified 
rehabilitation as the primary purpose of sentencing persistent offenders whose criminality is 
born from a drug or alcohol addiction. Consequently, some offenders with lengthy records 
for similar offending may be more likely than others to receive seemingly disproportionate 
but rehabilitative sentences such as CROs and DTTOs, particularly where the offence 
seriousness seems to be on the borderline between two categories of sentence. Magistrates 
                                                          
13 Separate sentences were not given for each offence.  
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had claimed that community sentences would usually be imposed only once an offender has 
accumulated a few convictions (except where the offence was particularly serious), giving 
credence to the claim that the courts may be influenced by other justifications (namely 
rehabilitative or deterrent) when sentencing persistent offenders. 
 
Section 8.1.1 identified a number of cases resulting in a community sentence, apparently 
justified on the basis of offence seriousness. Yet elsewhere in the sample, it appears that a 
community sentence may be imposed due to the offender’s criminal history rather than on 
the basis of the seriousness of the offence. A 12-month CRO was imposed upon the offender 
in case 065 following her admission to having stolen clothing valued £170 from a shop. The 
offender had ten previous convictions, including three for theft. Her co-offender had a clean 
prior record and was conditionally discharged. Since both had played an equal role in the 
offence, the difference in sentencing cannot be explained by reference to the offence. Rather, 
it must be due to a difference in the offenders’ characters. The value of the goods stolen 
probably placed the offence on the cusp of the community-sentence threshold. Whilst the co-
offender’s clean record pulled the sentence down to a discharge, the offender’s prior 
convictions appears to have had the effect of placing the sentence more firmly in the 
community-sentence bracket. 
 
Although the law requires an offence to be sufficiently serious in order to cross the 
community sentence threshold, when seeking to impose a proportionate penalty the 
boundary between a fine and a community sentence may not be particularly crisp or clear. 
Arguably, a fine can be just as punitive as a community sentence such as a CRO. Case 202 
involved a £120 retail theft committed by an offender with 180 previous convictions, 
including 88 thefts. The court imposed a 12-month CRO, despite the fact that the offender 
had been placed on probation seven times in the past, also demonstrating that the courts 
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may continue to try to rehabilitate even the most persistent offenders. Furthermore in case 
005, a six-month CRO was imposed upon an offender with 65 previous convictions, 20 of 
which were for thefts, following a £150 shoplifting. The offender had twice been placed on 
probation in the past. The PSRs in these cases may have indicated an offender characteristic 
which suggested that a shorter order could be successful in rehabilitating the offender. In 
the light of the value of the goods stolen in these cases, the sentences do not seem to have 
been disproportionate, notwithstanding the offenders’ previous convictions.  
 
Similarly to some CROs, the imposition of a CPO may not always have been justified solely 
by reference to offence seriousness. In case 129 the offender pleaded guilty to a shoplifting 
involving property valued £120. She had 64 previous convictions, over half of which were 
for similar thefts, and was ordered to complete an 80-hour CPO. The offender had a history 
of custodial sentences along with fines and discharges, but community orders had been 
imposed on her comparatively rarely. The offender had not previously been the subject of a 
CPO, and the court may have been inclined to impose a CPO in the hope that it would 
reduce her propensity to reoffend through a deterrent punishment. Although the offence 
involved the theft of moderately priced goods, the offence was in other ways a typical retail 
theft: the property was recovered at the scene and the offender immediately admitted the 
offence; there was little obvious aggravation present. The value of the goods stolen may 
have led the court to conclude that the community-sentence threshold had just been crossed, 
although the nature and length of the order may have been informed by the offender’s prior 
criminality.  
 
Case 215 appears to be a clearer illustration of prior record being used to impose a 
disproportionate sentence. The offender had committed a typical shoplifting involving 
goods worth £17, for which a proportionate sentence may have been a fine. His prior record 
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shows a recurring pattern of offending, involving breaches of community orders and 
receptions into prison as a consequence. Although the immediate offence did not appear to 
have been sufficiently serious, the court imposed a 12-month and 50-hour CPRO. It is 
possible that the PSR presented to the court may have demonstrated some hope that 
supervision and/or work within the community could be effective in reducing the 
offender’s propensity to reoffend which may have enticed the court to combine a sentence 
aimed to rehabilitate and punish the offender. 
 
It also seems that prior record can pull an offence over the custody threshold, thereby 
resulting in a disproportionate sentence. The sample included three cases resulting in a 
suspended sentence; two imposed by the magistrates’ court and one in the Crown Court.14 
The two magistrates’ cases were typical shopliftings, which ordinarily would not have 
crossed the custody threshold on the basis of seriousness owing to a lack of aggravating 
features. In case 051, the offender had stolen property valued £100 from a shop. She was 
detained at the scene, the property was recovered and an admission of guilt was made. The 
court suspended a 28-day period of imprisonment for six months. The offender had been 
made the subject of a CRO one year earlier, which was breached six months later following 
reconviction for shoplifting. As a result, the court revoked the CRO and resentenced her to a 
period of imprisonment. Since then, the offender had been imprisoned on a further occasion, 
again for shoplifting. The decision to impose a suspended sentence seems to have been 
based on both the offender’s prior history and offence seriousness. Whilst the court may not 
have believed that the gravity of the offence justified imposing a term of immediate 
imprisonment, the offender’s previous sentences had demonstrated an unwillingness to 
comply with community orders. This may have discouraged the court from imposing 
further community sentences even though such a penalty may have been a prima facie 
                                                          
14 The Crown Court case resulting in a suspended sentence is discussed above in section 8.1.1 
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proportionate response to the offence.  If this was indeed the case, it would be evidence of 
the courts imposing suspended sentences even where the custody threshold is not crossed, 
perhaps viewing them instead as a non-custodial sentencing option which can thereby be 
imposed for cases only crossing the community-sentence threshold but falling short of the 
custody threshold.15  
 
Similarly, case 073 involved a typical shoplifting of goods valued £100 which resulted in the 
imposition of a suspended sentence. It is unlikely that the offence justified the imposition of 
a custodial sentence based on offence seriousness, and that a factor relating to the offender’s 
character or circumstances may be attributable to the sentencing decision. It was not possible 
to see the offender’s criminal history record, but it may be that this played a role in 
determining the sentence. The fact that the offences do not seem to have been sufficiently 
serious to cross the custody threshold may mean that the court again regarded a suspended 
sentence as akin to a community sentence. The suspended sentence does not fit well in a 
proportionality-based framework. On the one hand, it is to be regarded as a custodial 
penalty, carrying the threat of imprisonment upon reconviction. But in reality it is a non-
punitive sentence; the main punishment comes where the offender reoffends during the 
operational period, leading to activation of the sentence. In this regard, the suspended 
sentence is akin to a conditional discharge and therefore may not be disproportionately 
severe when imposed for offences which do not cross the custody threshold. 
 
When sentencing offenders with drug addictions, the courts will often seek to rehabilitate 
the offender through the imposition of a DTTO, providing that the offence is does not cross 
the custody threshold or is so trivial that a community sentence would be overtly 
                                                          
15 These concerns that suspended sentences could be imposed for cases only warranting a community sentence were 
raised in Bottoms (1981), at 15. 
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disproportionate.16 The sample included 35 cases (committed by 18 offenders) resulting in a 
DTTO; all involving thefts from shops. Twenty-four cases (committed by 14 offenders) 
involved typical shopliftings where the value of the property stolen was below £100. As 
relatively non-serious offences, the decision to impose a community sentence may not have 
been justified on the basis of offence seriousness.17 It was common for offenders subjected to 
a DTTO to have numerous similar previous convictions, demonstrating a pattern of 
offending due to their addictions, which may have influenced the court to impose a DTTO in 
the hope of rehabilitating the offender. For example, the offender in case 112 had committed 
a typical retail theft involving property valued £23. The gravity of the theft would point to 
no more than a fine on the basis of proportionate sentencing. He had 77 previous 
convictions, including 35 for theft. The court imposed a 12 month DTTO. The interviews 
showed a view unanimously held by all sentencers that the courts should aim to rehabilitate 
those who persistently offend due to a drug or alcohol dependency,18 although the court 
should pay regard to whether the offender’s addiction is susceptible to treatment in 
accordance with section 52(3) of the PCCSA 2000.  
 
Although it is rare to find cases where the courts appear to undertake a ‘ratcheting’ 
approach to sentencing (that is, a more punitive penalty is imposed on an offender for each 
subsequent conviction), such a practice does appear to have occurred in case 103. The 
offender had stolen clothing valued £50 from a shop. Upon being detained on the premises, 
he eventually admitted the offence and the property was recovered. He had five previous 
convictions, four of which were for shopliftings, resulting chronologically in a fine, 
conditional discharge, community rehabilitation order and three months’ imprisonment. For 
                                                          
16 See section 8.1.1 above. 
17 Where the offence was trivial, the court may have been dissuaded from imposing a DTTO, even where the offence was a 
consequence of the offender’s drug addiction. In case 134, the offender had committed theft from a shop, having stolen 
goods valued £2.50. The court ordered the offender to pay a £25 fine rather than imposing a DTTO. The offence may have 
been too trivial to justify the imposition of a community sentence. 
18 See section 7.2.1 
292 
 
the current offence, the court ordered the offender to serve four months’ in prison, which 
appears to be disproportionately severe. With all prior convictions being dated in the 
previous 12 months, the offender was relatively new to crime. It is possible that the court 
had been seeking to deter the offender from continuing his criminal behaviour by imposing 
progressively more punitive sentences. 
 
Whilst it appears that prior record may affect the type of sentence imposed, it can also have 
the effect of increasing the duration of a community-sentence beyond what a strictly 
proportionate approach would necessitate. CROs contained in the sample ranged from six to 
24-months in duration, although the length of the order did not appear to necessarily reflect 
the gravity of the offence. Twelve cases resulted in the imposition of 18-month or 24-month 
orders, which included some of the more serious offences.19 However, long orders were also 
imposed for typical shopliftings committed by offenders with substantial criminal records, 
again indicating that gravity is informed by both offence and offender factors. Case 169 
involved the typical shoplifting of goods worth £70. The offender had 110 previous 
convictions, 66 of which were for similar offences, and was made the subject of a 24-month 
CRO. Similarly, an 18-month order was imposed in case 137 following a £75 typical 
shoplifting committed by an offender with 106 previous convictions including 33 thefts. 
Where an offender has a sustained pattern of offending, the court may believe that only a 
lengthy order would provide adequate opportunity to successfully rehabilitate the offender 
and reduce her propensity to reoffend. But from a purely proportionality perspective the 
CROs in these cases should probably have been no more than half the durations that were 
imposed.   
 
                                                          
19 For example, cases 024 and 025 concerned an offender who had removed CCTV cameras worth £750 from two business 
premises. The offences were clearly planned and the offender had gone to the scene equipped to commit the thefts. 
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Further evidence of prior history informing the duration of an order can be found in cases 
027, 028 and 029. Three offenders had climbed a fence and stole scrap metal from a 
merchant’s yard at 2.00am. Each offender was made the subject of a four-month night 
curfew, except for the offender in case 029 whose curfew was ordered to run for five 
months, perhaps due to his lengthy criminal record: whereas the offenders in cases 027 and 
028 had six and seven previous theft convictions respectively, the offender in 029 had 39 
previous convictions for similar offences. No doubt the fact that the offence occurred in the 
early morning influenced the court to impose curfews, which would restrict the liberty of 
the offenders and incapacitate them from committing further offences at similar times of the 
day, whilst the offences were serious enough to cross the community sentence threshold. 
Although the offence seems to have been sufficiently serious to cross the community-
sentence threshold, if a four-month curfew was proportionate to the gravity of the offence, 
the court should not have imposed a longer order on the offender in case 029 on the basis of 
his prior record. Conversely, if the court believed that a five-month curfew was a 
proportionate response to the offence, the offenders in cases 027 and 028 should not have 
received a discounted sentence for previous good character; their previous histories were 
substantial enough for any mitigation afforded for previous good character to have been 
exhausted under the principle of progressive loss of mitigation. 
 
 
8.1.2.3 Recent Break in Offending 
 
It seems that a break in offending can ease the severity of the sentence. Conditional 
discharges were commonplace in the sample, being imposed in 39 cases involving 37 
offenders. 33 of these cases were ‘typical’ (and often very low valued) shopliftings, although 
conditional discharges were also imposed in two more serious shopliftings involving goods 
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valued £200 and £235 (cases 176 and 249 respectively). Whether the cases were typical or 
more aggravated forms of the offence, it was very common for the offender to have had a 
substantial break in offending prior to the commission of the current offence. In 16 of the 39 
cases, the offender had a break in offending of between one and eight years. A further four 
cases involved offenders with one or no previous convictions. In either set of circumstances, 
although the offence factors suggest a fine would be more proportionate, the court may have 
been led to conclude that the offender posed a low-level risk of reoffending, who did not 
require a rehabilitative or punitively-deterrent sentence, and for whose offence a discharge 
was sufficient.  
 
 
8.1.2.4 Reduction in the Seriousness of Offending  
 
Similarly, where the latest offence reveals a reduction in the seriousness of an offender’s 
offending, the court may opt for a lower sentence category. In case 052, the offender had 
stolen goods valued £100 from a shop, property which was not recovered. The offender had 
recently been released from custody following his imprisonment for an unrelated burglary. 
The value of the property together with the fact that it was unrecovered, may have justified 
a community sentence. There was nothing in the file to explain why the court felt a 
discharge was adequate, although interviews with probation officers indicated a view that 
offenders should receive mitigation where their current offence is less serious than offences 







8.1.3 Offender Circumstances 
 
In section 8.1.2.2 it was suggested that the courts sometimes impose a community sentence 
such as a DTTO when sentencing drug addicts even though that seems disproportionate to 
their offence; the courts’ rationale for this is presumably the desire to rehabilitate the 
offender. There were also cases in the sample where the court effectively allowed such an 
order, which had been imposed on a previous court appearance, to continue and did this by 
conditionally discharging the offender for the latest theft. Again this effectively gives 
rehabilitation priority over proportionality possibly, though not necessarily, to the point of 
ignoring proportionality entirely. In six cases, a conditional discharge was imposed on an 
offender who was subject to another order (either a CRO or a DTTO) which was ordered to 
continue to run and could be justified on rehabilitative grounds. Each of these earlier orders 
had only recently been imposed and had not been running for long enough to be effective in 
reducing the offenders’ propensity to reoffend. The courts had conditionally discharged the 
offender for the latest theft and ordered the earlier sentence to continue seemingly so as to 
give it a chance to be effective. As an example, the offender in case 026 had committed a 
typical shoplifting involving goods valued £38, for which a fine would probably have been 
proportionate. The previously imposed DTTO was left to run, and the court conditionally 
discharged the offender for the latest offence. A further two cases concerned offenders with 
drug addictions who had demonstrated remorse for their offending and had voluntarily 
sought drug treatment, with which the court may not have wished to interfere by imposing 
anything more burdensome than a discharge. For example, the court conditionally 
discharged the offender in case 149 following his guilty plea for a £40 typical shoplifting. 
The offender had 23 similar previous convictions and had voluntarily sought drug 
treatment. Whereas in other cases, previous convictions may lead the court to impose a 
prima facie disproportionately punitive order, here the offender was discharged so that his 
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drug addiction could be addressed. In that regard, the sentence was both rehabilitative and 
not obviously disproportionate.  
 
Other aspects of an offender’s circumstances can apparently also persuade the court to 
impose a fine when a community sentence would probably have been more proportionate. 
The court’s purpose in doing this seems to be crime prevention. The sample included two 
cases resulting in a fine for which a community sentence was probably justifiable. The 
court’s decision may have been informed by the offender’s previous good character, which 
seems to have pulled the offence below the community-sentence threshold. For example, 
case 210 involved an employee of a warehouse who attempted to leave the work premises 
prior to the end of his shift. He was found to be carrying electronics valued £250 and was 
fined £100. The value along with the breach of trust would probably have justified the 
imposition of a community sentence. Prima facie, the sentence seems disproportionately 
lenient. A possible explanation for this is that the court was keen for the offender to take 
advantage of being in employment in the hope that this would bring stability to his life and 
thus prevent him from reoffending. 
 
At times, the court seems to have no choice but to impose a disproportionately lenient 
sentence. Two cases in the sample resulted in the imposition of an absolute discharge, both 
of which seem to be disproportionately lenient.20 In case 037, the offender was convicted of 
theft from a vehicle, involving significant damage and £170 loss. No doubt the offence 
would ordinarily have warranted a more punitive disposal, but at the time of sentencing, the 
offender was serving five years’ imprisonment for an unrelated burglary.21 The offender’s 
incarceration would have limited the disposal options available to the courts for the current 
offence. A proportionate sentence for the current offence would probably have been a 
                                                          
20 One of these involved a young offender and is discussed at section 8.2.2 
21 This case is dealt with in detail in section 5.14 above. 
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community sentence, but it was impossible to impose such a sentence because the offender 
was serving a prison sentence at the time. The court could have imposed either a short 
consecutive custodial sentence or a discharge for the theft.22 Further custody would have 
been disproportionately severe, perhaps explaining why the court opted for a discharge.  
 
Conversely, the offender’s circumstances may effectively force the court to impose a 
disproportionately tough sentence. Cases 038 and 039 involved two offenders who were on 
prison licence at the time the offences took place. Both resulted in the imposition of 14-day 
custodial sentences. Both cases involved typical shopliftings which would not ordinarily 
cross the custody threshold. No doubt the sentences were determined in reference to the 
prison licence terms (namely that the offender would risk re-imprisonment upon 
reconviction) rather than on the seriousness of the offences. 
 
 
8.1.4 Clearly Disproportionate Sentences 
 
Both magistrates and probation officers expressed a desire to rehabilitate an offender who 
suffers from a drug dependency. However, the magistrates had also said that a DTTO 
would only be imposed where it appeared there was a chance of it successfully treating an 
offender’s dependency.23 This is consistent with the legislation which states that a DTTO 
should only be imposed where an offender’s addiction is susceptible to treatment.24  
 
But if the offender does not show a willingness to comply with a DTTO, then it seems that 
the court may impose a custodial sentence which is prima facie disproportionately severe to 
                                                          
22 A conditional discharge would have been inappropriate as the only condition to be attached (that the offender will not 
reoffend during the operational period of the discharge) is redundant whilst the offender is incarcerated.  
23 See section 7.2.5.1 
24 As re-enacted in section 52(3) PCCSA 2000 
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the gravity of the offence. In such cases, a fine may be a proportionate sentence, but the 
offender’s record pulls this beyond the community threshold, and the offender’s 
unwillingness to comply with a community sentence again pulls the sentence up into the 
custody bracket. In case 021, the offender had refused help from a member of the drug 
referral team at the police station following his arrest for a typical shoplifting involving 
goods valued £17. The offender had 35 previous convictions, around half of which were for 
theft, and was imprisoned for two months. It does not appear that the gravity of the offence 
had justified the imposition of a custodial sentence. Rather, the decision to imprison had 
been based on the offender’s unwillingness to comply with a DTTO. Given the offender’s 
prior record, no doubt the court was willing to impose a community sentence aimed at 
rehabilitating him. The courts may take the view that where an offender is unwilling to 
comply with one order, this is indicative of a wider unwillingness to comply with any 
order.25 Since he was unwilling to accept treatment, the court may have sought to 
incapacitate him whilst he posed a high risk of reoffending. During interviews, magistrates 
had indicated that a failure by the offender to comply with previous community sentences 
may by necessity lead to the imposition of a custodial sentence.  
 
Similarly, the offender in cases 094 and 095 was sentenced to serve seven-day concurrent 
prison terms for two low-value shopliftings (£11 and £6 respectively). The decision to 
imprison was unlikely to have been made on the basis of offence seriousness – a fine would 
have been a more proportionate response - but the court seems to have been influenced by 
the offender’s prolific recent offending record, which included nine convictions (five 
shopliftings) in the preceding twelve months. That being said, the offender had not been 
made the subject of a community sentence since 1994 (which was not breached). In the 
                                                          
25 C.f. the views expressed by probation officers, who suggested that they would not disregard an offender who is unwilling 
to comply with one order. 
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circumstances therefore, it seems odd that the court did not consider a community order in 
an attempt to halt the offender’s criminality.26 
 
 
8.1.5 Apparently Perverse Sentences 
 
In some cases resulting in a custodial sentence, the decision appears to have been based on 
the seriousness of the offence, whilst the offender’s record or circumstances appears to have 
been heavily influential in other cases. In a third group of cases resulting in custody, the 
reasoning behind the decision to imprison cannot be determined on the basis of the gravity 
of the offence or the offender’s prior record. In cases 121 and 122, two co-offenders had 
stolen goods valued at £40 from a shop. Once detained, they both fully admitted the offence 
and entered early guilty pleas. Other than the fact that the offence was committed by a 
group (a pair), there was little apparent aggravation and the offence was in other ways 
typical. The offender in 122, a 31-year-old male with 38 previous convictions including nine 
thefts, was placed under a four-month curfew. The 23-year-old co-offender (case 121) on the 
other hand, who had 19 previous convictions including 12 for theft, was sentenced to serve 
one month imprison. There was no suggestion in the CPS case file that the offender in 121 
was in some way more culpable, or had played a different role than his co-offender, which 
would explain the decision to impose a custodial sentence upon only one of the offenders. In 
the absence of information to the contrary, it was assumed that each party played an equal 
role in the commission of the crime: were this not the case, the particulars of the offence 
contained in the prosecution file would have been expected to more accurately reflect the 
actual roles played by each of the parties. The different sentences imposed upon each co-
offender could not therefore be explained by reference to offence seriousness. This was a low 
                                                          
26 One might speculate that there was information available to the court, perhaps in a PSR, indicating that the offender was 
unwilling to cooperate with a community sentence or was otherwise unsuitable. 
300 
 
value theft, albeit aggravated by the fact that it was committed by two offenders, and a 
proportionate sentence would be a community penalty at most. Imprisonment in case 121 
therefore seems disproportionately severe. Further, the difference in sentence cannot be 
explained by reference to prior convictions as both offenders had lengthy records. 
 
An example of an overtly disproportionately lenient fine can be found in case 213. The 
offender stole a handbag and its contents valued £30 from a parked vehicle, breaking a 
window in the process. Upon being later detained, he denied the offence and proceeded to 
plead not guilty. He had 58 previous convictions dating back to 1974, including 12 for theft. 
Although the offender had a long criminal history, he had only one court appearance in the 
previous year. The seriousness of the offence, along with the not guilty plea, probably would 
have been sufficient to justify the imposition of community sentence (e.g. a CPO) but the 
sentence was a mere £75 fine. One can only speculate why the court determined a fine as an 
adequate punishment. The offender had not previously been ordered to undertake a CPO, 
which may suggest that he was assessed as unsuitable for work in the community. The 
spasmodic pattern of his offending may have led the court to believe that it was not 
necessary to attempt to rehabilitate him. 
 
 
8.2 Young Offenders 
 
Proportionality plays a less central role in the sentencing of young offenders, particularly 
first-time young offenders who must be referred to a youth offending panel following a 
guilty plea, unless the gravity of the offence warrants either a custodial sentence or 
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discharge, suggesting a degree of proportionality.27 Between these two extremes, all offences 
committed by first-time young offenders who plead guilty must be dealt with by way of a 
referral order, even for offences whose seriousness falls just short of the custody threshold 
and those on the cusp of a discharge. The effect of this is that the referral order may be 
imposed against a wide range of offences of varying degrees of seriousness. 
 
Other than in relation to first-time young offenders, the sentencing hierarchy in youth justice 
is broadly analogous to that for adult offenders. Custodial and community sentences may 
only be imposed where the seriousness of the offence crosses the appropriate threshold; the 
same thresholds as are applicable to adult offenders.  
 
 
8.2.1 Upholding the Welfare of the Young Offender 
 
For all young offenders, whether first-time or persistent, the principal aim of the youth 
justice system is to “prevent offending by children and young persons”28 whilst also “having 
regard to the welfare of the child”.29 This latter requirement may mean that the courts are 
less likely to impose a custodial sentence upon a young offender, preferring instead to 
impose a rehabilitative and supportive disposal option, which at the same time does not risk 
exposing the child to the potentially damaging effects of imprisonment. In interviews, those 
sentencers who had experience of dealing with young offenders indicated that crime 
reduction is paramount. Rehabilitation and support will usually be offered, but when 
dealing with very persistent young offenders, the courts’ attention seems to shift to a 
deterrence and public-protection model. There was considerably less suggestion made that 
                                                          
27 Section 16 PCCSA 2000 
28 Section 37 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
29 Section 44 Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
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the courts will pay high regard to the seriousness of the offence, and therefore may not be 
primarily concerned with upholding proportionality. 
 
As outlined above, the referral order is the mandatory disposal for young offenders who 
plead guilty at their first prosecution, provided that the court does not propose to impose 
either custody or an absolute discharge based on the seriousness of the offence. Provided 
they are completed, referral orders do not count as a conviction, so the young offender may 
avoid a criminal record along with its corresponding potential alienation and stigma. Its 
purpose is to support and rehabilitate so as to promote and encourage a crime-free life. 
Referral orders were imposed in 20 cases in the sample, 11 of which were committed by first 
time young offenders. Indeed, all first-time young offenders in the sample were referred to 
the youth offending panel, implying that none of the thefts committed by first-time young 
offenders were sufficiently serious to warrant imprisonment, but neither would an absolute 
discharge be appropriate. Offences committed by first-time young offenders tended to be 
low-value thefts from shops, but the theft of a vehicle valued £600 in case 093, and letters 
containing a credit card and PIN belonging to the offender’s mother which were used to 
withdraw £750 from the victim’s account in case 170 also resulted in referral. The relatively 
high value in these two cases did not dissuade the court from imposing a referral order. 
During interview, the judges and experienced magistrates said that the courts will try to 
avoid imprisoning young offenders so far as this is possible, suggesting that the custody 
threshold is set higher for young offenders. At first sight, the imposition of a referral order 
in these two cases may seem a disproportionately lenient response to the offending, but a 
detention and training order would have been the only alternative penalty available to the 
court as the offenders had no prior criminal record. The offences were almost certainly 
sufficiently serious to justify a custodial sentence but, mindful of the need for rehabilitation 
and support whilst safeguarding the welfare of the child, the courts may have wanted to 
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spare these young offenders from serving a custodial term and the alienation and social and 
educational impact such an experience may have upon them. 
 
The desire to give priority to welfare may be so strong that the courts may be led to refer 
young offenders even where they should not do so.30 The courts imposed nine referral 
orders on young offenders with one previous conviction, despite the fact that no such power 
existed at the time.31 In four of these cases, the offenders were subject to active referral 
orders which were effectively extended by the imposition of further referral orders for the 
current offences, although (again) at the time of sentencing there was no legislative power to 
legitimise this practice. For example, the offender in cases 187 and 188 had committed two 
typical retail thefts valued £24 and £34 respectively. The referral order imposed for her only 
previous conviction was extended by eight months. In a further three cases, the offender had 
completed the earlier referral order and the offences seemed to cross the community-
sentence threshold. As an example, the offender in case 222 had stolen goods valued £240 
from a shop. Owing to the relative seriousness of these offences, one would have expected 
them to result in supervision orders, but the imposition of this would have necessitated the 
revocation of the existing referral orders which might have been undesirable if the offender 
was progressing well under the order. The fourth case, in which the offender had stolen £20 
dropped on the street by the victim, does not appear to cross the community-sentence 
threshold, and ought to have resulted in a reparation order, fine or discharge. The obvious 
implication from these four cases is that the courts were exclusively concerned with 
rehabilitation and support.  
 
 
                                                          
30 Although it cannot be said with certainty that the courts were aware that in doing so they were acting ultra vires.  
31 When brought into force in April 2009, section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 enhanced the courts’ 
powers to refer a young offender in cases where the offender has been dealt with by a court on one previous occasion, and 
in exceptional circumstances even where the previous conviction(s) was dealt with by way of a referral order. 
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8.2.2 Purely Rehabilitative Sentences 
 
There was evidence of cases in the sample where the sentence was motivated by 
rehabilitation with little regard to proportionality. The supervision order was the most 
commonly imposed penalty for young offenders with one or more previous convictions. Of 
the 15 cases resulting in supervision (committed by 14 offenders), 12 involved offenders 
with two or more previous convictions. 11 of these were typical shopliftings or otherwise 
low-value thefts,32 and from a proportionality perspective, the offence perhaps did not 
warrant a community sentence.33 The decision to impose a supervision order in these cases 
appears to be based not on the seriousness of the offences, but rather on the offenders’ 
record and the unavailability of the referral order as a disposal option. Where the young 
offender has a criminal history, the courts appear more intent on imposing a rehabilitative 
sentence, thereby upholding the principal crime-preventive aim of the youth justice system, 
albeit at the cost of proportionality.  
 
Only one young offender received an absolute discharge following a low-value retail theft. 
At the time of sentencing, the offender was already subject to a supervision order imposed 
for an earlier offence. The sentence seems disproportionately lenient, but may have been 
selected so as not to interfere with the pre-existing supervision order. That being said, a 
conditional discharge could have been imposed for the same purpose, but by upholding the 
existing supervision order, the court’s emphasis was on rehabilitation rather than deterrence 
which is usually associated with a conditional discharge.  
 
                                                          
32 For example, case 224 involving a 12-year-old offender who stole goods valued £10 from a shop. He was made the 
subject of a supervision order of an unknown duration. 
33 The remaining case (009) involved the theft of goods valued £310 from a shop. Details of the offender’s previous 
convictions were not available, but the offender was described as a persistent young offender. The decision to impose a six 
month supervision order was most likely based upon the offender’s prior record, although it might also have been 




8.2.3 Crime Prevention and Proportionality 
 
There were also some cases where the sentence reflected both a desire to rehabilitate the 
offender and impose a proportionate sentence. In addition to referral orders, supervision 
orders were also imposed against young offenders with only one previous conviction. The 
offender in case 013 had stolen a bankcard belonging to her grandmother and had used it to 
withdraw £300 from the victim’s account. She had one previous conviction (for theft) and 
was placed under supervision for 18 months. In case 040, the offender had stolen a mobile 
telephone from his teacher’s coat pocket whilst the victim was out of the classroom. Finally, 
the offender in case 250 had stolen £2.50 from a washing machine in a coin-operated 
laundrette, causing £600 worth of damage in the process. Although the offender had only 
one previous conviction, the court imposed a six month supervision order, no doubt a 
reflection of the gravity of the offence and the significant damage caused. Although the 
sentences in these three cases were probably selected primarily on the basis of rehabilitation, 
the supervision orders imposed in each also represented a proportionate response to the 
seriousness of the offence.  
 
Overall, the practice of discharging young offenders seemed consistent with that applied to 
adult offenders. The courts are likely to conditionally discharge minor offending where 
there is a break in offending, or where an offender is subject to a pre-existing order which 
the court wishes to continue to run. Five persistent young offenders in the sample were 
discharged for their offences. All offences were non-serious (tending to be low-value, typical 
shopliftings). Four of the five offenders had a significant break in offending (of between one 
and three years) preceding the current offence, which seems to reflect the apparent general 
practice of the courts to discharge offenders who have committed non-serious thefts and 
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have a noticeable break in their offending.34 Each of these four offenders was conditionally 
discharged.  
 
There seems to be evidence of a broad analogy with sentencing adult offenders in that an 
offender’s record may deter the court from giving him the benefit of any doubt about the 
offence seriousness. In case 228, the offender was fined £25 having stolen property valued 
£2.50 from a shop. On a purely proportionate basis, the appropriate sentence would 
probably have been a conditional discharge due to the very low value of the theft. But it 
seems that the offender’s previous convictions persuaded the court to impose a fine. This is 
not overtly disproportionate, but may well reflect the court’s desire to deter the offender.  
 
 
8.2.4 Purely Proportionate Sentences 
 
It is difficult to judge from cases in the sample whether there were any instances in which 
the courts sought to sentence a young offender purely on the basis of proportionality. 
Perhaps the nearest example of this was in cases 089 and 229 which resulted in the 
imposition of reparation orders. Both involved typical shopliftings and the offenders had 
one and two previous convictions respectively. The court rightly felt that the offences were 
not sufficiently serious to justify a community sentence, and that effectively dissuaded the 
court from imposing a supervision order. There is clearly an element of punishment in the 
reparation order in the sense that the offender has to face up to the effects of his offence. But 
there is arguably also an element of crime prevention in that the offender may either be 
rehabilitated or deterred from further offending by the realisation of what he has done. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that there were other similar cases in the sample 
                                                          
34 See section 8.2.2 above 
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involving typical shopliftings committed by offenders with short criminal records which 
were dealt with by supervision orders, where more priority seems to be given to 
rehabilitation than proportionality. 
 
 
8.2.5 Custodial Sentencing 
 
When imposing a custodial sentence, the same statutory criteria exist in relation to young 
offenders as that found for adult offenders. In other words, a detention and training order 
(the youth justice custodial sentence) should be imposed only where the offence is so serious 
that a non-custodial sentence cannot be justified. But in practice it appears that even in cases 
which are not especially serious, the presence of a very lengthy record can take the sentence 
from a community sentence into the custody bracket. Consequently, both proportionality 
and rehabilitation are abandoned as sentencing aims, and instead the court seeks to deter 
and incapacitate. Four cases committed by three individuals in the sample resulted in the 
court imposing a detention and training order. The offender in cases 109 and 110 was 
convicted of two shopliftings. In the first case, acting as part of a group, he had stolen spirits 
value £17 from an off-licence. His co-offenders were not caught, and the offender refused to 
name the other parties. He pleaded not guilty to the offence, admitting that he was at the 
scene, but denied having any part in the theft. In case 110, the same offender pleaded guilty 
to a typical shoplifting involving the theft of goods valued £35. The court imposed a four 
month detention and training order for each count, ordered to run concurrently. Since the 
first offence had taken place a few months before the second, the offences did not constitute 
a single transaction, and so should have been dealt with by consecutive sentences. 
(Ultimately, the same sentence - i.e. four months’ imprisonment - could have been reached 
by imposing two consecutive sentences of two months duration.) The offender had 62 
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previous convictions, including 12 thefts, and had recently completed an 18-month 
supervision order, which may have dissuaded the court from imposing a further 
supervision order on the basis that the earlier order had not reduced his propensity to 
offend. Although neither of the offences was particularly serious, the court may have been 
led to take a more punitive approach because of the lack of the offender’s cooperation in 
refusing to name his co-offenders. Additionally, his not guilty plea would deny the offender 
an important source of mitigation. The offender’s prior record and previous sentences may 
also have influenced the court’s decision to impose a custodial sentence. The sentence 
appears to be disproportionately punitive, but the court may have sought to deter the 
offender from future criminality. The recent supervision order had not successfully 
rehabilitated him and that probably dissuaded the court from adopting a rehabilitative 
approach for the latest offence.  
 
The potential influence of a young offender’s record was also seen in case 212 in which the 
court imposed a six month detention and training order. The offender pleaded guilty to a 
typical shoplifting involving property worth £48. Again, the decision does not appear to 
reflect the gravity of the offence. Unlike other typical shopliftings committed by young 
offenders, the offender in 212 had five court appearances in the current year for offences 
which resulted in a fine, two separate periods of supervision (both of which were breached), 
and an attendance centre order. The court seemed to have felt that since the previous 
sentences had been tried and failed, the offender was beyond any prospect of rehabilitation. 
This resulted in the court imposing a disproportionately punitive custodial sentence for an 






8.2.6 Offender Circumstances 
 
It seems that, occasionally at least, the offender’s circumstances may influence the 
sentencing of a young offender. In case 251, the court also imposed a detention and training 
order on one of two offenders who had stolen £2.50 from a laundrette. It appeared from the 
CPS file that both offenders were equally culpable. One offender (case 250) was placed 
under supervision whilst the offender in 251 was ordered to serve a four month detention 
and training order, to run concurrently to a 12-month order for an unrelated robbery. By 
imposing a supervision order on one offender, the court had rightly accepted that the 
offence itself was not sufficiently serious to justify the imposition of a custodial sentence. 
Rather, the decision to imprison was surely made because of the offender’s present 
incarceration for the earlier robbery and the restrictions this would place on the offender’s 
availability to undertake supervision or a similar order within the community. Had the 
offender in case 251 not been incarcerated for another offence, the court may have concluded 
that a supervision order would have been suitable for him also. 
 
The 15-year-old offender in case 071 had one previous conviction (dated two years earlier) 
and was fined £25 for stealing property valued £35 from a shop, which seemed to be a 
proportionate sentence. But the sentencing decision may have been influenced more on an 
offender circumstance (such as their ability to personally pay a fine), rather than being based 
on the seriousness of the offence. Similar offences elsewhere in the sample (wrongly) 
resulted in referral orders. Where a young offender is able to pay a fine, this might present 
an attractive sentencing option to the courts as it is punitive whilst also being of deterrent 
benefit as the offender himself will be responsible for paying the fine. Fines are also 
economical as they do not carry the high costs associated with imposing community 
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sentences. In case 071, it may well be that the offender’s ability to personally pay the fine 
was a factor which confirmed the courts desire to impose a proportionate sentence. 
 
 
8.2.7 An ‘Odd’ Case 
 
Sometimes the precise details of a sentence were difficult to rationalise. In case 014, the 
offender had stolen £3 from a desk drawer, where he worked as a part-time cleaner. The 
offender had one previous conviction for criminal damage. Although there was an element 
of breach of trust, the theft was very low-value, and yet the court appears to have viewed 
the offence as quite serious, imposing a 15-hour ACO. Not only did the court seem to believe 
the offence was sufficiently serious to cross the community-sentence threshold, but it also 
seems to have regarded the offence as seriousness enough to warrant the imposition of an 
order of a length exceeding the standard maximum 12-hour order.35 Arguably, a fine would 
have been a proportionate sentence, and so it seems that a 15-hour ACO was clearly 
disproportionate. It is difficult to draw any confident conclusions about this case but it may 
be that the court had information suggesting that the offender required a real effort to be 
made in improving his social skills and thereby to prevent further offending.  
 
 
8.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has indicated that some sentences are imposed proportionately to the offence in 
accordance with the 1991 Act’s sentencing framework, which construed proportionality by 
                                                          
35 According to section 60(4) PCCSA 2000, the length of the order must not exceed 12 hours unless, having regard for all of 
the circumstances, the court is of the opinion that 12 hours would be inadequate, in which case an order not exceeding 24 
hours may be imposed on an offender aged under 16. See further section 2.5.2.9 above. 
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reference to offence characteristics. This was true across a range of categories of theft and 
sentences. Furthermore, it seems that the desire for proportionality can, in certain 
circumstances, can take precedence over other sentencing aims (e.g. rehabilitation), such as 
where a drug addict is fined or imprisoned on the basis of the seriousness of the offence, 
despite the fact that such offenders may ordinarily be candidates for a rehabilitative 
approach. 
 
The offender’s criminal record can be influential in various ways. Where the offence 
seriousness puts the sentence on the border between two categories, an absence of previous 
convictions can persuade the court to opt for the lower category. The court sees such 
offenders as posing less risk of further offending and may opt for the less punitive sentences 
which are cheaper and less burdensome on both the state and the offender. Conversely, a 
criminal record can, in some instances, persuade the court to push the sentence into a higher 
category. It can certainly deter the court from giving offenders the benefit of any doubt in 
cases on the border between sentence categories, and may also influence the length or 
amount of the sentence. Provided the offence is not especially serious or minor, a record can 
induce the court to emphasise the need for rehabilitation or crime prevention, possibly at the 
cost of proportionality. Alternatively, where the offender’s record shows a break in 
offending, the courts may be inclined to impose a less punitive sentence, for example by 
conditionally discharging the offender instead of fining him. Similarly, where the latest 
offence reveals a reduction in the seriousness of an offender’s criminality, the court may 
show some leniency and opt for a lower sentencing category. 
 
The offender’s circumstances can be very influential, with some cases being dealt with 
disproportionately severely or leniently for the sake of rehabilitation. Elsewhere, 
circumstances can prevent a proportionate response from being imposed where an offender 
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is currently serving a sentence which places limitations on the available penalties. Of 
particular noteworthiness, it seems that occasionally the courts impose quite dramatically 
disproportionately severe sentences – for example, by imposing a custodial sentence when a 
fine would have been the appropriate proportionate penalty – through a combination of the 
offender’s record and his unwillingness to comply with court orders. 
 
When sentencing young offenders, there is considerable evidence that, as required by the 
legislation, the courts are primarily concerned with achieving crime prevention (especially 
through rehabilitation, but also through deterrence and incapacitation) whilst being mindful 
of the offender’s welfare. Whilst there appeared to be cases where prevention and welfare 
were compatible with proportionality, there were surely others where there was no such 
compatibility, and the courts gave preference to prevention and welfare. Moreover, there 
seemed to be cases where the courts disregarded proportionality, and rehabilitation, on the 
basis of an offender’s record, and imposed a custodial sentence on a young offender. The 
justification in such cases is believed to the desire to reduce the offender’s incidence of 
crime. This meant that some cases were dealt with disproportionately severely (for example, 
supervision orders or detention and training orders for low-value retail thefts) whilst other 
sentences are disproportionately lenient (for example, referral orders imposed on first-time 
offenders whose offences are on the cusp of the custody threshold).  
 
Despite the differences between sentencing and sentencing policy with regard to young and 
adult offenders, there exists some evidence of similarities. In some cases of both groups of 
offenders, the courts will try to control crime within the confines of proportionality, whereas 
in other cases the need to control crime can eclipse proportionality as the primary sentencing 
justification. Some factors were present in both the adult and young offender samples which 
appear to have the same impact on sentencing. A recent break in offending is likely to be 
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viewed by the courts as significant mitigation, regardless of whether the offender is an adult 
or youth. Restrictions on sentence combinations in cases where the offender is currently 
subject to an order will similarly impact the sentencing decision in the same way despite the 
age of the offender. There was also evidence that the offender’s criminal record can be a 













9.1 The Elasticity of Proportionality and its Compatibility with other Sentencing 
Justifications 
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1991 required sentences to be a proportionate response to the 
seriousness of the offence. To facilitate this, the courts were required to measure the gravity 
of the offence by reference to various offence-related aggravating and mitigating factors, and 
to identify and impose a proportionate sentence on this basis, applying the custodial and 
community sentence thresholds provided in the Act.  
 
This study has aimed to understand the courts’ construction of proportionality in relation to 
theft. It has also considered the extent to which the courts are willing to adopt sentencing 
philosophies other than proportionality and has explored the extent to which these are 
reconcilable with proportionality. The thesis offers three principal related findings regarding 
its aims.  
 
Firstly, as indicated in Chapter Seven, the courts usually pay high regard to the seriousness 
of the offence when passing sentence. In measuring offence seriousness, only a small 
number of factors appear to individually affect the sentence imposed (high value of goods, 
breach of trust, significant related damage and offending in breach of prison licence 
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conditions). Elsewhere, other factors may be influential, but less so. Often it is a cocktail of 
factors which collectively affect the sentence decision, rather than one factor determining the 
sentence. It seems that the courts give greater regard to the harm element over the offender’s 
culpability in their construction of seriousness perhaps because theft will almost inevitably 
involve a high degree of culpability, requiring the offender to act both intentionally and 
dishonestly. 
 
Secondly, in determining sentence severity, there is some evidence to suggest the courts 
have adopted a system which defies the sentence hierarchy of the 1991 and 2003 Criminal 
Justice Acts. Rather than basing sentence severity on sentence type alone, the courts have 
regard to the quantum of that sentence. This is more in line with notions of sentence 
interchangability and beliefs that sentences from different bands may be of equivalent 
severity. The 1991 Act identified custodial and community sentence thresholds, although 
these may not be conducive to proportionality. The impact of any given sentence will vary 
depending on the character and circumstances of the offender. For example, a community 
sentence might have a more punitive effect on an offender than a custodial sentence. The 
sample included cases where the sentence appeared to have been stretched from one 
category to another. The courts appeared to do this because they were keen to prevent 
further offending. Arguably however, these sentences were not necessarily disproportionate.  
 
The quest for perfection in proportionality is elusive: there will rarely (if ever) be a single 
proportionate sentence for an offence. Deciding whether a sentence is proportionate or not is 
an art rather than a science, and the measurement of offence seriousness is ultimately 
subjective, although there are some elements of objectivity. Identifying which factors 
aggravate or mitigate the seriousness of an offence may be relatively uncontentious. What is 
more subjective is determining the weight to be ascribed to each factor and, consequently, 
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how each factor may impact on the sentence. Additionally, the sentence thresholds 
contained in the 1991 and 2003 Acts are similarly open to subjective interpretation. Whilst 
some may interpret the threshold tests quite strictly, thereby constructing high thresholds, 
others may not.  
 
This subjectivity of proportionality extends beyond the courts. The comments made here, 
particularly in Chapter Eight, are also based on a subjective interpretation of the data, 
offence seriousness and the thresholds. One cannot therefore always be certain that an 
apparently severe or lenient sentence was in fact disproportionate. Since it was not possible 
to interview the sentencers for each case in the sample, one cannot be sure that all sentencers 
agree in their construction of proportionality. For example, whilst all sentencers may regard 
a break in offending as a mitigating factor, there may be different views as to how long the 
break should be, and the extent to which it is mitigating.  
 
The third conclusion to be drawn from the findings relates to the reconciliation of 
proportionality and crime reduction aims. When sentencing under the 1991 Act, there is 
evidence of the courts adopting a crime reduction even though there was no statutory 
obligation to do so. Whilst this can be compatible with proportionality, in other cases it may 
not be possible to reconcile the two, leading to the courts to adopt either a proportionately 
non-crime reductive sentence or a disproportionately crime reductive sentence.  
 
There are occasions however when the courts seem to make little or no attempt to pass a 
proportionate sentence - the most obvious example of this is when sentencing persistent 
offenders whom the courts seem eager to dissuade from further offending through 




One dimension of the subjective nature of proportionality is illustrated in the debate about 
(i) whether it should be construed purely by reference to offence characteristics or whether it 
should also have regard to offender characteristics, and also (ii) what constitutes offence 
characteristics. As to (i) the 1991 Act clearly indicated that proportionality should be 
confined to offence characteristics, but the sample included cases which appeared to give 
significance to the offender’s criminal record, and that is usually regarded as an offender 
characteristic. However, one should not be too quick to conclude that the sentence in these 
cases was disproportionate. First, the elasticity of proportionality may enable a sentence to 
be stretched from one category to another due to subjectivity in measurement of both 
offence seriousness and sentence severity. Second, though somewhat tenuously, it is 
arguable that the offender’s record might be construed as an offence characteristic; an 
offender who has no previous convictions might argue that his theft was an abnormal1 
transgression into criminality for which the law should show some tolerance. The problem 
with this argument is that it is difficult to apply the same principle to those offenders who 
have previous convictions. Whilst offenders who have not offended for some time can argue 
that the break in their offending shows that the latest theft is untypical of their current 
behaviour, those for whom there is no break in offending clearly cannot rely on this 
principle. 
 
As to (ii), it is arguable that, for example, where (as occurred in some cases in the sample) an 
offender who had previously been given a community sentence such as a CRO then 
commits a theft before the expiration of that order, the fact that the CRO was still in force 
should be treated as a characteristic of the theft because it is a circumstance in which the 
theft was committed. Thus the court should take it into account when passing sentence for 
                                                          
1 Obviously, this is not to imply any mental or psychiatric abnormality. Rather, the implication is that the theft was not an 
example of the way in which the offender normally behaves.  
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the theft as an aggravating factor. Alternatively (and as occurred in the sample) the courts 
may decide to pass a sentence for the theft which enables the previous order to continue, so 
that ultimately the offender faces no additional punishment for the (de facto) breach. The 
sentence which is passed for the theft (perhaps a conditional discharge) prima facie appears 
to be disproportionately lenient but the court may be more concerned with preventing 
reoffending through rehabilitation and continues the CRO for that purpose. 
 
Whilst a lack of previous convictions may be mitigating, Chapter Eight demonstrated that 
the courts may also regard a lengthy criminal history as aggravating.2 But record should not 
aggravate the sentence according to the proportionality principle.3 It appears, therefore, that 
the courts are probably not just stretching proportionality but ignoring it by imposing 
disproportionately tough sentences for some other reason (i.e. crime reduction). As 
demonstrated in both Chapters Seven and Eight, a pattern of offending may inform the 
sentencing approach, with the courts paying higher regard of the need to rehabilitate, deter 
or incapacitate a recidivist. It is possible that the courts view repeat offenders as posing a 
greater risk of reoffending and accordingly impose more punitive sentences in an effort to 
reduce this risk. 
 
 
9.2 Young Offenders 
 
For young offenders, the dominant statutory aim is crime prevention whilst upholding the 
welfare of the child. In some cases, there was evidence of the courts attaching such weight to 
this that they appear to impose disproportionately lenient (for example, the use of referral 
                                                          
2 See section 8.1.2.2 
3 Although Youngjae Lee has recently claimed that a sentence enhancement is justifiable under a desert scheme as a 
second offence, in addition to being a wrong in itself, also represents a failure of the offender to take steps to prevent 
himself from committing further crime. This omission accordingly justifies a recidivist premium. See Lee (2010).  
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orders for offenders with one previous conviction, or first-time offenders whose crimes 
could justify the imposition of a custodial sentence) or severe (for example, the imposition of 
supervision orders and detention and training orders for non-serious offences committed by 
young offenders with lengthy records) sentences. Conversely, it was rare of the courts to 
uphold proportionality to the exclusion of crime prevention and the offender’s welfare. That 
is not to say that proportionality has no place in youth justice. The mandatory referral order 
for first-time offenders should only be imposed where the seriousness of the offence does 
not lead the court to consider imposing a detention and training order or absolute discharge. 
But it appears the courts impose a particularly high custody threshold in relation to young 
offenders. It is arguable that in doing so the courts impose disproportionately lenient 
sentences out of a desire to prevent crime and uphold the welfare of the young offender.  
 
 
9.3 Implications of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 
It appears that the 2003 Act did not depart so greatly from the 1991 Act as might have 
initially seemed. Whilst the 2003 Act makes express reference to the need for courts to have 
regard to crime reduction justifications, these are clearly compatible with proportionality. 
The sample contains evidence of crime prevention justifications being used by the courts 
under the 1991 Act’s proportionality-based framework. Whilst the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
states that prior record can be a source of aggravation, the sample suggests it could play a 
similar role under the 1991 Act. Therefore, the 2003 Act may not have made any significant 
difference to the sentencing of theft.  
 
Although the Act appears prima facie to have moved away somewhat from a proportionality-
based framework by reference to crime reduction aims and the greater reliance on previous 
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convictions in determining sentence, other changes brought about under the Act have 
arguably moved further toward proportionality than before. The previously wide range of 
community sentences (along with the diversity of their punitiveness) have now been 
narrowed into three ranges (i.e. low, medium and high-level community sentences), which 
feature prominently in the SGC’s guidelines. The various community sentence requirements 
have been graduated according to their punitiveness, which may have enabled the courts to 
more clearly identify those community sentence requirements which would be 
proportionate to the offence.  
 
With all of this in mind, it appears that comparable cases dealt with under the 2003 Act 
would not result in the imposition of different sentences to those imposed under the 1991 
Act.4 Fundamentally, the decision to impose a custodial or community-based sentence must 
still be made on the ground of offence seriousness. Having identified the appropriate 
sentence band, the court may then move to consider the desirability of seeking to, for 
example, reform the offender through the imposition of a drug rehabilitation or supervision 
requirement attached to a community sentence. To safeguard against the imposition of 
disproportionate sentencing, the menu of purposes provided by the 2003 Act should be a 
secondary consideration, taken into account only after the court has identified the sentence 




                                                          
4 Despite the fact that the CJA 2003 appeared to alter significantly the approach taken to previous convictions at 
sentencing, Wasik (2010) claims that the impression from everyday practice is that the 2003 Act has had very little impact 
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